Nardone et al. v. United States
308 U.S. 338 (1939)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence discovered as an indirect result of information obtained through an illegal act, such as an unlawful wiretap, is inadmissible in court under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, unless the connection has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint or the evidence was obtained from an independent source.
Facts:
- Federal agents investigated Frank Nardone and others for frauds on the revenue.
- During the investigation, agents intercepted the defendants' telephone messages, in violation of Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934.
- The Supreme Court had previously held in a prior proceeding involving the same parties that the direct use of these intercepted messages as evidence was illegal.
- In preparation for a new trial, the government intended to introduce evidence that the defendants alleged was only discovered because of the information learned from the illegal wiretaps.
Procedural Posture:
- Nardone and others were convicted in a U.S. District Court (trial court) for revenue fraud.
- In a prior case, Nardone v. U.S., 302 U.S. 379, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that evidence obtained from illegal wiretaps violated the Communications Act of 1934 and was inadmissible.
- At a new trial in the District Court, the trial judge refused to permit the defendants to question whether the prosecution's evidence was discovered through the use of the illegal wiretaps.
- The defendants were convicted again.
- The defendants (appellants) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed the convictions, holding that the statute only barred the intercepted conversations themselves, not evidence derived from them.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the Second Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does the statutory prohibition against admitting illegally intercepted communications into evidence also render inadmissible other evidence that was discovered as a result of those illegal interceptions?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Frankfurter
Yes, the statutory prohibition against using illegally intercepted communications also renders inadmissible other evidence discovered as a result of those interceptions. To forbid the direct use of illegally obtained evidence but permit its full indirect use would stultify the policy of the statute and invite law enforcement to continue using methods deemed 'inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty.' Citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, the Court reasoned that the essence of forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that such evidence 'shall not be used at all.' Knowledge gained by the government's own wrongdoing cannot be used simply because it is used derivatively. The defendant has the burden to show the evidence was tainted, after which the burden shifts to the government to prove the evidence came from an independent, untainted source or that the connection to the illegality was so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice McReynolds
No. The dissent stated that the Circuit Court of Appeals reached the correct conclusion for the reasons it provided, and its judgment affirming the convictions should be affirmed. The lower court had held that the statute only made the intercepted conversations themselves incompetent, not other testimony that became accessible by using the information from those conversations.
Analysis:
This case is foundational for establishing the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, which holds that evidence derived from an illegal search, seizure, or interrogation is inadmissible. While the principle was suggested in earlier Fourth Amendment cases like Silverthorne, Nardone II explicitly articulates and applies it in the context of a statutory violation. The decision significantly broadens the scope of the exclusionary rule by extending it from primary evidence to derivative evidence. It also establishes the key exceptions to the doctrine—attenuation and independent source—which remain critical in modern criminal procedure, creating a framework for analyzing the causal chain between police misconduct and the discovery of evidence.
