Nathan E.Brooks v. Board of Professional Responsibility
578 S.W.3d 421 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
Requiring a suspended attorney to pay an advance cost deposit for a reinstatement proceeding, as mandated by a state supreme court rule, does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the attorney is indigent, because the practice of law is a privilege, not a fundamental right.
Facts:
- In 1998, attorney Nathan E. Brooks consented to a two-year suspension of his law license for multiple disciplinary violations.
- The consent order required Brooks to pay over $10,000 in restitution and costs as a condition for reinstatement.
- In 2017, Brooks filed a petition to reinstate his law license after nearly two decades of suspension.
- At the time of his 2017 filing, Brooks was indigent.
- Instead of paying the advance cost deposit required by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, Brooks submitted a pauper's oath and an affidavit of indigency.
Procedural Posture:
- Nathan E. Brooks filed a petition for reinstatement of his law license with the Board of Professional Responsibility, substituting a pauper's oath for the required cost deposit.
- Disciplinary Counsel for the Board filed a motion to dismiss Brooks' petition for failure to pay the advance cost deposit.
- A hearing panel for the Board of Professional Responsibility granted the motion and dismissed the petition without prejudice.
- Brooks appealed the hearing panel's decision to the Hamilton County Chancery Court, which is a state trial court.
- The Chancery Court affirmed the hearing panel's dismissal.
- Brooks then appealed as of right from the Chancery Court to the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
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Issue:
Does requiring a suspended, indigent attorney to pay an advance cost deposit to petition for reinstatement, as mandated by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Holly Kirby, J.
No, requiring a suspended, indigent attorney to pay an advance cost deposit for reinstatement proceedings does not violate the Due Process Clause. The court's inherent authority to regulate the legal profession allows it to establish specific procedural rules for attorney discipline that are not superseded by general civil statutes, such as those permitting pauper's oaths. Substantively, the practice of law is a privilege, not a fundamental right, and thus the cost requirement does not trigger heightened due process scrutiny. Procedurally, the rule reflects a rational policy decision to shift the financial burden of reinstatement proceedings onto the attorney whose misconduct necessitated them, rather than onto the general body of practicing lawyers, which is not a denial of a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Concurring - Sharon G. Lee, J.
Yes, the decision to dismiss the petition is correct, but the majority's reasoning is unnecessarily expansive. The court should have dismissed Brooks' due process claim on the grounds that it was inadequately briefed and lacked merit, as the precedent he cited (Boddie v. Connecticut) is clearly distinguishable because a law license is a privilege, not a fundamental right. It was improper for the court to engage in a lengthy, detailed procedural due process analysis that went far beyond the arguments presented by the appellant, as it is not the court's role to construct arguments for the parties.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle of the judiciary's inherent and exclusive power to regulate the legal profession, insulating its disciplinary rules from general legislative enactments. It distinguishes the privilege of practicing law from fundamental constitutional rights, thereby setting a precedent that financial barriers to license reinstatement for indigent attorneys are subject to a lower standard of judicial review. The ruling reinforces the policy of placing the financial onus of disciplinary and reinstatement proceedings directly on the attorney whose misconduct created the costs, thereby protecting the resources of the state's other licensed attorneys. This case will likely be cited to uphold cost-bearing requirements in other professional licensing contexts.
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