MOTOROLA INC. v. MICHAEL PATRICK MURRAY
2016 WL 6134870, 147 A.3d 751, 2016 D.C. App. LEXIS 382 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
The District of Columbia courts will now apply Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as the standard for admitting expert testimony, requiring a trial judge to assess both the reliability of an expert's principles and methods and their reliable application to the facts of the case.
Facts:
- Plaintiffs filed thirteen lawsuits against various cell phone manufacturers, service providers, and trade associations.
- Plaintiffs alleged that long-term exposure to cell-phone radiation causes brain tumors.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs sued numerous cell phone manufacturers, service providers, and trade associations in Superior Court.
- Judge Frederick H. Weisberg of the Superior Court held four weeks of evidentiary hearings on the admissibility of the expert testimony offered by the plaintiffs regarding causation.
- Judge Weisberg concluded that some, but not all, of plaintiffs' expert testimony on general causation would be admissible under the Frye/Dyas standard, but most, if not all, would likely be excluded under the Rule 702/Daubert standard.
- Judge Weisberg certified the question of whether the District of Columbia should adopt Federal Rule of Evidence 702 for interlocutory appeal.
- The District of Columbia Court of Appeals granted appellants’ motion for interlocutory review.
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Issue:
Should the District of Columbia courts abandon the Dyas/Frye test, which focuses on general acceptance, and adopt Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which requires a broader assessment of expert testimony's reliability and relevance, for the admissibility of expert evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Fisher, Associate Judge
Yes, the District of Columbia courts should abandon the Dyas/Frye test and adopt Federal Rule of Evidence 702 for the admissibility of expert testimony. The court, sitting en banc, determined its role was to decide whether to change the legal standard for expert testimony. It detailed the existing Dyas/Frye test, which required (1) the subject matter to be beyond the ken of the average layman, (2) the witness to have sufficient skill to aid the trier of fact, and (3) the scientific theory or methodology to have gained "general acceptance" in the relevant scientific community. The court noted that Dyas/Frye inquiry "begins—and ends—with a determination of whether there is general acceptance of a particular scientific methodology," not its application or correctness in a specific case. The opinion then outlined the Supreme Court's Daubert trilogy (Daubert, Joiner, Kumho Tire), which superseded Frye in federal courts by interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Daubert relaxed the "general acceptance" requirement but emphasized the trial judge's "gatekeeping" role to ensure expert testimony is both relevant and reliable. It suggested factors like testing, peer review, known error rate, and standards, while maintaining a flexible inquiry. Joiner clarified that conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct, allowing courts to exclude opinions with "too great an analytical gap." Kumho Tire extended Daubert's gatekeeping to all specialized knowledge and stressed the trial judge's broad latitude in determining reliability. The court observed that the amended Rule 702 (2000) reflects the Daubert trilogy's guidance, requiring expert testimony to be: (a) helpful to the trier of fact, (b) based on sufficient facts/data, (c) the product of reliable principles/methods, and (d) reliably applied to the facts. The court found Rule 702 preferable because its expanded focus on the reliable application of principles and methods is a decided advantage over Dyas/Frye's sole focus on general acceptance of methodology. It acknowledged criticisms of both tests but concluded that Rule 702 leads to better decision-making by allowing "good science" in and keeping "bad science" out, regardless of general acceptance. The court noted the benefits of uniformity with federal and other state rules, and expressed confidence in trial judges to perform this gatekeeping function. The new Rule 702 will apply to the present case and all trials beginning after the date of the opinion.
Concurring - Easterly, Associate Judge
Yes, the District of Columbia courts should adopt Federal Rule of Evidence 702 for the admissibility of expert testimony. Judge Easterly concurred with the court's decision, emphasizing that the adoption of Rule 702 means trial courts must now rigorously scrutinize all forensic expert testimony, including types routinely admitted under the old Dyas/Frye standard, as there is no "grandfathering" provision. The opinion highlighted the utility of landmark reports, such as the National Research Council's 2009 report and the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology’s (PCAST) 2016 report, which provide guidance on scientific validity for forensic disciplines. These reports offer an objective yardstick and critiques, recommending that judges consider "foundational validity" (reliable principles and methods) and "validity as applied" (reliable application to facts) under Rule 702. Judge Easterly stressed that expert testimony on certainty must be scientifically valid and limited to empirical evidence, explicitly cautioning against scientifically indefensible claims of "100 percent certainty" or "zero" error rates.
Analysis:
This case represents a significant shift in evidentiary standards for expert testimony in the District of Columbia, moving from a "general acceptance" test to a more rigorous "reliability" standard. The adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 aligns D.C. courts with the federal system and a majority of states, promoting greater uniformity and access to a broader body of jurisprudence on expert evidence. The ruling will likely lead to more extensive pretrial scrutiny of expert qualifications and methodologies, potentially increasing litigation costs for expert challenges but also enhancing the quality and trustworthiness of evidence presented to juries. Future cases will see trial judges playing a more active "gatekeeping" role, particularly for novel scientific theories or forensic evidence previously admitted without extensive reliability checks.
