Mullett v. Bradley
53 N.Y.S. 781, 24 Misc. 695 (1898)
Sections
Rule of Law:
A property right in a wild animal (ferae naturae) is qualified and is wholly lost when the animal escapes confinement, regains its natural liberty, and demonstrates no intention of returning (animus revertendi), regardless of whether it has returned to its native habitat.
Facts:
- The Plaintiff, who was in the business of capturing animals, caught a sea lion near San Francisco and transported it to the East Coast.
- After a buyer rejected the animal due to blemishes, the Plaintiff placed the sea lion on Glen Island in the Long Island Sound.
- In July 1896, the sea lion escaped the Plaintiff's control; the Plaintiff made no effort to recapture it, believing it was lost forever.
- Approximately two weeks later, a fisherman captured the sea lion in a fish-pound on the New Jersey coast, over 70 miles from Glen Island.
- The fisherman sold the sea lion to the Defendant.
- About one year later, the Plaintiff discovered the sea lion in the Defendant's possession.
- The Plaintiff demanded the return of the animal, but the Defendant refused.
Procedural Posture:
- The Plaintiff sued the Defendant for conversion (wrongful possession) of the sea lion in the lower trial court.
- The trial court dismissed the complaint on the merits, ruling in favor of the Defendant.
- The Plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court, Appellate Term.
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Issue:
Does an owner retain property rights in a wild animal that escapes confinement and regains its freedom from artificial restraint, even if the animal is not native to the region where it escaped?
Opinions:
Majority - Presiding Justice Beekman
No, the owner does not retain property rights because the animal regained its natural liberty without any intention of returning. The court reasoned that sea lions are ferae naturae (wild by nature), meaning property rights in them are qualified and exist only as long as the animal is under the owner's actual control or possesses animus revertendi (an intent to return). In this case, the evidence showed no custom of returning; rather, the animal fled immediately and traveled 70 miles away, indicating an intent to remain free. The court rejected the Plaintiff's argument that the animal had not regained 'natural liberty' because it was not in its native Pacific habitat. The court defined 'natural liberty' not as a return to a specific geography, but as the freedom from artificial restraint and the ability to follow natural inclinations.
Analysis:
This case is a classic illustration of the Law of Capture and the ephemeral nature of property rights in wild animals. It clarifies the definition of 'natural liberty' in the context of escaped exotic animals. The court established that an animal does not need to return to its indigenous climate or geography to be considered 'wild' and 'free' again in the eyes of the law; it merely needs to be free from human restraint and able to provide for itself. This distinction prevents owners from claiming perpetual ownership over escaped exotic animals simply because the animals are far from home.
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