NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc.
152 So. 2d 179 (1963)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A business may obtain an injunction against picketing for social or racial objectives that is intended to injure the business and coerce customers, particularly when such picketing creates an inflammatory situation and causes substantial economic damage, as it is not considered protected free speech.
Facts:
- Webb's City, Inc., is a privately owned Florida corporation operating a general mercantile business in St. Petersburg, Florida.
- The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), a non-profit New York corporation, has a local chapter in St. Petersburg, Florida, led by its President, Ralph M. Wimbish.
- On December 2, 1960, a group of approximately thirty individuals associated with the NAACP began picketing Webb's City's premises, carrying placards protesting its policies of lunch counter segregation and disproportionate employment of Black individuals in certain positions.
- The picketing demonstration included an inside demonstration within Webb's City's trading area and invited participation from any interested citizens.
- On December 6, 1960, Jack Morrison, Jr., an active participant in the demonstration, was arrested for unlawfully trespassing on Webb's City property while obstructing an entrance, and was later convicted of a municipal offense.
- The picketing created a tense and inflammatory situation around Webb's City, adversely affecting community peace and tranquility and fostering an atmosphere of apprehension and potential violence.
- During the picketing period (December 2-6, 1960), Webb's City's switchboard received numerous profane telephone calls from undisclosed parties.
- As a direct consequence of the picketing, Webb's City suffered a loss of revenue of not less than $10,000 below its reasonably expected revenue for those days.
Procedural Posture:
- Webb's City, Inc. (plaintiff) filed a suit in equity in a Florida trial court (Chancellor) seeking an injunction against the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and Ralph M. Wimbish for interference with its business.
- On December 6, 1960, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order against the defendants.
- At a final hearing, the trial court entered a permanent injunction against the NAACP and Ralph M. Wimbish, while granting a motion to dismiss as to Bette C. Wimbish.
- The NAACP and Ralph M. Wimbish (defendants below, now appellants) appealed the final decree to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does picketing intended to injure a business and coerce customers for racial or social objectives, where it creates a tense and inflammatory situation and causes substantial damages, receive constitutional protection as free speech and thus prohibit an injunction?
Opinions:
Majority - Associate Judge Barns
No, picketing intended to injure a business and coerce customers for racial or social objectives, especially when inflammatory and damaging, is not clothed with constitutional protection and may be enjoined. The court affirmed the lower court's permanent injunction. A business is property entitled to protection from unlawful interference. The primary purpose of the picketing was to injure Webb's City's business by coercing customers and inducing a boycott, which it successfully did, causing substantial and continuing damages. While freedom of speech is protected, picketing is "more than free speech" because it involves patrolling a specific location and can induce action irrespective of the ideas disseminated. The "loyalties and responses evoked and exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by printed word." While the right to protest policies can be exercised through conventional communication or withholding patronage, coercive and destructive picketing can be enjoined, particularly where there is no adequate remedy at law for continuing damages. The court explicitly distinguished this case from labor disputes, stating that the rules applicable to labor disputes have no application here. Balancing the plaintiff's interest in its commercial expectancies against the defendants' interest in advancing social objectives and the injury caused by the coercive picketing, the court found that the Chancellor did not err in granting the injunction.
Analysis:
This case significantly narrows the scope of constitutionally protected picketing, particularly by distinguishing it from picketing in labor disputes. It establishes that even picketing for important social or racial objectives can be enjoined if its primary purpose is to injure a business through coercion and it results in substantial economic damage and an inflammatory environment. The decision highlights that the method of communication, specifically the coercive nature of picketing, can outweigh the expressive content, allowing state courts to prioritize a business's economic rights over certain forms of protest. This ruling reflected the legal landscape in Florida during the Civil Rights era, setting a precedent that limited direct action against private businesses for civil rights goals when such action was deemed economically destructive.
