Mullaney v. Wilbur
421 U.S. 684 (1975)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when that issue is properly presented in a homicide case. A state may not shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant for a fact critical to determining the degree of criminal culpability, even if state law characterizes that fact as a mitigating factor rather than an element of the crime.
Facts:
- Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr. fatally assaulted Claude Hebert in Hebert's hotel room.
- In a pretrial statement introduced by the prosecution, Wilbur claimed he attacked Hebert in a frenzy.
- Wilbur's statement asserted that this frenzy was provoked by Hebert's homosexual advance.
- At trial, Wilbur's defense did not present any evidence but argued that the killing occurred in the heat of passion on sudden provocation, making it manslaughter rather than murder.
Procedural Posture:
- A jury in a Maine state trial court found Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr. guilty of murder.
- The trial court instructed the jury that malice was implied unless Wilbur proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion.
- Wilbur appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, arguing the instruction violated due process; the court rejected his appeal.
- Wilbur filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, which was granted.
- The State of Maine appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's grant of habeas corpus.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of a recent Maine court decision.
- On remand, the First Circuit again affirmed the grant of habeas corpus.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.
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Issue:
Does a state law that requires a homicide defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Powell
Yes. The Maine rule violates the Due Process Clause. The constitutional requirement that the prosecution prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be circumvented by a state redefining the elements of a crime and characterizing a critical factual issue, like the absence of heat of passion, as merely a factor for sentencing. The court found that the distinction between murder and manslaughter is of major significance, affecting both the potential for a life sentence and the social stigma of the conviction. Because the absence of heat of passion is the critical factor that distinguishes murder from manslaughter under Maine law and determines the degree of culpability, the prosecution must bear the burden of proving that fact beyond a reasonable doubt, in line with the principles of In re Winship. The Court emphasized that its analysis is concerned with substance and the actual effect of the law, not formalistic labels created by the state legislature.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Yes. The holding is consistent with In re Winship and does not conflict with Leland v. Oregon, which allowed a state to require a defendant to prove the affirmative defense of insanity. Insanity is a defense considered only after the prosecution has proven all elements of the crime, including the required mental state (mens rea). In contrast, the presence or absence of 'heat of passion' is not a separate defense but is directly intertwined with the mental element of malice aforethought, which is a necessary component of the crime of murder. Therefore, placing the burden on the defendant to disprove an element essential to the higher degree of the crime constitutes an unconstitutional shift of the state's burden of proof.
Analysis:
This decision significantly extended the constitutional protections established in In re Winship. It clarified that the prosecution's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applies not only to the formal elements of a crime but also to any fact that is a functional equivalent of an element, particularly those that determine the degree of the offense and the severity of the punishment. Mullaney prevents states from using legislative formalism—redefining crimes to characterize critical facts as affirmative defenses or mitigating circumstances—to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. This ruling reinforces the principle of substance over form in due process analysis and has had a lasting impact on how criminal statutes and affirmative defenses are structured and reviewed.
