National Treasury Employees Union v. Donald J. Trump

Majority - Judge PLF

Yes, the President exceeds the authority granted by 5 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(1) when issuing an executive order that excludes a significant portion of the federal workforce from collective bargaining rights if the determination of 'primary function' related to 'national security work' is overly broad and contrary to Congressional intent, especially when clear evidence rebuts the presumption of regularity by indicating retaliatory motives or unrelated policy objectives. The Court first established jurisdiction, finding that the administrative review scheme under the FSLMRS (via the Federal Labor Relations Authority - FLRA) was unavailable to NTEU. The Executive Order itself excluded the affected agencies from FSLMRS coverage, and FLRA precedent demonstrated it would lack jurisdiction over such a challenge, thus precluding meaningful judicial review elsewhere. Next, analyzing NTEU's likelihood of success on the merits for a preliminary injunction, the Court found NTEU had successfully rebutted the 'presumption of regularity,' which typically supports the official acts of public officers. This rebuttal was based on 'clear evidence' that the President acted indifferently to or in contravention of the FSLMRS's purposes. The evidence included: (1) the Executive Order's sweeping scope (two-thirds of the federal workforce) and the accompanying White House Fact Sheet's 'dangerous' characterization of collective bargaining directly contradicted Congress's explicit finding that such rights are 'in the public interest'; (2) the Fact Sheet demonstrated a retaliatory motive against unions for their opposition to the President's agenda, focusing on union behavior rather than the statutory national security criteria; and (3) the OPM Guidance tied the Executive Order to unrelated policy goals of workforce reform and easier employee termination, rather than legitimate national security considerations. With the presumption of regularity rebutted, the Court determined the Executive Order was likely ultra vires (beyond the President's legal authority). The President's interpretation of 'primary function' was overly broad, applying a generalized national security rationale to entire agencies based on minor functions, effectively reading 'primary' out of the statute. Furthermore, the President's interpretation of 'national security work' was excessively broad, encompassing activities like tax collection and food supply management. Citing Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956), the Court reiterated that 'national security' must be narrowly construed to mean activities 'directly concerned with the protection of the Nation from internal subversion or foreign aggression,' not those that merely impact 'the general welfare.' This broad interpretation risked allowing the statutory exception to 'swallow the rule' of broad collective bargaining rights. The Court also found NTEU would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. This harm included a significant and immeasurable loss of bargaining power due to the removal of rights for 65.9% of its represented employees, causing waning employee interest and hindering the union's primary mission. Financial harm from an estimated $25 million loss in dues revenue (half its annual budget), threatening its 'very existence,' also constituted irreparable injury. These harms were deemed ongoing and not speculative or easily remediable. Finally, the balance of equities and public interest weighed in favor of the injunction. Congress explicitly found collective bargaining to be 'in the public interest,' and there is a substantial public interest in ensuring executive actions adhere to federal law. The Court declined to require a bond, noting NTEU's strong showing of unlawful government action and the existential threat posed to the union, and enjoined Section 2 of the Executive Order in its entirety.