Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train
545 F.2d 320, 9 ERC 1425 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Clean Air Act, if the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency determines that an air pollutant has an adverse effect on public health and originates from numerous or diverse sources, the Administrator has a mandatory, non-discretionary duty to list that pollutant under § 108(a)(1).
Facts:
- Lead is an air pollutant that results from numerous and diverse mobile and stationary sources.
- The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its Administrator, Russell Train, determined that lead has an adverse effect on public health and welfare.
- Despite these findings, Administrator Train declined to place lead on the list of air pollutants under § 108(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act.
- The EPA argued that listing lead was one of several alternative control strategies and that it could choose to control lead by regulating it at the source under other sections of the Act, such as § 211, instead of listing it under § 108.
- By not listing lead, the EPA avoided triggering the mandatory process of setting national ambient air quality standards and requiring states to develop implementation plans with strict deadlines.
Procedural Posture:
- The National Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) filed a citizen suit against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its Administrator, Russell Train, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
- The district court issued an order compelling the Administrator to place lead on the list of air pollutants under § 108(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act within thirty days.
- The EPA and Administrator Train, as appellants, appealed the district court's order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The NRDC was the appellee in the court of appeals.
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Issue:
Does § 108(a)(1)(C) of the Clean Air Act grant the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency discretion to decline listing an air pollutant for which air quality criteria are to be issued, even after determining that the pollutant meets the health and source criteria of § 108(a)(1)(A) and (B)?
Opinions:
Majority - J. Joseph Smith
No. The Clean Air Act does not grant the Administrator such discretion; once a pollutant is found to meet the criteria of subsections (A) and (B) of § 108(a)(1), its listing is mandatory. The court's reasoning is based on the statutory structure, legislative history, and judicial precedent. First, the statute uses the mandatory word "shall," and interpreting subsection (C) as a discretionary third criterion would render the mandatory language of the first two subsections as "mere surplusage" and allow the Administrator to bypass the Act's rigid deadlines at will. Second, the legislative history, including Senate reports, explicitly identifies lead as a pollutant for which Congress expected air quality criteria to be issued, indicating a lack of intended discretion. Congress enacted the 1970 Amendments to force action, not to perpetuate administrative delay. Finally, Supreme Court precedent in cases like Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council emphasizes that the attainment of national air quality standards within strict deadlines is the "heart of the 1970 Amendments," reinforcing the mandatory nature of the listing process that triggers those deadlines.
Analysis:
This decision significantly curtails the EPA's discretion under the Clean Air Act, establishing that the agency's duty to regulate widespread, harmful pollutants is mandatory, not optional. It prevents the executive branch from sidestepping the core regulatory framework of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) in favor of source-specific controls that lack Congressionally mandated timelines. The ruling empowers citizen suits to compel agency action and ensures that the structured, state-federal partnership for air quality management envisioned by Congress cannot be avoided by administrative foot-dragging. This precedent solidifies a textual and purposive reading of the Act, reinforcing the principle that statutory commands like "shall" are to be treated as non-discretionary obligations.
