National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop
59 L. Ed. 2d 533, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 75, 440 U.S. 490 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
In the absence of a clear, affirmative expression of congressional intent, federal statutes will not be construed in a manner that would create a significant risk of infringing upon the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, such as by granting the National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools.
Facts:
- The Catholic Bishop of Chicago operates two high schools, Quigley North and Quigley South, which are considered 'minor seminaries' for students who may pursue the priesthood.
- The Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc. operates five high schools.
- Both school systems provide a standard college-preparatory secular curriculum but are fundamentally oriented towards the tenets of the Roman Catholic faith.
- The mission of these schools is to integrate religious doctrine into the educational experience, and religious instruction is a mandatory part of the curriculum.
- The schools employ lay teachers, who are not members of religious orders, to provide instruction.
- Union organizations sought to be certified as the collective bargaining representatives for the lay teachers employed at these schools.
Procedural Posture:
- Unions filed representation petitions with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to represent lay teachers at schools operated by the Catholic Bishop of Chicago and the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend.
- The NLRB asserted jurisdiction over the schools and ordered representation elections.
- The unions won the elections and were certified as the exclusive bargaining representatives.
- The schools refused to recognize or bargain with the unions, leading the unions to file unfair labor practice complaints with the NLRB.
- The NLRB granted summary judgment against the schools, found they had committed unfair labor practices, and ordered them to bargain.
- The schools (petitioners) sought review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, while the NLRB (respondent) cross-petitioned to enforce its order.
- The Court of Appeals denied enforcement of the NLRB's orders, holding that the Board's exercise of jurisdiction violated the First Amendment.
- The NLRB (petitioner) was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the National Labor Relations Act grant the National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction over lay teachers employed by church-operated schools that teach both religious and secular subjects?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Burger
No. The National Labor Relations Act does not grant the National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools. Applying the canon of constitutional avoidance, the Court held that exercising such jurisdiction would create a significant risk of excessive government entanglement with religion, thus raising serious questions under the First Amendment. Teachers in parochial schools play a unique and critical role in fulfilling the school's religious mission, making their duties inseparable from religious doctrine. The NLRB's involvement in resolving unfair labor practice disputes or defining 'terms and conditions of employment' would inevitably require inquiry into the religious motivations of the school administration, infringing on the school's First Amendment rights. Given these serious constitutional risks, the Court requires a 'clear expression of an affirmative intention of Congress' to confer such jurisdiction, and found no such expression in the NLRA's text or legislative history.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The National Labor Relations Act does grant jurisdiction over lay teachers in church-operated schools because the Act's plain language covers all employers not within its specific, enumerated exceptions. The majority invents a new, overly stringent canon of statutory construction requiring an 'affirmative expression' of congressional intent, which is a departure from the traditional rule of adopting any 'fairly possible' construction to avoid a constitutional question. The legislative history, particularly Congress's rejection of a broad exemption for religious and educational institutions in the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments, demonstrates a clear intent to include such employers. By refusing to apply the statute as written, the Court is impermissibly substituting its own policy judgment for that of Congress and avoiding a constitutional question it is obligated to decide.
Analysis:
This decision established a significant principle of statutory interpretation, often called the 'Catholic Bishop canon' of avoidance. It creates a heightened 'clear statement rule' requiring an explicit expression of congressional intent before a general regulatory statute is applied to religious institutions in a way that raises serious First Amendment questions. This substantially shields religious organizations from federal regulation by placing the burden on Congress to legislate with specificity. The case narrowed the NLRB's jurisdiction and has influenced subsequent judicial analyses of the application of other federal laws, like anti-discrimination statutes, to religious employers.
