No. The copyright law was written for humans, using words like 'children' and 'widow' that don't apply to animals. For an animal to be able to sue, the law would need a special sentence saying 'animals have the right to sue for copyright.' Since our current law doesn't have that sentence, Naruto cannot sue.

I agree the monkey loses, but for a bigger reason: the court shouldn't have heard this case at all. The animal rights group, PETA, doesn't have the legal authority to sue on the monkey's behalf. Since no one with the proper right to sue brought the case, the court has no power to make a decision.

No, Naruto can't sue for copyright. Even though monkeys might be able to go to court for some reasons, they can't sue for copyright. This is because the law about copyrights doesn't say anything about animals being able to own copyrights or sue for them. The law talks about things like children and widows, which only apply to humans. So, we have to say that Naruto can't sue in this case.

I agree that Naruto can't sue, but for a different reason. I think the court shouldn't even be looking at this case at all. PETA, the group trying to speak for Naruto, isn't allowed to do that. Only in very special cases can someone speak for someone else in court, and this isn't one of those cases. Also, animals have never been allowed to have someone speak for them in court like this before, and we shouldn't start now unless Congress makes a new law saying we can.

No, a monkey does not have statutory standing to sue for copyright infringement under the U.S. Copyright Act. Following the precedent set in Cetacean Community v. Bush, if Congress intends to authorize animals to sue under a statute, it must state so plainly. The Copyright Act does not contain any such plain statement. Furthermore, the text of the Act implies humanity through terms such as 'children,' 'widow,' and 'widower,' which are inapplicable to animals. While the court is bound by precedent to conclude that Naruto has Article III constitutional standing, he lacks statutory standing to bring this specific claim.

No, the case should be dismissed, but on the grounds that the federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear it at all. The majority improperly reached the merits of the statutory standing question. The threshold issue is that People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) failed to establish 'next-friend' standing, which is a jurisdictional requirement, not a procedural one. Because an animal cannot be represented by a 'next friend' and PETA failed to meet the requirements, the court lacks the power to hear the case, and the district court's judgment on the merits should be vacated.

No, Naruto does not have statutory standing under the Copyright Act to file a copyright infringement suit. While Naruto may have Article III standing under the precedent set in Cetacean Community v. Bush, he lacks statutory standing under the Copyright Act because the Act does not expressly authorize animals to file copyright infringement suits. We base this conclusion on our precedent in Cetacean, which established that if an Act of Congress plainly states that animals have statutory standing, then animals have statutory standing. If the statute does not so plainly state, then animals do not have statutory standing. The Copyright Act does not expressly authorize animals to file copyright infringement suits. Additionally, several provisions of the Copyright Act, such as those referring to 'children,' 'widows,' and 'grandchildren,' imply humanity and necessarily exclude animals. Therefore, based on our precedent and the text of the Copyright Act as a whole, we conclude that Naruto lacks statutory standing to sue under the Copyright Act.

I concur that this case must be dismissed, but I write separately because I believe the appeal should be dismissed and the district court's judgment on the merits should be vacated because the federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear this case at all. PETA's failure to meet the requirements for next-friend standing removed jurisdiction of the court. Next-friend standing is jurisdictional, and both the United States Supreme Court and our Circuit have held as such. The majority's conclusion that next-friend standing is nonjurisdictional is not supportable and violates Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. Additionally, animals cannot be represented by a next friend, as there is no historical evidence that animals have ever been granted authority to sue by next friend, and absent an act of Congress, it would be improper to expand this narrow exception to the actual injury requirement of Article III.

Naruto v. David Slater

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