Murdock v. Fraternal Order of Eagles
779 N.E.2d 964, 2002 WL 31812913, 2002 Ind. App. LEXIS 2071 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
Under Indiana's Dram Shop Act, evidence of a driver's erratic driving and subsequent collision, without more, is insufficient as a matter of law to create a triable issue of fact that the establishment that served the driver had actual knowledge of the driver's visible intoxication.
Facts:
- On April 30, 1999, Lindel Riley entered the Fraternal Order of Eagles (FOE) private club at approximately 3:00 p.m.
- Riley consumed two or three beers over a period of approximately two hours and twenty minutes.
- Riley departed the FOE in his pickup truck at approximately 5:20 p.m.
- Approximately five minutes after leaving, Riley's westbound truck rounded a curve, weaved sharply several times, and drove directly toward Dwight Murdock, who was jogging on the eastbound shoulder of the road.
- Murdock and Riley made eye contact before Riley's truck struck Murdock at about thirty-five miles per hour.
- Riley panicked after the collision and left the scene.
- Doris Brockus, who had been following Riley's truck for a block, did not see Riley driving erratically before the collision but stopped her vehicle to assist Murdock.
Procedural Posture:
- Dwight and Sharron Murdock filed a complaint against the Fraternal Order of Eagles (FOE) in an Indiana trial court, alleging liability under the state's Dram Shop Act.
- The FOE filed a motion for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted the FOE's motion for summary judgment, finding the Murdocks failed to present evidence that the FOE had actual knowledge Riley was visibly intoxicated.
- The Murdocks, as appellants, appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Indiana Court of Appeals, with the FOE as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a driver's erratic driving and subsequent collision, without independent evidence of the driver's condition while at a bar, create a genuine issue of material fact that the bar had actual knowledge of the driver's visible intoxication under Indiana's Dram Shop Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Brook, C.J.
No. The evidence presented is insufficient as a matter of law to support an inference that the Fraternal Order of Eagles (FOE) had actual knowledge that the driver was visibly intoxicated. Indiana's Dram Shop Act requires a plaintiff to prove that the person furnishing the alcohol had 'actual knowledge' that the patron was 'visibly intoxicated' at the time of service. This is a subjective standard. While actual knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence—such as the amount consumed, behavior at the establishment, and condition shortly after leaving—the evidence here is too speculative. Riley consumed only two to three beers over more than two hours, and there is no evidence of his behavior while at the FOE club. The only evidence relates to his erratic driving for a few moments before the collision, which, standing alone, is not enough to infer that he was visibly intoxicated earlier at the bar. Unlike prior cases where there was independent evidence like a high blood-alcohol content or failed sobriety tests, this record lacks any such corroboration.
Dissenting - Kirsch, J.
Yes. Summary judgment for the Fraternal Order of Eagles (FOE) was inappropriate because the FOE failed to meet its burden under Indiana's summary judgment standard. Unlike the federal standard, Indiana law requires the moving party (the FOE) to affirmatively designate evidence to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The FOE did not present evidence to show that Riley was not visibly intoxicated; instead, it merely argued that the Murdocks failed to produce evidence that he was. Under Indiana precedent set in Jarboe, merely pointing to the non-movant's lack of evidence is insufficient. Because the FOE failed to carry its initial burden of disproving the existence of a material fact—namely, its actual knowledge of visible intoxication—it was not entitled to summary judgment.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the evidentiary standard for plaintiffs in Indiana dram shop liability cases, establishing a high bar for surviving summary judgment. By holding that a subsequent accident, without more, cannot create an inference of 'visible intoxication' back at the time of service, the court makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to proceed without direct or strong circumstantial evidence of the patron's behavior at the establishment. The ruling underscores the importance of independent evidence like BAC tests, witness testimony about the patron's conduct at the bar, or police observations of impairment. Furthermore, the dissent highlights a critical tension in Indiana jurisprudence regarding the state's unique summary judgment standard, which places a heavier initial burden on the moving party compared to the federal system.
