National Mining Association v. United States Environmental Protection Agency
313 U.S. App. D.C. 363, 59 F.3d 1351 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has broad discretion under the Clean Air Act § 112 to define 'major source' by aggregating all emissions from a contiguous, commonly controlled plant site and to include fugitive emissions without a separate rulemaking, but it may not limit the consideration of emission controls for 'potential to emit' calculations solely to 'federally enforceable' controls without adequately explaining why demonstrably effective state or local controls are excluded.
Facts:
- In 1990, Congress enacted comprehensive amendments to the Clean Air Act, specifically revising § 112 to regulate emissions of hazardous air pollutants through a technology-based scheme.
- Section 112(a)(1) defines a 'major source' as any stationary source or group of stationary sources located within a contiguous area and under common control that emits or has the potential to emit, considering controls, specific aggregate quantities of hazardous air pollutants.
- In July 1992, EPA published an initial list of categories of sources emitting hazardous air pollutants, followed by a schedule for promulgating emission standards in November 1993.
- In August 1993, EPA proposed a rule codifying general procedures and criteria for implementing these emission standards.
- On March 16, 1994, EPA promulgated a final rule adopting these general provisions, which implemented § 112(a)(1)'s definition of 'major source' to include aggregation of all emissions from contiguous, commonly controlled plant sites, the inclusion of fugitive emissions, and the requirement that only 'federally enforceable' controls could reduce a source's 'potential to emit'.
- General Electric Company and trade associations including the National Mining Association, American Forest and Paper Association, Chemical Manufacturers Association, and American Petroleum Institute challenged these three aspects of EPA's rule.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1990, Congress revised § 112 of the Clean Air Act as part of a comprehensive overhaul.
- In July 1992, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published an initial list of source categories for hazardous air pollutants.
- In August 1993, EPA proposed a rule to codify general procedures and criteria for implementing hazardous air pollutant emission standards.
- On March 16, 1994, EPA promulgated the final general provisions rule, which included its definitions and interpretations regarding 'major source,' aggregation, fugitive emissions, and 'potential to emit' considering controls.
- General Electric Company, National Mining Association, American Forest and Paper Association, Chemical Manufacturers Association, and American Petroleum Institute filed a petition for review of the EPA's order in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
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Issue:
1. Does the EPA act arbitrarily and capriciously by requiring the aggregation of all hazardous air emissions within a contiguous, commonly controlled plant site, rather than only those from facilities in similar industrial categories, when determining if a source is 'major' under § 112(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act? 2. Does the EPA err by including 'fugitive emissions' in a source’s aggregate emissions without first conducting a separate rulemaking as per § 302(j) of the Clean Air Act? 3. Does the EPA exceed its statutory authority by defining 'potential to emit' such that only 'federally enforceable' emission controls and limitations are considered, thereby excluding demonstrably effective state or local controls, under § 112(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No, the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by aggregating all hazardous air emissions within a contiguous, commonly controlled plant site, nor by including fugitive emissions without a § 302(j) rulemaking, but Yes, the EPA exceeded its statutory authority by limiting consideration of emission controls for 'potential to emit' to only 'federally enforceable' controls without sufficient explanation. Regarding the aggregation of emissions, the court found EPA's interpretation reasonable and consistent with § 112(a)(1), which defines 'major source' as a 'group of stationary sources' meeting specific geographic and control conditions without reference to industrial classifications or SIC Codes. The statutory language itself, read in isolation, nearly compels EPA's broad reading. The court rejected arguments that other provisions of § 112 or Alabama Power Co. v. Costle (a previous case) required a narrower, category-specific definition, noting that § 112(a)(1) expressly allows for a 'group of stationary sources.' Legislative history further supported EPA's view that 'all emissions' from a plant site 'as a whole' should be counted to prevent artificial subdivision. Regarding the inclusion of fugitive emissions, the court concluded that EPA could require their inclusion without a special rulemaking under § 302(j). It distinguished the case from Alabama Power, which was a pre-Chevron decision and involved statutory language in § 302(j) referring to sources that 'directly' emit pollutants, thereby suggesting fugitive emissions were not 'direct.' In contrast, § 112(a)(1) lacks the 'directly' modifier and explicitly refers to a 'group of stationary sources located within a contiguous area and under common control,' which can reasonably be read to include all emissions, fugitive or otherwise. This express provision in § 112(a)(1) satisfies § 302(j)'s '[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided' clause. However, regarding the 'federally enforceable' controls, the court found EPA's definition arbitrary and an overstep of authority. While acknowledging EPA's legitimate interest in considering effective controls, the court stated that EPA failed to explain how limiting creditable controls only to those that are federally enforceable (e.g., approved in a State Implementation Plan) serves the statutory directive to 'consider[] controls' when demonstrably effective state or local controls are disregarded. The court noted that Congress, in drafting § 112, specifically directed EPA to consider controls but conspicuously did not limit them to federally enforceable ones, despite a decade of prior 'skirmishing' on this very issue. EPA's justifications of administrative burden and uniformity were not sufficiently connected to the statute's objective of crediting effective controls and did not justify disregarding all non-federalized, but effective, state or local programs.
Analysis:
This case highlights the deference afforded to administrative agencies under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., particularly at Chevron Step Two where statutory language is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is reasonable. However, it also sets a crucial limit on that deference: agency justifications for a particular interpretation must genuinely align with the statutory objectives. Here, EPA's policy on 'federally enforceable' controls, while potentially serving legitimate administrative interests, was deemed insufficiently explained in relation to the statutory purpose of considering effective emission controls. This ruling underscores that agencies cannot impose conditions unrelated to the statute's core aims, even when the statute is silent on specifics, particularly when the agency has a history of vacillation on the issue.
