NAACP v. Button
371 U.S. 415 (1963)
Rule of Law:
A state cannot, under its power to regulate the legal profession, prohibit an organization's activities of advising people of their legal rights and financing litigation on their behalf when such litigation is a form of political expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Facts:
- The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) is a non-profit corporation whose principal objective is to eliminate racial discrimination.
- As part of its mission in Virginia, the NAACP financed lawsuits challenging racial segregation in public schools.
- The Virginia Conference of the NAACP maintained a legal staff of 15 attorneys who were paid per diem fees and expenses to handle these cases, with the NAACP defraying all costs of litigation.
- NAACP staff lawyers held meetings with parents and students, advised them of their rights, and provided forms authorizing the lawyers to represent them in desegregation lawsuits.
- In 1956, Virginia amended its statutes forbidding solicitation of legal business by a 'runner' or 'capper' to include agents for organizations that retain a lawyer for a case in which the organization is not a party and has no pecuniary interest.
- These anti-solicitation laws had existed for many years but were not applied to the NAACP's activities until after the 1956 amendment.
Procedural Posture:
- The NAACP sued in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, a federal trial court, to enjoin the enforcement of several state statutes.
- A three-judge panel of the District Court struck down some statutes but abstained from ruling on Chapter 33, directing the NAACP to seek an interpretation from Virginia state courts.
- The NAACP petitioned the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, a state trial court, which held Chapter 33 was constitutional and applicable to the NAACP's activities.
- The NAACP appealed this decision to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, the state's highest court.
- The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that the NAACP's activities constituted improper solicitation of legal business under Chapter 33.
- The NAACP then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a state statute prohibiting the improper solicitation of legal business, as applied to the NAACP's activities of encouraging and financing litigation to end racial segregation, violate the freedoms of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
Yes, the state statute as applied violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The NAACP's activities are not merely a private legal dispute but a form of political expression and association used to achieve lawful political objectives, specifically the vindication of constitutional rights for minority groups. Litigation, under these circumstances, is a constitutionally protected mode of expression, and the state's broad prohibition unduly inhibits these freedoms. While a state has a legitimate interest in regulating the legal profession to prevent misconduct like barratry and champerty, that interest is not compelling enough to justify this sweeping infringement on core First Amendment rights, especially where there is no evidence of pecuniary gain, malicious intent, or conflict of interest.
Concurring - Justice Douglas
Yes. The Virginia statute violates the Constitution because it was not applied neutrally but was instead part of a program of 'massive resistance' specifically designed to penalize the NAACP for its efforts to desegregate schools following Brown v. Board of Education. The law draws a discriminatory line between organizations protecting pecuniary rights, which can solicit legal business, and those like the NAACP protecting other civil rights, which cannot. This distinction reveals the statute's true purpose: to obstruct the enforcement of constitutional rights for African Americans, which is a clear violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Justice White
Yes, as construed by the Virginia court, the statute is unconstitutional because it broadly forbids advising the employment of particular attorneys, which infringes on protected rights. However, a state does have the power to enact a narrowly drawn statute that proscribes the actual day-to-day management and control of litigation by a lay entity like the NAACP. The practice of law by a corporation or its dictation of litigation tactics is not constitutionally protected and falls within the state's regulatory power. The majority opinion may be too broad if it would also strike down such a narrowly tailored statute.
Dissenting - Justice Harlan
No, the Virginia statute is a constitutional exercise of the state's power to regulate the legal profession. The NAACP's litigation program involves more than mere advocacy; it includes the systematic solicitation of litigants and the control of litigation by a lay organization, which directs its paid staff attorneys on pleading, relief, and strategy. This creates potential conflicts of interest, where the organization's policy goals may diverge from an individual client's best interests, and undermines the personal attorney-client relationship. The state has a compelling interest in maintaining high professional standards and preventing such interference, and this regulation is reasonably related to that interest without suppressing the NAACP's right to advocate for its views.
Analysis:
This landmark decision established that litigation can be a form of political expression protected by the First Amendment, particularly for minority groups seeking to vindicate their constitutional rights. It significantly expanded the concept of freedom of association to include group legal action. The ruling curtails the state's power to regulate the legal profession when such regulations burden First Amendment activities, requiring the state to show a compelling interest to justify the restriction. This case paved the way for the modern public interest law firm and affirmed the legitimacy of cause-based litigation as a central tool for social and political change in the United States.
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