Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
12 ERC 1306, 578 F.2d 1341 (1978)
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Rule of Law:
A prospective intervenor has a right to intervene in an action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) if it claims a practical, though not necessarily direct, interest that may be impaired by the disposition of the action, and this interest is not adequately represented by an existing party, with the burden to show inadequacy being minimal.
Facts:
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is authorized by the Atomic Energy Act to license uranium mills.
- The NRC entered into an agreement with New Mexico, delegating the authority to issue these licenses to the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Agency (NMEIA), a state agency.
- The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies like the NRC to prepare Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) for major federal actions, but as a state agency, NMEIA is not required to do so.
- The Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) initiated a lawsuit seeking to require an EIS for licenses issued by NMEIA, arguing the state licensing process still constitutes a "major federal action."
- Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation, one of the largest holders of uranium properties in New Mexico, operates a uranium mill under an NMEIA license and has an application for renewal pending.
- The American Mining Congress is a trade association representing numerous companies with interests in uranium mining and milling.
- United Nuclear Corporation, another uranium company, had just been granted a license by NMEIA when the lawsuit was filed and was an existing party to the case.
Procedural Posture:
- Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and others sued the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Agency (NMEIA) in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico.
- The district court granted United Nuclear Corporation's motion to intervene in the action.
- Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation and the American Mining Congress filed motions to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2), or alternatively, for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b).
- The district court denied both motions, concluding that the movants' interests would be adequately represented by United Nuclear.
- Kerr-McGee and the American Mining Congress (appellants) appealed the denial of their motions to intervene to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a prospective intervenor satisfy the requirements for intervention as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) when its interest is not direct but may be practically impaired by the stare decisis effect of the outcome, and when the existing party representing its interest has similar, but not identical, objectives and potential defenses?
Opinions:
Majority - William E. Doyle
Yes. A prospective intervenor satisfies the requirements for intervention as of right when its interest may be practically impaired and representation may be inadequate. The court held that the interest required for intervention does not have to be a direct interest in the specific transaction at issue; a practical interest that would be impaired by the outcome is sufficient. Here, a ruling requiring environmental impact statements for all New Mexico uranium licenses would have a profound, practical effect on Kerr-McGee and members of the American Mining Congress. The court found this impairment does not require a finding of res judicata; the potential stare decisis effect of a case of first impression is a sufficient practical impairment. Finally, the court determined that representation by United Nuclear 'may be' inadequate. The burden to show inadequacy is minimal. Since United Nuclear had already received its license, its legal position and potential defenses (like laches) differed from Kerr-McGee's, creating a possibility for a divergence of interests, which is sufficient to permit intervention.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies a liberal interpretation of the requirements for intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2). It establishes that a 'significantly protectable interest' can be practical rather than direct, and that impairment can result from the stare decisis effect of a ruling, not just its res judicata effect. The ruling significantly lowers the bar for showing inadequate representation, confirming the 'minimal' burden established in Trbovich and making it easier for parties with similar but not identical interests to an existing litigant to join a case. This precedent encourages broader participation in lawsuits with wide-ranging public and economic policy implications.
