Narney v. Daniels
846 P.2d 347, 115 N.M. 41 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
A municipality can be held directly liable for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of a police officer, even for actions committed off-duty and outside jurisdictional limits, if the employer had prior knowledge of potential danger and it was foreseeable that the officer might misuse their authority to the public's detriment.
Facts:
- David Daniels served in the U.S. Air Force from 1973 to 1977, where superiors noted mental or emotional problems and sent him for psychological evaluation at Wilford Hall, a USAF hospital.
- After his Air Force discharge, Daniels was suspended and later fired from the Luna County Sheriff's Department, and then resigned from the Deming Police Department to avoid termination, after being suspended and required to undergo a psychological evaluation for shooting javelina pigs.
- In August 1982, the City of Roswell Police Department hired Daniels after a brief background check, which included a personality profile test and an oral interview, but did not ask about prior psychological problems or treatment, despite receiving his military discharge form mentioning the Wilford Hall assignment.
- In 1983, Daniels was involved in an arrest that resulted in the death of Cameron Marshall, which deeply distressed Daniels and led to an FBI investigation, but he received no assistance, counseling, or time off from the Department.
- On June 4, 1984, Daniels' supervisors (Sergeant Escalante, Lieutenant Schwartz, and Loy) met with him due to his strange behavior, loss of sleep, appetite, and work performance issues, where Daniels revealed past traumatic incidents and Loy concluded he suffered from "extreme job stress" and "post-shooting stress syndrome."
- Daniels' supervisors advised him to take a couple of days off and encouraged him to leave town to see his estranged wife and child, but did not instruct him to return his badge or Department-issued weapons, which officers were encouraged to carry even off-duty.
- On the evening of June 5, 1984, while driving his personal car outside Roswell on a trip to Deming, Daniels (carrying his badge, commission card, and four guns including a semi-automatic rifle) encountered plaintiffs Marlon Bunch, Kealy, Castro, and Narney, flashing his brights, showing his badge, and motioning them to pull over.
- After Bunch pulled over, Daniels, acting increasingly strangely, pointed his gun at the plaintiffs, spoke in various voices, talked to non-existent people, got into their car, sped away without headlights, drove it off the road, through a fence, into a field, wrecked it, and injured Narney.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs Marlon Bunch, Kealy, Castro, and Narney sued David Daniels, the City of Roswell, the Roswell Police Commissioners, and Steve Wisniewski (Chief of Police) in district court.
- The plaintiffs' claims against the municipal defendants included respondeat superior and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention.
- The municipal defendants moved for summary judgment.
- The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the municipal defendants, ruling that Daniels was not acting within the course and scope of employment, that defendants owed no duty to plaintiffs for negligent hiring/retention/supervision, and that any such negligence was not a proximate cause of injuries.
- All four plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
- During the appeal, plaintiffs Kealy, Castro, and Bunch settled with defendants, leaving Narney as the sole appellant.
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Issue:
1. Does an off-duty police officer, while experiencing a psychotic episode and acting outside his jurisdiction, act within the "course and scope of employment" such that his employer is liable under respondeat superior? 2. Does a municipality owe a duty of ordinary care to the public in the hiring, supervision, and retention of its police officers, even for harms caused by an officer acting off-duty and outside the city limits, and can such actions be a proximate cause of injury?
Opinions:
Majority - APODACA, Judge
No, David Daniels was not acting within the course and scope of his employment when he terrorized the plaintiffs. The court applied a four-point test to determine scope of employment, considering whether the action (1) is the kind the employee is employed to perform, (2) occurs during a period reasonably connected to the authorized employment period, (3) occurs in an area reasonably close to the authorized area, and (4) is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer. While stopping speeders or suspected drug activity is the kind of activity a police officer performs and could generally be seen as serving governmental interests, Daniels' actions occurred nearly 200 miles from Roswell, well outside his authorized area, and during a time he was explicitly told to take off. Thus, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude he was acting within the scope of his employment, making summary judgment on the respondeat superior claim appropriate. Yes, the municipal defendants owed a duty of ordinary care to the plaintiffs in the hiring, supervision, and retention of Daniels, and genuine issues of material fact existed regarding proximate cause. The court rejected the argument that a municipality's duty ceases at its city limits or that a specific direct business connection between the employer and the injured party is always required. Instead, the court focused on foreseeability, emphasizing that a strong public policy (reflected in state statutes) dictates that only mentally stable police officers should be appointed and retained, as a mentally unstable officer with law enforcement authority poses a foreseeable danger to the public. Given the defendants' knowledge of Daniels' prior psychological care (from his military records) and his recently manifested strange behavior, and allowing him to retain his badge and weapons while encouraging him to leave town, it was not unforeseeable as a matter of law that Daniels might misuse his authority. Therefore, the district court erred in determining there was no duty and that defendants' actions were not a proximate cause, as proximate cause is generally a question of fact for the jury.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of municipal employer liability for police officers in New Mexico. It draws a critical distinction between respondeat superior (where the employer is vicariously liable for an employee's actions within scope) and direct negligence claims for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention. The ruling establishes that even if respondeat superior does not apply due to an officer acting completely outside normal scope, a direct negligence claim can proceed if the employer had prior notice of potential danger and it was foreseeable that the officer might misuse their authority. This expands the concept of a municipality's duty to the general public, suggesting it extends beyond strict jurisdictional limits when an officer, equipped with the means and authority of the state, poses a foreseeable danger.
