Muldrow v. City of St. Louis
601 U.S. 346 (2024)
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Rule of Law:
To state a claim of discrimination under Title VII for a job transfer, an employee must show that the transfer brought about some disadvantageous change in the terms or conditions of employment, but the employee does not need to show that the harm was 'significant' or 'material.'
Facts:
- From 2008 to 2017, Sergeant Jatonya Muldrow worked as a plainclothes officer in the St. Louis Police Department's specialized Intelligence Division, a role considered prestigious.
- As part of her position, Muldrow was deputized as a Task Force Officer with the FBI, which afforded her FBI credentials, an unmarked take-home vehicle, and a regular Monday-to-Friday work schedule.
- In 2017, the new commander of the Intelligence Division, Captain Michael Deeba, requested to transfer Muldrow out of the unit to replace her with a male officer.
- Against her wishes, the Department approved the transfer and reassigned Muldrow to a uniformed position in the Fifth District.
- In her new position, Muldrow's rank and pay remained the same, but her duties changed to supervising patrol officers, her schedule became a rotating one that included weekends, and she lost her take-home vehicle and FBI credentials.
Procedural Posture:
- Jatonya Muldrow sued the City of St. Louis in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of St. Louis.
- The District Court reasoned that Muldrow had not shown that her transfer effected a 'significant' change in working conditions producing a 'material employment disadvantage.'
- Muldrow, as appellant, appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Muldrow failed to show the transfer caused a 'materially significant disadvantage.'
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Muldrow's petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the issue.
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Issue:
Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 require an employee challenging a discriminatory job transfer to show that the transfer caused a 'significant' or 'materially adverse' disadvantage with respect to their terms or conditions of employment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kagan
No. An employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the transfer caused some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant. The text of Title VII prohibits discriminating against an individual regarding the 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' without establishing an elevated threshold of harm. To demand 'significance' is to add words to the statute that Congress did not write. The term 'discriminate against' means to treat someone worse, and any disadvantageous change to employment terms or conditions based on a protected characteristic is actionable. The Court distinguished this standard from the 'materially adverse' standard used in Title VII retaliation cases under Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, explaining that the anti-retaliation provision's standard is designed to prevent actions that would dissuade a reasonable worker from making a charge of discrimination, a rationale that does not apply to the core anti-discrimination provision.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
While concurring in the judgment to vacate and remand, Justice Thomas argues that the practical difference between the Court's 'some harm' standard and the lower courts' 'materially significant disadvantage' standard is minimal. Both standards essentially require a harm that is more than trifling or de minimis. The Eighth Circuit likely ruled against Muldrow because her claims of harm were either forfeited or lacked sufficient evidentiary support, not because it applied an improperly high legal standard. Muldrow failed to prove a non-trifling change in her job's prestige, which was her main argument on appeal. Thus, while agreeing with remanding the case, Justice Thomas views the distinction between the standards as largely semantic rather than substantive.
Concurring - Justice Alito
The judgment is correct, but the majority opinion is unhelpful. There is little substantive difference between the 'harm' or 'injury' standard the Court adopts and the 'significant' or 'substantial' terminology it rejects. The definitions of 'harm' and 'injury' already incorporate some degree of significance. As a result, lower court judges will likely continue to apply the same substantive analysis as before, merely changing their vocabulary to comply with this decision.
Concurring - Justice Kavanaugh
No. The Court is correct to reject the 'significant disadvantage' requirement, but it needlessly adds a new 'some harm' requirement. A discriminatory transfer itself is the actionable harm under Title VII because a transfer inherently changes the 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.' The plain text of the statute requires no separate showing of harm beyond the discriminatory act of the transfer itself. However, since the Court's 'some harm' bar is low, this approach will likely lead to the same result as a per se rule in nearly all cases.
Analysis:
This decision resolves a circuit split by lowering the standard of harm a plaintiff must show in a Title VII discriminatory transfer case. By rejecting the 'significant' or 'material' harm requirement, the Court makes it easier for employees to bring claims based on transfers that negatively alter job responsibilities, schedules, or perks, even if rank and pay are unaffected. This clarification separates the analysis for core discrimination claims from the higher 'materially adverse' standard used in retaliation claims, potentially allowing more cases to survive summary judgment and proceed to trial. The ruling forces lower courts to focus on whether any disadvantageous change occurred due to a protected status, rather than on the magnitude of that change.
