No. A simple mistake by your lawyer is not a good enough excuse. For a federal court to review an issue that your state-court lawyer failed to raise, you must show either that something outside of your defense team's control stopped you, or that your lawyer's work was so terrible it violated your constitutional right to a lawyer. Unless you can prove this mistake likely resulted in an innocent person being convicted, you are stuck with your lawyer's error.

Yes. This is unfair. When a lawyer makes an honest mistake, the state's interest in strictly following its procedures isn't strong enough to prevent a federal court from correcting a major constitutional error that might have affected the trial's outcome. We should allow an accidental mistake to be a good enough excuse.

I agree we should send the case back, but for different reasons. The most important thing is to make sure an innocent person isn't in jail. Instead of using a strict rule, courts should look at the whole picture to see if there has been a 'miscarriage of justice.' The lower court needs to look at those police statements to see if they could have proven Carrier's innocence.

No, a lawyer accidentally failing to bring up an issue on appeal is not automatically a good reason to let a federal court hear the case later. To show a good reason, the prisoner has to point to something outside of his control that stopped the lawyer from following the state's rules. If the lawyer was unconstitutionally bad, that could be a good reason, but the prisoner has to complain to the state courts about the bad lawyer first before using it as a reason in federal court. The prisoner also has to show the mistake hurt him so badly that his whole trial was unfair.

I think a lawyer's accidental mistake should count as a good reason. The state's interest in punishing lawyers for accidentally not following the rules isn't good enough to stop a federal court from hearing a case when Congress said they should, especially if the prisoner can show the mistake really hurt his case. This is even more true when the prisoner might be put to death.

The Court is right to send the case back to look at the prisoner's actual issue. But I don't agree with everything they said. I don't think the 'good reason' and 'hurt his case' test always matters when the basic fairness of the conviction is at stake. That test is part of a bigger question of what justice requires. A mistake on appeal shouldn't always stop a federal court from considering a really important constitutional issue that could prove the prisoner's innocence.

To demonstrate cause for a procedural default, a petitioner must show that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule."

A fundamental miscarriage of justice of occurs "where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent."

In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims …

Petitioner is correct that ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute cause for a procedural default

If a claim is procedurally defaulted, the court may require the petitioner to demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation.

To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show "not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions."

The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must have been "presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for a procedural default."

"Cause may be demonstrated with `a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel,... or that "some interference by state officials" made compliance impracticable,...[or that] the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.'"Id

No. The existence of 'cause' for a procedural default does not turn on whether counsel erred or the type of error made. So long as a defendant is represented by counsel whose performance is not constitutionally ineffective under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, the defendant must bear the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural default. Cause must ordinarily be an objective factor external to the defense that impeded counsel's efforts, such as governmental interference or the reasonable unavailability of the factual or legal basis for a claim. While ineffective assistance of counsel does constitute cause, that claim must first be exhausted in state court as an independent claim. The Court rejected any distinction between defaults at trial and on appeal, finding that state appellate procedural rules serve vital interests of finality and efficiency. However, in an extraordinary case where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal court may grant the writ of habeas corpus even without a showing of cause.

Yes. Where a procedural default results from counsel's inadvertence rather than a deliberate tactical decision, the state's interest in enforcing its procedural rules is significantly weaker. This diminished state interest is insufficient to overcome the heavy presumption in favor of a federal court exercising its jurisdiction to review a constitutional claim, especially where the petitioner can show prejudice. The balance of interests between the state and the petitioner requires that counsel's inadvertent failure to raise a claim be considered 'cause' to excuse the procedural default.

Concurs in the judgment to remand, but not in the Court's reasoning. The rigid 'cause and prejudice' formula is not dispositive when the fundamental fairness of a prisoner's conviction is at issue, particularly when there is a claim of actual innocence. The analysis should be a broader inquiry into the demands of justice, which requires considering the nature of the constitutional claim and the state procedural rule that was violated. An appellate default is less serious than a trial default, and the state's interest in finality should not defeat a meritorious federal claim that may establish the prisoner's innocence. Therefore, the lower court must examine the victim's statements to determine if a miscarriage of justice occurred, but the majority's creation of a new, strict 'actual innocence' standard is premature and ill-considered.

No, inadvertent failure by defense counsel to raise a substantive claim of error does not automatically constitute 'cause' for a procedural default. To demonstrate cause for a procedural default, a petitioner must show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule. Ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute cause for a procedural default, but the claim must have been presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for a procedural default. Additionally, to demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that the errors at trial worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.

I would hold that 'cause' is established where a procedural default resulted from counsel's inadvertence. The State's interest in punishing lawyers' inadvertent failures to comply with state procedures is not sufficient to overcome the heavy presumption against a federal court's refusing to exercise jurisdiction clearly granted by Congress, especially where the petitioner has satisfied the prejudice prong of the Wainwright v. Sykes test. This is even more true in capital cases, where the consequence to the defendant is death.

The Court is correct to remand the case for further proceedings on the substance of respondent's claim. However, I do not join the Court's opinion, as I believe the 'cause and prejudice' formula is not dispositive when the fundamental fairness of a prisoner's conviction is at issue. That formula is part of a broader inquiry into the demands of justice. Appellate procedural default should not foreclose habeas corpus review of a meritorious constitutional claim that may establish the prisoner's innocence.

Murray v. Carrier

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