Muller v. . McKesson
1878 N.Y. LEXIS 599, 73 N.Y. 195 (1878)
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Rule of Law:
The owner of a known vicious animal is strictly liable for injuries caused by it; this liability is not excused by the contributory negligence of the injured person unless their actions, taken with full knowledge of the immediate risk, were the sole cause of the injury.
Facts:
- The defendants owned a chemical factory and a ferocious Siberian bloodhound used as a guard dog.
- The dog was typically kept fastened during the day and let loose in the factory's enclosed yard at night.
- The plaintiff was employed by the defendants as a nightwatchman.
- The plaintiff's duties required him to cross the yard each morning to open the main gate for other workmen.
- An engineer was responsible for securing the dog in the morning and for notifying the plaintiff if the dog was loose.
- On the morning of the incident, the plaintiff was not notified that the dog was loose.
- While returning from his duty of opening the gate, the plaintiff was attacked and severely bitten by the dog, which was loose in the yard.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff sued the defendants in a New York trial court to recover for his injuries.
- At the conclusion of the trial, the defendants moved for a nonsuit, which the trial judge denied.
- The trial judge then ruled as a matter of law that the defendants were liable and that the only issue for the jury to decide was the amount of damages.
- The defendants appealed from the judgment entered against them.
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Issue:
Does an employee's failure to check if a known vicious dog was secured constitute contributory negligence sufficient to relieve the employer-owner from strict liability for injuries, when the employee was performing his duties and had no notice the dog was loose?
Opinions:
Majority - Church, Ch. J.
No. An owner of a vicious animal is held to a standard of strict liability, and the ordinary defense of contributory negligence is not applicable unless the injured party, with full knowledge of the danger, voluntarily brought the injury upon himself. The gravamen of the action is the keeping of the ferocious animal, not the manner in which it was confined. The court reasoned that since the owner's negligence is presumed and absolute, the negligence of a co-servant in failing to secure the animal is also immaterial. To be relieved of liability, the owner must prove the injured person's act was the direct cause, such as wantonly exciting the animal or unnecessarily placing oneself in its way with full notice of the risk. Here, the plaintiff was properly discharging his duties, had no notice the dog was loose, and reasonably believed it was secured per custom. Therefore, he did not voluntarily bring the calamity upon himself, and the defendants remain liable.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the doctrine of strict liability for owners of known dangerous animals, significantly limiting the applicability of traditional tort defenses. It establishes that contributory negligence is not a defense in its ordinary sense; instead, the defendant must show the plaintiff's conduct was essentially a willful act that superseded the defendant's wrongdoing. This raises the bar for defendants in such cases, reinforcing the public policy of protecting human life and safety from the inherent danger of keeping ferocious animals. The ruling also clarifies that the fellow-servant rule and assumption of risk are not viable defenses when an injury results from a risk beyond what the employee agreed to assume.
