No, the NCAA's rule is illegal. The Court decided that limiting education-related benefits harms athletes without a good enough reason. While keeping sports 'amateur' might be a valid goal, the NCAA can still do that without blocking schools from offering things like grad school scholarships, tutoring, or paid internships. The Court reasoned that giving an athlete a scholarship for a master's degree makes them look more like a student, not less, so the NCAA's strict rule was unnecessary and anti-competitive.

Yes, I completely agree, and I want to add that the NCAA's entire system of not paying athletes is on very thin ice legally. In almost any other industry, it would be a huge crime for all the employers to get together and agree to cap worker pay. The NCAA's excuse that 'not paying players is our product' doesn't make sense. The NCAA is not above the law.

Yes, the NCAA's limits on education benefits are illegal. The limits are too strict and don't have a good reason that helps competition. The NCAA doesn't get special treatment. Its limits have to be looked at closely to see if they hurt competition. The lower court did this and found the education benefit limits are not justified. The court's order lets the NCAA suggest new definitions and rules for education benefits as long as they follow antitrust law.

I agree with the Court’s decision to block the NCAA rule that limits extra education benefits because it unfairly keeps student‐athletes from earning the pay a competitive market would offer. I write separately to point out that, even though the main decision is correct, I feel we should also look at other rules the NCAA uses since they might also hurt fair competition. In other words, while I support the decision based on solid antitrust principles, I think there’s more to examine about how the NCAA runs its business.

Yes. The NCAA's rules limiting education-related benefits for student-athletes violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act because they are an unreasonable restraint of trade. The Court applied a full rule of reason analysis, rejecting the NCAA's request for a more deferential 'quick look' review. While acknowledging the NCAA's procompetitive justification—that its rules preserve consumer demand for the unique product of amateur college sports—the Court found that this goal could be achieved through substantially less restrictive means. The district court correctly found that enjoining the NCAA's limits on education-related benefits (such as scholarships for graduate school, payments for academic tutoring, and paid internships) would not blur the distinction between college and professional sports. The Court also dismissed the NCAA's reliance on dicta from *NCAA v. Board of Regents*, stating that it did not grant the NCAA a blanket antitrust exemption for its compensation rules, especially given how much the market for college sports has changed since 1984.

Yes. Justice Kavanaugh joined the majority in full but wrote separately to emphasize that the Court's reasoning raises serious questions about the legality of the NCAA's remaining compensation rules. He argued that the NCAA's business model of price-fixing student-athlete labor would be 'flatly illegal in almost any other industry in America.' He characterized the NCAA's primary defense—that amateurism is the product—as circular and unpersuasive, stating that a monopsony cannot launder its price-fixing of labor by calling it product definition. He concluded forcefully that 'The NCAA is not above the law.'

Yes, the district court's injunction is consistent with established antitrust principles because the NCAA's restrictions on education-related benefits are unduly restrictive and do not serve a procompetitive purpose that justifies their anticompetitive effects. The NCAA is not entitled to a special exemption from antitrust scrutiny. Its restrictions must be analyzed under the rule of reason to determine if they harm competition. The district court properly applied this analysis and found the restrictions on education-related benefits cannot be justified. The injunction appropriately allows the NCAA to propose definitions and rules regarding these benefits consistent with antitrust law.

I concur in the Court’s judgment affirming the district court’s injunction against the NCAA’s restrictions on education‐related benefits because the NCAA’s practices unreasonably suppress compensation in a market where student‐athletes have no alternative. However, while I join the outcome, I differ from the majority by emphasizing that our analysis should not stop with education‐related benefits alone; other compensation rules, though not at issue today, warrant further scrutiny. I write separately to note that a more complete review of the NCAA’s broader regulatory framework is needed to ensure that all measures which limit competition are addressed appropriately. I agree with the result because applying the traditional rule of reason here is both necessary and proper, even as I signal caution regarding the full scope of the NCAA’s practices.

NCAA v. Alston

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