Murphy v. Hunt
455 U.S. 478 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant's constitutional challenge to the denial of pretrial bail becomes moot upon conviction. For the 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' exception to mootness to apply, there must be a 'demonstrated probability,' not merely a theoretical possibility, that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.
Facts:
- Eugene Hunt was charged in Nebraska with first-degree sexual assault on a child and three counts of first-degree forcible sexual assault.
- Hunt appeared in Omaha Municipal Court, where his request for bail on these specific charges was denied.
- The denial was based on Article I, § 9 of the Nebraska Constitution, which makes sexual offenses involving penetration by force non-bailable when 'the proof is evident or the presumption great.'
- During a bail review hearing, Hunt's own counsel stipulated that, for the purposes of the bail application, the proof of guilt was evident and the presumption was great.
Procedural Posture:
- Pending his state trial, Hunt filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska against Judge Murphy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the state's bail provision violated his federal constitutional rights.
- While the federal suit was pending, Hunt was convicted in state court of three of the sexual assault charges and sentenced to prison.
- The U.S. District Court dismissed Hunt's § 1983 complaint.
- Hunt, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision, holding that the Nebraska constitutional provision violated the Eighth Amendment.
- Murphy, as appellant, sought and was granted review by the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Is a defendant's constitutional challenge to a state law denying him pretrial bail moot once the defendant has been convicted of the charged offenses?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes, the claim is moot. Once Hunt was convicted and sentenced, his claim to pretrial bail was no longer a 'live' controversy, as a favorable decision could not grant him the relief he originally sought. The court rejected the argument that this case fell under the 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' exception to the mootness doctrine. The court reasoned that for the exception to apply, there must be a 'reasonable expectation' or a 'demonstrated probability' that Hunt would face the same situation again. The mere possibility that all three of Hunt's separate convictions could be overturned on appeal, thus putting him back in a pretrial posture, was deemed too speculative and did not rise to the level of a demonstrated probability.
Dissenting - Justice White
No, the claim is not moot. The same provision of the Nebraska Constitution that was used to deny Hunt pretrial bail also serves to deny him bail while his convictions are on appeal. Therefore, the constitutionality of the provision remains a live issue with direct consequences for Hunt's current liberty. Because a ruling striking down the provision would allow Hunt to seek bail pending appeal, he maintains a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the case. The majority's focus on the 'pretrial' aspect is too narrow, as the underlying legal barrier to Hunt's release remains in effect.
Analysis:
This decision refines the 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' exception to the mootness doctrine by heightening the standard for what constitutes a 'repetition.' The Court's insistence on a 'demonstrated probability' rather than a 'theoretical possibility' makes it more difficult for litigants to maintain a case after the initial injury has ceased. This holding effectively limits federal court review of many short-term, pretrial constitutional challenges once a defendant is convicted, as the likelihood of convictions being reversed to a point where the same pretrial issue recurs is considered too speculative.
