Navarro v. Block
1995 WL 611512, 72 F.3d 712 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
A municipality may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a custom that denies equal protection, even if facially neutral and without explicit proof of gender-based discriminatory intent, if there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of such a custom and it fails the rational basis test.
Facts:
- On August 27, 1989, Maria Navarro was celebrating her birthday at her East Los Angeles home when she received a phone call from her estranged husband Raymond Navarro’s brother, warning her that Raymond was on his way to kill her and others present.
- Maria immediately dialed 911, informed the dispatcher of the warning, expressed her belief that Raymond was coming to kill her, and mentioned an existing restraining order.
- The 911 dispatcher told Maria that they could not send a unit to wait at her house, advising her to call back if Raymond arrived.
- Approximately fifteen minutes after Maria’s 911 call, Raymond Navarro entered her home through the rear, where he shot and killed Maria and four other people, and injured two others.
Procedural Posture:
- On July 13, 1990, Denise Navarro and other relatives of Maria Navarro (the Navarros) filed an action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against Los Angeles County and the Sheriff of Los Angeles County.
- The Navarros claimed that the Sheriff's Department had a policy and custom of not classifying domestic violence 911 calls as an 'emergency,' which discriminated against abused women and violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
- The Navarros also claimed a policy of inadequate assistance to child victims of domestic violence and residents of minority neighborhoods, and failure to adequately train dispatchers, amounting to deliberate indifference.
- On May 27, 1993, the defendants (Los Angeles County and the Sheriff) filed a motion for summary judgment.
- On January 4, 1994, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims, concluding the Navarros failed to offer evidence of discriminatory policy/customs or deliberate indifference.
- The Navarros then appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with the County and Sheriff as appellees.
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Issue:
Does a genuine issue of material fact exist as to whether Los Angeles County had an unconstitutional custom of classifying 911 domestic violence calls differently from non-domestic violence calls, thereby denying equal protection, even without direct evidence of gender-based discriminatory intent, such that summary judgment for the County was improper?
Opinions:
Majority - Pregerson, Circuit Judge
Yes, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Los Angeles County's custom of treating domestic violence 911 calls differently, making summary judgment for the County improper on the equal protection claim. The court found that under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, a municipality can be liable for constitutional deprivations pursuant to governmental 'custom,' even if not formally approved. Here, the deposition testimony of 911 dispatcher Helen Pena, stating it was the practice of the Sheriff's Department not to classify domestic violence 911 calls as 'emergency procedure' calls in 1989, provided sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of such a custom. While the Navarros failed to present evidence of discriminatory intent against women, which is typically required for gender-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause as established in Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., their equal protection claim could still survive if the classification (domestic violence vs. non-domestic violence) fails the rational basis test. The rational basis standard, while limited, is not 'toothless,' and the Navarros could potentially prove that the County's custom lacked a rational relation to a legitimate governmental objective. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the deliberate indifference claim arising from failure to train, finding the Navarros offered no evidence to support it or refute testimony of training received.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the evidentiary threshold for establishing a 'custom' under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, allowing a single dispatcher's testimony about department practice to create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to withstand summary judgment. It also demonstrates that even without direct proof of discriminatory intent for a facially neutral policy or custom, an Equal Protection claim can proceed under the rational basis test, emphasizing that this test is not merely perfunctory. The ruling encourages victims of systemic discrimination to challenge practices that, while not explicitly targeting a protected class, may still lack a rational governmental purpose. Future cases may rely on this precedent to argue against summary judgment in similar circumstances where evidence of an informal, yet widespread, discriminatory practice exists.
