Munoz v. State
1993 WL 406367, 629 So. 2d 90 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
While the Legislature may establish statutory defenses like entrapment, it cannot abrogate the judiciary’s power to review law enforcement conduct for due process violations under the Florida Constitution, regardless of a defendant's predisposition. Florida's entrapment defense now operates under a statutory subjective test, but judges retain authority to rule on entrapment as a matter of law if undisputed facts show government inducement and lack of prior, independent predisposition.
Facts:
- The Bay County Sheriff's Office received an anonymous complaint that minors were renting X-rated videotapes from a video store called "Top Banana."
- Without specific complaints or independent knowledge about other stores, the sheriff's office decided to expand its investigation to other video stores listed in the Yellow Pages, including Video Den, owned by Manuel Munoz.
- The sheriff's office obtained a false Video Den membership card under the fictitious name "Brian Jackson," indicating Jackson was 34 years old.
- A sixteen-year-old girl, who appeared at least 18 and had recently been arrested for marijuana, was recruited as a juvenile informant.
- The juvenile informant was instructed to use the false membership card, lie about her age, and claim to be Jackson's sister or girlfriend to rent X-rated videotapes from Video Den.
- Video Den kept X-rated videotapes in a separate "adults only" room with a sign prohibiting entry to persons under 18.
- On her first visit, the juvenile informant rented an X-rated video from the adults-only room, presented the false card to Munoz, and told him she was Jackson's girlfriend.
- Approximately two weeks later, the juvenile informant rented two more X-rated movies from Video Den, lied about her age when Munoz asked, claimed she had forgotten her driver's license, and insisted she had rented movies before and was Jackson's girlfriend or sister.
Procedural Posture:
- Manuel Munoz was charged in a Florida trial court with two counts of sale or distribution of harmful materials to a person under 18 years of age.
- The trial judge dismissed the charges against Munoz on the basis of entrapment as a matter of law, applying the objective entrapment test set forth in Cruz v. State.
- The State of Florida appealed the trial court's dismissal to the First District Court of Appeal.
- The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the legislature had abolished the objective entrapment test from Cruz v. State through the enactment of section 777.201.
- Manuel Munoz filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court of Florida.
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Issue:
Does section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1987), abolish the objective entrapment test previously established by the Florida Supreme Court in Cruz v. State, and what is the proper framework for evaluating entrapment claims in Florida, including the judiciary's role?
Opinions:
Majority - OVERTON, J.
Yes, Section 777.201, Florida Statutes, effectively abolished the objective entrapment test established in Cruz v. State, but it does not diminish the judiciary's authority to review entrapment claims for due process violations under article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution, and judges can still find entrapment as a matter of law under the statutory subjective test. The Court first reviewed the evolution of entrapment defense under federal law, noting the U.S. Supreme Court’s consistent adoption of the subjective test (focusing on defendant's predisposition) in cases like Sorrells, Sherman, and Jacobson, while acknowledging the possibility of due process violations by outrageous government conduct (Russell). It then examined Florida's unique history, including State v. Glosson, which recognized a due process defense regardless of predisposition under the Florida Constitution, and Cruz v. State, which adopted an objective entrapment test focused on police conduct (specific ongoing criminal activity and reasonably tailored means). The Court concluded that the Legislature, in enacting section 777.201, intended to reinstate the federal subjective test and thus validly overrode the Cruz objective test, as that test, to the extent it did not implicate constitutional due process, was a judicially established substantive principle. However, the Court asserted that the Legislature cannot abrogate an accused's constitutional due process rights. Therefore, egregious law enforcement conduct that violates due process, as in Glosson and State v. Williams, still warrants judicial intervention and dismissal, regardless of predisposition. For statutory entrapment under section 777.201, the subjective test applies: (1) the accused must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the government induced the offense; (2) the burden then shifts to the prosecution to prove the defendant's predisposition prior to and independent of the inducement, beyond a reasonable doubt. While the statute mandates jury submission, a judge can rule on entrapment as a matter of law if the facts are undisputed and the State fails to show predisposition, as requiring a jury to decide a purely legal question would violate procedural due process. Applying this to Munoz, the undisputed facts showed government inducement and no evidence of Munoz's predisposition prior to or independent of the inducement, leading the Court to conclude Munoz was entrapped as a matter of law. The Court quashed the district court's decision and reinstated the trial court's dismissal.
Concurring - KOGAN, J.
Justice Kogan concurred, noting that the due process entrapment defense recognized in Cruz, Glosson, and Hunter is essentially the same as "objective entrapment." He observed that the majority appears to discard "objective entrapment" only to reintroduce a similar concept into Florida law through the due process clause, albeit with some minor adjustments to the analysis. He generally agreed with the majority’s conclusions but suggested that future cases might be needed to fully clarify the precise analysis to be used.
Concurring - SHAW, J.
Justice Shaw concurred in the result only, providing no separate reasoning.
Analysis:
This case is highly significant as it harmonized conflicting interpretations among Florida's district courts regarding the entrapment defense. It established a bifurcated framework for entrapment: a constitutional due process defense, where a judge can dismiss charges due to egregious police misconduct regardless of predisposition, and a statutory subjective test, which focuses on the defendant's predisposition. The ruling reaffirmed the judiciary's ultimate authority to protect constitutional due process rights, preventing legislative overreach. Furthermore, it clarified the burden-shifting mechanism under the subjective test and underscored that entrapment can still be found as a matter of law if the facts are undisputed, particularly concerning the "prior to and independent of" predisposition requirement from Jacobson.
