Naghi v. Brener
2009 WL 2170135, 2009 La. LEXIS 2195, 17 So. 3d 919 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
An amended petition adding a new plaintiff cannot 'relate back' under La. C.C.P. art. 1153 to the date of an original filing to avoid a peremptive period, because peremption extinguishes the cause of action itself and nothing may interfere with its running.
Facts:
- Benny and Ephraim Naghi hired attorney Lisa Brener to represent them in a claim for damages after their property was damaged by fire on October 26, 2005.
- The property that was damaged was owned by Mohtaram, Inc., a corporation for which the Naghis were directors and shareholders, not by the Naghis as individuals.
- Brener allegedly failed to pursue the property damage claim in a timely manner.
- As a result of this alleged failure, the underlying claim for property damage prescribed (expired) on October 26, 2006.
Procedural Posture:
- On December 7, 2006, Benny and Ephraim Naghi sued their former attorney, Lisa Brener, for legal malpractice in a Louisiana state trial court.
- Brener filed an exception of no right of action, arguing the Naghis personally did not own the property at issue and thus could not bring the claim.
- The trial court granted the exception and allowed the plaintiffs to amend their petition.
- On March 12, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a 'First Supplemental/Amending Petition' to add the property's owner, Mohtaram, Inc., as the proper plaintiff.
- Brener filed an exception of peremption, arguing the claim by Mohtaram, Inc. was filed after the one-year deadline in La. R.S. 9:5605 had expired.
- The trial court denied the exception, finding the one-year period to be prescriptive and holding that the amended petition related back to the original, timely filing date.
- Brener, as relator, applied for a supervisory writ from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, which denied the application and affirmed the trial court's ruling.
- The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the defendants' writ application to review the lower courts' judgments.
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Issue:
Does Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1153, which allows an amended petition to 'relate back' to the date of the original filing, apply to the one-year peremptive period for legal malpractice claims established in La. R.S. 9:5605?
Opinions:
Majority - Victory, J.
No. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1153 does not apply to the one-year peremptive period for legal malpractice because the doctrine of relation back impermissibly interferes with the running of a peremptive period. The court reasoned that La. R.S. 9:5605(B) explicitly defines the one-year time limit for legal malpractice claims as peremptive. Unlike prescription, which merely bars a remedy, peremption extinguishes the underlying right or cause of action itself. Citing precedent like Hebert v. Doctors Memorial Hosp., the court emphasized the absolute nature of peremption, stating that 'nothing may interfere with the running of a peremptive period.' Allowing an untimely amended petition to 'relate back' would be a form of interference that avoids the operation of the peremptive period. Furthermore, once the peremptive period expires, the cause of action is destroyed, leaving nothing to which a later-filed amended petition can relate back.
Dissenting - Kimball, C.J.
Yes. The amended petition should be allowed to relate back because the one-year period in La. R.S. 9:5605 is properly interpreted as prescriptive, not peremptive, despite the statute's language. The dissent argued that the court's role is to interpret legislative intent, which is not always reflected in the literal words of a statute. The language of the one-year period in the legal malpractice statute is nearly identical to that in the medical malpractice statute, which the court previously held to be prescriptive in Borel v. Young. The majority's holding creates an illogical inconsistency with that precedent. Moreover, treating the one-year discovery-based period as peremptive renders the statute's separate three-year absolute peremptive period meaningless. The dissent concluded the majority avoided the actual legal question of how relation back applies by instead mischaracterizing the one-year period as peremptive.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the absolute nature of peremptive periods in Louisiana law, establishing a bright-line rule that procedural remedies like the 'relation back' doctrine cannot overcome them. It creates a significant pitfall for plaintiffs, as a mistake in naming the proper party in an initial complaint cannot be corrected by amendment after a peremptive period has run, even if the defendant was on notice of the claim's substance. The ruling reinforces the critical distinction between prescription (barring a remedy) and peremption (extinguishing the right itself), demanding absolute precision from litigants in cases governed by peremptive statutes like the one for legal malpractice.
