Murray v. Giarratano
1989 U.S. LEXIS 3134, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1, 492 U.S. 1 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
Neither the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment requires states to appoint counsel for indigent death row inmates seeking state postconviction relief.
Facts:
- Joseph M. Giarratano, an indigent prisoner on Virginia's death row, sought to challenge his conviction and sentence through state postconviction proceedings.
- Giarratano and other similarly situated death row inmates could not afford to hire legal counsel for these proceedings.
- Virginia's system provided death row inmates with access to a law library or lawbooks in their cells.
- The state also employed institutional 'unit attorneys' to provide limited legal assistance to inmates regarding their incarceration, but not to act as personal representatives in postconviction litigation.
- Under Virginia law, a court had the discretion to appoint counsel for an inmate after a postconviction petition was filed, but there was no mechanism for guaranteed appointment of counsel to help prepare the initial petition.
- The inmates argued that the complexity of capital punishment law, strict time limits for filing, and the severe emotional distress of facing execution made it impossible for them to effectively represent themselves.
Procedural Posture:
- Joseph M. Giarratano filed a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Virginia corrections officials in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
- The District Court certified a class of all indigent Virginia death row inmates and, after a trial, ruled in their favor.
- The District Court ordered Virginia to develop a program to appoint counsel for indigent death row inmates for state postconviction proceedings.
- The defendants (Virginia officials) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
- A three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision.
- The Fourth Circuit then reheard the case en banc, vacated the panel's decision, and affirmed the District Court's order requiring the appointment of counsel.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the en banc decision of the Fourth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the Constitution require a state to appoint counsel for indigent death row inmates seeking to challenge their convictions or sentences in state postconviction (habeas corpus) proceedings?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist
No. The Constitution does not require a state to appoint counsel for indigent death row inmates in state postconviction proceedings. The Court's holding in Pennsylvania v. Finley, which established that there is no right to counsel in non-capital postconviction cases, applies equally to capital cases. Postconviction relief is considered civil in nature and is not part of the original criminal proceeding where the right to counsel attaches. The heightened reliability required by the Eighth Amendment for capital cases is satisfied by the procedural safeguards at the trial and direct appeal stages; this does not create a new right to counsel for collateral attacks. Furthermore, the right of meaningful access to the courts established in Bounds v. Smith requires states to provide tools like law libraries or legal assistance, but does not mandate the appointment of personal counsel for postconviction petitions.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
No. There is no constitutional requirement for states to provide counsel in postconviction proceedings. Such proceedings are civil actions, not part of the criminal process, and states have wide discretion in how they are administered. The decision to provide counsel in these circumstances is a legislative policy choice, not a constitutional command.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
No. While acknowledging the complexity of capital jurisprudence and the unlikelihood of an inmate succeeding without legal help, the Constitution does not mandate the specific remedy of appointed counsel. The 'meaningful access' requirement from Bounds v. Smith allows states 'wide discretion' to find solutions. Although Virginia's system is not as robust as others, it is not unconstitutional, as it includes institutional lawyers to assist inmates. The issue is better left to legislative bodies like Congress and state legislatures to study and address.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. Due process requires the appointment of counsel for indigent death row inmates in state postconviction proceedings. This case is fundamentally different from non-capital cases for three reasons: 1) The death penalty is unique in its severity and finality, requiring greater procedural protections at all stages, including meaningful collateral review. 2) In Virginia, state postconviction proceedings are the first and often only opportunity to raise critical claims like ineffective assistance of trial counsel, making it an integral part of the appellate process. 3) The unique circumstances of death row—including extreme time pressure, legal complexity, and the inmates' psychological state—render their right of 'access' to the courts meaningless without the guiding hand of counsel.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the constitutional line between direct and collateral review, extending the rule from Pennsylvania v. Finley to capital cases. By refusing to create a death penalty exception, the Court affirmed that postconviction proceedings are not a constitutionally required part of the criminal process that triggers a right to counsel. The ruling places the responsibility squarely on state and federal legislatures to create and fund systems for providing counsel in capital postconviction cases, treating it as a matter of policy rather than constitutional mandate. This has significant implications for the ability of death row inmates to challenge their convictions, as the quality and availability of counsel for these crucial proceedings now depend on legislative action rather than judicial enforcement of a constitutional right.
