National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo
602 U.S. 175 (2024)
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Rule of Law:
A government official violates the First Amendment by using their regulatory power to coerce private entities into severing business relationships with a disfavored speaker in order to punish or suppress that speaker's advocacy.
Facts:
- The National Rifle Association (NRA) offered affinity insurance programs to its members, which were administered by Lockton Companies, LLC (Lockton) and underwritten by Chubb Limited (Chubb) and Lloyd's of London (Lloyd's).
- Maria Vullo, as Superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS), began an investigation into one of the NRA's insurance programs, Carry Guard, and discovered it violated New York law by covering intentional criminal acts and being promoted by the unlicensed NRA.
- Following the February 2018 Parkland school shooting, Vullo met with senior executives at Lloyd's, where she expressed her personal support for gun control.
- During the meeting, Vullo allegedly told the Lloyd's executives that DFS would be "less interested in pursuing" unrelated regulatory infractions if Lloyd's agreed to cease providing insurance to the NRA and other gun advocacy groups.
- On April 19, 2018, Vullo issued official "Guidance Letters" encouraging DFS-regulated entities to evaluate their "reputational risks" from dealing with the NRA and similar "gun promotion organizations."
- On the same day, Vullo and Governor Andrew Cuomo issued a joint press release urging all banks and insurance companies in New York to discontinue any arrangements with the NRA.
- In the wake of these actions, Lockton, Chubb, and Lloyd's all publicly announced they were cutting ties with the NRA and later entered into consent decrees with DFS, agreeing to stop underwriting NRA-endorsed programs and pay millions in fines.
Procedural Posture:
- The National Rifle Association (NRA) sued Maria Vullo in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York for alleged First Amendment violations.
- Vullo filed a motion to dismiss the NRA's claims.
- The District Court denied Vullo's motion to dismiss, holding that the NRA had plausibly alleged a claim of unconstitutional coercion.
- Vullo, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Second Circuit reversed the District Court, finding that Vullo's actions constituted permissible government speech and legitimate enforcement, and dismissed the NRA's claim.
- The NRA, as petitioner, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted on the First Amendment question.
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Issue:
Does a government official violate the First Amendment by allegedly using their regulatory authority to coerce private entities into severing business relationships with a political advocacy organization to punish or suppress that organization's protected speech?
Opinions:
Majority - Sotomayor, J.
Yes. A government official violates the First Amendment by wielding their power to coerce private parties in order to punish or suppress disfavored speech. The NRA's complaint plausibly alleges that Vullo engaged in such unconstitutional coercion. Reaffirming the principles of Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, the Court found that a regulator cannot do indirectly what they are barred from doing directly. Vullo's alleged conduct, viewed in its entirety, could be reasonably understood as a coercive threat. Key to this conclusion was the private meeting with Lloyd's, where Vullo allegedly linked leniency on unrelated regulatory violations to the company's willingness to disassociate from the NRA. This implicit threat, combined with the official Guidance Letters and public press release singling out the NRA, plausibly conveyed a message that entities risked adverse regulatory action if they maintained ties with the gun-promotion group. The fact that some of the NRA's insurance products were illegal does not insulate Vullo from First Amendment scrutiny, as her alleged actions were aimed at suppressing the NRA's broader advocacy.
Concurring - Gorsuch, J.
Yes. While joining the Court's opinion in full, this concurrence cautions against the mechanical application of multifactor tests. The Second Circuit erred by taking the complaint's allegations in isolation, a mistake potentially encouraged by a rigid, prong-by-prong analysis. The ultimate inquiry should not be lost in a checklist; rather, courts must assess whether the alleged conduct, when viewed in context as a whole, could be reasonably understood to convey a threat of adverse government action aimed at punishing or suppressing speech.
Concurring - Jackson, J.
Yes. This concurrence agrees with the outcome but emphasizes the distinction between government coercion and the resulting First Amendment violation. Coercion is merely the tool; the constitutional harm must be identified separately, for instance as censorship (prior restraint) or retaliation. This case is an 'awkward fit' for the censorship theory of Bantam Books because it involves business services rather than direct conduits of speech. A First Amendment retaliation framework, which focuses on the official's motive and requires a causal link between that motive and the adverse action, might be a better analytical tool for these facts, and this theory should be explored on remand.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms and strengthens the Bantam Books precedent, clarifying that informal 'jawboning' by powerful regulators can cross the line into unconstitutional coercion. It establishes that a regulator cannot leverage a legitimate enforcement investigation to pressure third parties into punishing a disfavored speaker for its protected speech. The ruling makes it more difficult for officials to use their regulatory power to achieve ideological goals by targeting the business relationships of advocacy groups, and it provides a clearer path for such groups to survive motions to dismiss by alleging a holistic campaign of coercive threats.
