Nathans v. Offerman
922 F. Supp. 2d 271, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15928, 2013 WL 452665 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
An employer may be vicariously liable under respondeat superior for an employee's intentional torts if the conduct, though unauthorized, occurs within the scope of employment, is foreseeable in the competitive context, and is at least in part motivated by a purpose to serve the employer. However, co-participants in team contact sports are only liable for reckless or intentional conduct, not mere negligence, and an employer cannot be held vicariously liable for punitive damages.
Facts:
- In August 2007, Jose Offerman, a player for the Long Island Ducks, was the lead-off hitter against Johnathan Nathans, a catcher for the Bridgeport Bluefish, during a professional baseball game.
- In the first inning, Offerman hit a home run against Bluefish pitcher Matt Beech.
- In the second inning, Beech threw a cut fastball that struck Offerman on the left calf.
- Instead of taking his base, Offerman charged the pitcher's mound with his baseball bat in hand.
- Johnathan Nathans, the Bluefish catcher, chased Offerman toward the middle of the infield as both benches cleared.
- During the ensuing melee, Offerman struck Nathans in the head with his bat.
- Offerman was ejected from the game, arrested on assault charges, and indefinitely suspended by the league, never playing for the Ducks again.
Procedural Posture:
- Johnathan Nathans filed an action in federal district court against Jose Offerman and the Long Island Ducks Professional Baseball Club, LLC, alleging assault and battery, negligence, and reckless assault and battery.
- The Long Island Ducks filed a motion for summary judgment in its favor against plaintiff Nathans on all claims against it.
- The Long Island Ducks also moved for summary judgment against the intervening plaintiff Baseball and Sports Associates, LLC.
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Issue:
1. Does a professional baseball player act within the scope of his employment when he charges the pitcher's mound with a bat and strikes an opposing catcher during a game, potentially making his team vicariously liable for assault and battery under respondeat superior? 2. Does the standard of care requiring reckless or intentional conduct for co-participants in team contact sports shield a professional baseball player and his club from liability for assault and battery claims arising from such an incident? 3. Can an employer be held vicariously liable for punitive damages based on an employee's intentional torts?
Opinions:
Majority - Warren W. Eginton
1. No, the court cannot determine as a matter of law that Offerman's conduct was outside the scope of his employment for the purpose of vicarious liability under respondeat superior. The court reasoned that an employer is vicariously liable for compensatory damages from an employee's tortious conduct occurring during the course of employment and in furtherance of the employer's business. While typically a question of fact, a servant's digression can be so clear-cut that it becomes a matter of law. However, Connecticut courts distinguish between misguided efforts in furtherance of business (liability) and abandonment of business (no liability). The court applies a three-part test: (1) primarily within employer’s authorized time and space; (2) of the type employee is employed to perform; and (3) motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer. The court emphasized foreseeability, citing the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 245, which states a master is liable for unauthorized tortious harm if the act was not unexpectable given the servant's duties, especially for acts in 'excess of zeal in competition' or 'fighting arising out of a dispute connected with his work.' Charging the mound after being hit by a pitch is not 'unexpected' in professional baseball. The court concluded that Offerman’s alleged digression was not so clear-cut to be decided as a matter of law, leaving it for the trier of fact. 2. No, the standard of care for co-participants in team contact sports does not shield the Ducks or Offerman from liability for assault and battery. The court noted that Connecticut law requires a standard of care imposing a legal duty to refrain from reckless or intentional conduct between co-participants in team contact sports; mere negligence is insufficient. However, the doctrine of 'transferred intent' applies to assault and battery actions. An act intended to cause bodily injury to one person is actionable by another who is in fact injured. Thus, Offerman's intent to strike the pitcher, Matt Beech, transfers to Nathans, validating the assault and battery claims. 3. No, an employer cannot be held vicariously liable for punitive damages. The court cited Matthiessen v. Vanech, establishing that under Connecticut law, there is no vicarious liability for punitive damages.
Analysis:
This case highlights the complexities of applying respondeat superior in unique employment contexts, particularly professional sports, where intense competition can lead to foreseeable, albeit unauthorized, employee misconduct. The court's emphasis on foreseeability and the 'excess of zeal' factor from the Restatement provides important guidance for determining the scope of employment. Furthermore, the decision reinforces the application of the 'reckless or intentional conduct' standard for co-participant liability in contact sports while simultaneously demonstrating how the doctrine of 'transferred intent' can expand liability to unintended victims. It also definitively limits an employer's vicarious liability to compensatory damages under Connecticut law, excluding punitive damages.
