Navarro Pomares v. Pfizer Corporation
261 F.3d 90, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 18745, 7 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 321 (2001)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
When determining if an adult child's impairment constitutes a 'disability' under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), courts must apply a flexible, case-by-case balancing test that does not rigidly require the impairment to be long-term or permanent. The durational element, while relevant, is less significant than in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) due to the FMLA's different statutory purpose and more limited relief.
Facts:
- Gladys Navarro Pomares (Navarro) was employed by Pfizer Corporation as a secretary.
- On October 14, 1997, Navarro requested unpaid leave to travel to Germany and care for her adult daughter, Gladys Hernandez.
- Navarro provided Pfizer with a physician's note stating that Hernandez was in her 36th week of pregnancy, had high blood pressure, and was prescribed bed rest, rendering her unable to care for her other children.
- Pfizer denied Navarro's request for leave.
- On October 25, 1997, Navarro traveled to Germany despite the denial.
- Pfizer sent correspondence directing her to return to work, but she remained with her daughter.
- Pfizer subsequently terminated Navarro's employment.
Procedural Posture:
- Gladys Navarro Pomares sued Pfizer Corporation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico for violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act.
- Pfizer filed a motion for summary judgment.
- The district court granted Pfizer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Navarro's daughter did not have a 'disability' under the FMLA because her condition was a temporary, non-chronic impairment.
- Navarro, as the appellant, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a severe but temporary, non-chronic impairment, such as high blood pressure during pregnancy, qualify as a 'disability' under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) for the purpose of an employee taking leave to care for an adult child who is incapable of self-care?
Opinions:
Majority - Selya, Circuit Judge
Yes, a severe but temporary impairment can qualify as a 'disability' under the FMLA. The FMLA allows leave to care for an adult child who is incapable of self-care because of a disability, and the implementing regulations borrow the definition of disability from the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). However, the district court erred by giving Chevron deference to an EEOC interpretive guidance document—created for the ADA—which suggests that temporary impairments are not disabilities. This guidance is not entitled to such deference in the FMLA context because the EEOC lacks rulemaking authority for the FMLA; it is only entitled to Skidmore deference, meaning it is respected only to the extent it is persuasive. The guidance is unpersuasive here because the ADA and FMLA have divergent aims; the ADA involves ongoing accommodations for long-term conditions, while the FMLA provides a more limited benefit of up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave for more immediate family needs. Therefore, the definition of disability must be applied flexibly, through a case-by-case balancing of factors (severity, duration, long-term impact) where duration is not a dispositive element. A jury could reasonably find that the daughter's severe, pregnancy-induced high blood pressure, which required bed rest, substantially limited the major life activity of self-care, thus qualifying as a disability for FMLA purposes.
Dissenting - Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge
No, a temporary, non-chronic impairment does not qualify as a 'disability' under the FMLA. Congress deliberately imposed a higher standard for leave to care for adult children by requiring a 'disability,' a limitation not applied to minor children, spouses, or parents. This was intended to restrict leave to special circumstances where an adult child remains dependent. The Secretary of Labor reasonably effectuated this intent by adopting the established ADA definition of disability, which incorporates a durational component. The majority's decision to accept the Secretary's adoption of the EEOC's regulations but reject the EEOC's own interpretation of those regulations is illogical. By creating a new, relaxed 'balancing' test that minimizes the duration factor, the majority effectively reads the 'disability' requirement out of the statute, destabilizing the law and ignoring clear congressional intent. Navarro presented no evidence that her daughter's condition would have any long-term impact, and thus, under a proper application of the ADA standard, summary judgment for the employer was correct.
Analysis:
This case is a significant first-impression ruling at the federal appellate level that distinguishes the application of the term 'disability' between the ADA and the FMLA. It establishes that the analysis for FMLA purposes must be more flexible and context-sensitive, specifically de-emphasizing the durational requirement that is often central to ADA claims. This decision broadens the scope of FMLA protection for employees needing to care for adult children with severe but temporary medical conditions, creating a more lenient standard than a direct application of ADA precedent would suggest.
