Myers v. United States
272 U.S. 52 (1926)
Rule of Law:
The President of the United States has the exclusive constitutional power to remove executive officers whom he has appointed, even when those appointments were made with the advice and consent of the Senate. A congressional act that requires the Senate's consent for the removal of such an executive officer is an unconstitutional infringement on the President's executive power under Article II.
Facts:
- On July 21, 1917, the President appointed Frank S. Myers to be a first-class postmaster at Portland, Oregon, for a four-year term.
- Myers' appointment was made with the advice and consent of the Senate under the Act of July 12, 1876.
- This act stipulated that postmasters of Myers' class 'shall be appointed and may be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.'
- On January 20, 1920, Myers' resignation was demanded, which he refused.
- On February 2, 1920, the Postmaster General, acting by direction of the President, removed Myers from office without the Senate's consent.
- Myers protested his removal and pursued no other employment for the remainder of his term.
Procedural Posture:
- Frank S. Myers sued the United States in the Court of Claims to recover his salary from the date of his removal until the end of his term.
- The Court of Claims rendered judgment against Myers, holding that he had lost his right to sue because of his delay (laches).
- Myers' administratrix (appellant) appealed the judgment of the Court of Claims to the Supreme Court of the United States, with the United States as appellee.
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Issue:
Does the President have the exclusive power under Article II of the Constitution to remove an executive officer, in this case a first-class postmaster, whom he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, despite a statute requiring the Senate's consent for removal?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Taft
Yes, the President has the exclusive power under the Constitution to remove executive officers whom he has appointed. The grant of 'the executive Power' to the President in Article II, Section 1 is a general grant that includes the power to remove subordinates. This power is an essential incident of the power to appoint, and it is necessary for the President to fulfill his constitutional duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' The Senate's role in advising and consenting to appointments is an explicit exception to the President's power and must be strictly construed; it does not imply a corresponding role in removals. The Court's conclusion is heavily supported by the 'Decision of 1789,' where the First Congress, which included many framers of the Constitution, determined that the removal power vested solely in the President. Subsequent legislative acts attempting to limit this power, like the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, were unconstitutional encroachments on executive authority.
Dissenting - Justice Holmes
No, Congress has the power to prescribe the conditions for removal from an office that it creates by statute. The office of postmaster exists only because Congress created it; Congress can set the salary, define the duties, and abolish the office entirely. Therefore, it follows that Congress also has the power to set the terms of the office, including the condition that an incumbent can only be removed with the Senate's consent. The President's duty to execute the laws does not give him power beyond what the laws themselves provide. The majority's arguments based on inherent executive power are 'spider's webs inadequate to control the dominant facts.'
Dissenting - Justice McReynolds
No, the President does not have the power to ignore a provision of an Act of Congress under which an officer was appointed. The Constitution does not contain plain words granting the President an illimitable power of removal, and such a power should not be inferred as it conflicts with the principle of a government of enumerated powers. The majority's reliance on the 1789 debate is misplaced, as that concerned a superior officer serving at will, not an inferior officer with a statutorily defined term. For over a century, Congress has consistently and validly enacted statutes prescribing restrictions on removals, which many Presidents have approved, demonstrating a long-standing practice contrary to the majority's conclusion. The President should promote orderly government, not subvert it by disregarding statutory restrictions on his power.
Dissenting - Justice Brandeis
No, Congress may impose upon the Senate the responsibility of consenting to the removal of an inferior officer. The power to remove a subordinate executive officer is not inherently a power of the chief executive but comes from Congress when it creates a statutory office. The ability of Congress to prescribe the tenure of an office includes the power to set the conditions under which that tenure may be terminated. A persistent legislative practice, established by the concurrent affirmative action of Congress and the President over many decades, of making Senate consent a condition of removal should be deemed tantamount to a judicial construction. The doctrine of separation of powers was intended to prevent the exercise of arbitrary power, not to promote efficiency, and allowing Congress to place a check on the President's removal power serves this fundamental purpose.
Analysis:
This landmark decision significantly strengthened the presidency by establishing a broad, inherent power of removal over executive branch officials, grounding it in the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause of Article II. It affirmed the theory of a 'unitary executive,' where the President has full control over the personnel and functions of the executive branch. The decision's sweeping scope was later limited in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, which held that Congress could restrict the President's removal power over officials in independent quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies. However, Myers remains the foundational authority for the President's plenary power to remove purely executive officers.
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