Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co.
1986 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1136, 54 U.S.L.W. 2566, 386 N.W.2d 67 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
Iowa law adheres to the traditional rule of causation in product liability actions, requiring a plaintiff to prove that the defendant manufactured or supplied the specific product that caused the injury, and rejects theories of enterprise, alternative, or market share liability to circumvent this requirement.
Facts:
- In 1949, Cleo Rorman was prescribed and ingested the drug DES (a synthetic estrogen compound of stilbene derivatives) during her pregnancy with Linda Mulcahy by her physician, Dr. Lee E. Rosebrook, in Ames, Iowa.
- Dr. Rosebrook did not specify any particular brand or trade name of DES when writing prescriptions, and Mrs. Rorman could not remember where she filled the prescription or what the medication looked like.
- Linda Mulcahy was allegedly injured due to her in utero exposure to DES.
- Linda Mulcahy later gave birth prematurely to two children in 1973 and 1976, who also allegedly sustained injuries as a result of Linda's in utero DES exposure.
- After extensive discovery, Linda Mulcahy and Michael Mulcahy were unable to positively identify which specific defendant(s) manufactured or marketed the DES ingested by Mrs. Rorman.
- Plaintiffs had evidence that DES manufactured by Eli Lilly & Co. was available in at least one pharmacy in Ames, Iowa, in 1949, and asserted that DES from Abbott Laboratories, Inc. and The Upjohn Company may have also been available there.
Procedural Posture:
- Linda Mulcahy and Michael Mulcahy commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa against 25 companies alleged to have manufactured and marketed DES.
- All defendants filed motions for summary judgment, arguing a lack of evidence regarding which defendant manufactured or marketed the DES ingested by Mrs. Rorman.
- The federal district court reserved ruling on the motions of the three companies that had sales in Ames, Iowa, but held that summary judgment for the remaining defendants would be appropriate unless Iowa law permitted imposing liability without specific product identification.
- The federal district court, pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 684A and Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure 451-61, certified questions of law to the Iowa Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does Iowa law recognize theories of enterprise, alternative, or market share liability in product liability cases when a plaintiff cannot identify the specific manufacturer or seller of the injury-causing product, such as DES, after exhaustive discovery?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Schultz
No, Iowa law does not recognize enterprise, alternative, or market share liability in product liability cases where the specific manufacturer of an injury-causing product cannot be identified. The court firmly adheres to the established principle that a plaintiff must prove a causal connection between the defendant's specific product and the plaintiff's injury. Regarding enterprise liability, the court found the facts inappropriate for its application, noting that the DES industry involved a large number of manufacturers (unlike the small number in the originating case, Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.) and lacked industry-wide delegation of safety functions to a trade association, with pervasive regulation instead exercised by the Food and Drug Administration. For alternative liability, the court distinguished the present DES case from its foundational precedent, Summers v. Tice, because in Summers, all possible tortfeasors were before the court, and there was a certainty that one of the named defendants caused the harm. In the DES context, the plaintiffs could not establish that the three named companies constituted the only possible manufacturers of DES in the relevant market, making the application of alternative liability, which requires the plaintiff to prove harm by the conduct of one of the defendants before the court, speculative. Finally, the court rejected market share liability on a broad policy basis. It viewed this theory, which apportions liability based on market share without direct proof of causation for a specific injury, as a form of "court-constructed insurance plan" and "social engineering" that is more appropriately within the legislative domain. The court emphasized its commitment to fundamental negligence requirements of proving causation and cautioned against imposing liability on manufacturers for harm they may not have caused without legislative guidance or prior warnings.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Iowa's strict adherence to traditional tort principles of causation in product liability cases, particularly in complex, multi-defendant scenarios like those involving DES. It places a significant burden on plaintiffs to identify the specific manufacturer of the harm-causing product, effectively closing off avenues of recovery that have been adopted by courts in other jurisdictions. The ruling also underscores the Iowa Supreme Court's view on judicial restraint, signaling that fundamental shifts in liability rules, especially those that assign liability without direct causation, are matters for the legislature rather than the judiciary, leaving plaintiffs in such situations with limited recourse under common law.
