Murphy Company v. Joseph Biden
65 F.4th 1122 (2023)
Rule of Law:
The President's authority under the Antiquities Act to designate federal lands as national monuments, even those previously managed for other purposes like timber production under the O&C Act, is not implicitly repealed or overridden by the O&C Act where the two statutes are capable of coexistence and Congress has not expressly limited the President's power.
Facts:
- In 1866, the United States granted public lands to private railroad companies to facilitate the construction of a rail line between Oregon and California.
- By 1893, these railroad companies had failed to dispose of most of the granted parcels to 'actual settlers only,' violating the terms of the grant.
- In 1916, Congress revested much of this land, directing the Secretary of the Interior to sell its timber 'as rapidly as reasonable prices can be secured.'
- To address the region's economic and environmental situation, Congress passed the Oregon and California Railroad and Coos Bay Wagon Road Grant Lands Act ('O&C Act') in 1937, mandating that classified timberlands be managed for 'permanent forest production' and timber sales based on 'sustained yield,' while also considering watershed protection, stream flow regulation, economic stability of local communities, and recreational facilities.
- In June 2000, President Clinton established the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument on nearly 53,000 acres of federal land in southwestern Oregon, prohibiting commercial timber harvest within its boundaries with limited exceptions.
- In 2011, a group of scientists issued a report finding that expanding the Monument was 'required to fully protect the unique biological diversity of the area.'
- In January 2017, President Obama issued Proclamation 9564 under the Antiquities Act, expanding the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument by approximately 48,000 acres, some of which overlapped with O&C timberlands, and prohibiting logging within the expanded area.
- Murphy Timber Company and Murphy Timber Investments, LLC are Oregon timber businesses that own woodlands and purchase timber harvested in western Oregon and were concerned about new limitations on their timber supply due to the Proclamation.
Procedural Posture:
- Murphy Timber Company and Murphy Timber Investments, LLC (collectively, Murphy) sued the President, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Bureau of Land Management in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief challenging Presidential Proclamation 9564.
- Soda Mountain Wilderness Council and other environmental organizations intervened in the district court action as defendants.
- The district court initially stayed the litigation but later lifted the stay in February 2018.
- The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States and the intervenor environmental organizations, concluding that it had jurisdiction to review whether the President had acted ultra vires and holding that Proclamation 9564 was consistent both with the President’s Antiquities Act authority and with the O&C Act’s land-management directives.
- Murphy appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does Presidential Proclamation 9564, issued under the Antiquities Act to expand the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument and restrict logging on certain Oregon and California Railroad and Coos Bay Wagon Road Grant Lands (O&C Lands), conflict with or violate the O&C Act's mandate for permanent forest production, thereby exceeding the President's statutory authority?
Opinions:
Majority - McKeown
No, Presidential Proclamation 9564 does not conflict with or violate the O&C Act, as the Antiquities Act and the O&C Act are capable of coexistence, and the Proclamation is consistent with the O&C Act's flexible land-management directives. First, the court concluded that Murphy's claims against the President were justiciable, meaning the court had the authority to review them, whether characterized as constitutional (separation of powers) or ultra vires (exceeding statutory authority), because Murphy pleaded plausible factual allegations of the President exceeding statutory authority. Second, on the merits, the court held that the O&C Act did not explicitly or implicitly repeal the Antiquities Act. The two statutes are directed at different officials (President vs. Secretary of Interior), and the O&C Act makes no reference to the Antiquities Act. The court noted that repeals by implication are disfavored, and Congress has historically restricted presidential Antiquities Act authority expressly when it wished to. Third, the Proclamation's exercise of Antiquities Act power is consistent with the text, history, and purpose of the O&C Act. The O&C Act's plain language allows the Department of the Interior to classify and manage lands for several purposes beyond exclusive timber production, including 'protecting watersheds' and 'providing recreational facilties,' indicating broad discretion. This interpretation is reinforced by the O&C Act's legislative history, which sought 'conservation and scientific management' and empowered the Department with flexibility. The court also rejected the dissent's concerns, explaining that the President’s Antiquities Act authority includes shifting federal land from one use to another, and the impact of the Proclamation on O&C lands (less than 2% of the total) is minimal, not an executive nullification of Congress's land-management scheme.
Partial concurrence and partial dissent - Tallman
Yes, Presidential Proclamation 9564 conflicts with the O&C Act because it directs the Secretary of the Interior to disregard her statutory duties under the O&C Act, thereby exceeding the President's authority. Judge Tallman concurred that the court could review claims that the President’s execution of one statute obstructs another. However, he dissented from the majority's conclusion on the merits, arguing that Proclamation 9564 creates an 'obvious conflict' with the O&C Act. The O&C Act mandates sustained yield calculation for all O&C timberlands, but Proclamation 9564 explicitly removes O&C timberlands within the monument from this calculation and prohibits commercial timber harvest. Judge Tallman asserted that the Antiquities Act does not grant the President authority to suspend another Act of Congress, and the Secretary's duty to conduct a sustained yield analysis is a precise, legally enjoined act, not subject to presidential command to disregard. He applied the canon of construction generalia specialibus non derogant, arguing that the more specific O&C Act should prevail over the general Antiquities Act, and noted that later-in-time statutes generally take priority. He also criticized the majority's reliance on Congress's failure to expressly act (as in Wyoming and Alaska) as an improper inference of legislative intent, emphasizing the judiciary's duty to curtail unlawful executive action. Finally, he contended that the majority's 'discretion' argument for the Secretary was irrelevant because the Proclamation is a presidential command that removes the Secretary's discretion, preordaining a result rather than allowing for flexible management under the O&C Act.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the expansive interpretation of presidential power under the Antiquities Act, particularly when balanced against prior congressional land-management directives. It underscores the difficulty in establishing an implicit repeal of a broad presidential authority by a later, more specific statute, especially absent clear congressional intent to limit presidential power. The ruling affirms the judiciary's role in determining justiciability for challenges to presidential actions but often defers to executive discretion on the merits of statutory conflict when coexistence is possible. Future challenges to national monument designations will likely need to demonstrate an explicit statutory prohibition or an outright evisceration of a legislative scheme, rather than merely an inconsistency with prior land-use mandates, to succeed.
