Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Ass'n v. Environmental Protection Agency
9 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20581, 201 U.S. App. D.C. 109, 627 F.2d 1095 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
Section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act empowers the EPA Administrator to waive federal preemption for California's motor vehicle emission control regulations, including "accompanying enforcement procedures" like in-use maintenance regulations, unless there is clear and compelling evidence that California's determination of protectiveness was arbitrary and capricious, the state does not need the standards for compelling circumstances, or the standards/procedures are inconsistent with technological feasibility under Section 202(a). The burden of proof to demonstrate that a waiver should be denied rests with those challenging the waiver.
Facts:
- Section 209 of the Clean Air Act generally preempts state motor vehicle emission control regulations but requires the EPA Administrator to waive this preemption for California unless specific findings are made against it.
- The federal program establishes nationwide motor vehicle emission standards and a certification process where prototype vehicles undergo durability tests with limited scheduled maintenance to ensure compliance.
- California, due to its unique status, maintains an emissions control program that parallels the federal one.
- In May 1977, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) adopted "in-use maintenance regulations" limiting the amount of scheduled maintenance manufacturers could require of purchasers in the written instructions for new motor vehicles, making compliance a condition for retail sale in California.
- CARB staff reports indicated that in-use vehicles were not achieving demonstrated emission control levels, partly due to improper maintenance, and suggested that reducing required maintenance could encourage more durable emission-related parts.
- During public hearings and workshops, manufacturers raised objections, particularly regarding the technological feasibility of limiting maintenance on various parts.
- CARB subsequently adopted a resolution finding that its maintenance regulations met the requirements imposed by the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act.
- After conducting two public hearings and reviewing the record, the EPA Administrator concluded that there was no plausible evidence that California's new in-use maintenance regulations would impair the protectiveness of California's emission standards, nor had manufacturers shown technological infeasibility.
Procedural Posture:
- In May 1977, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) adopted regulations limiting scheduled maintenance for prototype vehicles during certification and for purchasers in new motor vehicle instructions.
- Following the adoption of these regulations, CARB formally requested a waiver from the EPA for them under Section 209 of the Clean Air Act.
- The EPA Administrator conducted a public hearing to consider CARB's initial waiver request.
- After Congress amended the Clean Air Act in 1977, the Administrator held a second public hearing to explore the implications of these amendments for CARB's regulations.
- In July 1978, the EPA Administrator issued a decision granting the waiver of federal preemption for California's in-use maintenance regulations.
- Petitioners, including The Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association, the Automotive Service Industry Association, the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, the Chrysler Corporation, and the General Motors Corporation, filed petitions with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit seeking to set aside the Administrator's waiver decision.
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Issue:
Does Section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act empower the EPA Administrator to waive federal preemption for California’s in-use motor vehicle maintenance regulations, and if so, did the Administrator’s decision to grant such a waiver, based on the presented evidence and scope of review, constitute an arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful action?
Opinions:
Majority - MacKINNON, Circuit Judge
Yes, the EPA Administrator's decision to waive federal preemption for California's in-use motor vehicle maintenance regulations was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful. The court affirmed that Section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act authorizes the Administrator to waive preemption for California's entire program of emissions control, including "accompanying enforcement procedures" like in-use maintenance regulations, not just "standards." This interpretation aligns with the plain meaning of "waive application of this section" and legislative history showing Congress's intent to grant California the "broadest possible discretion" as an environmental "laboratory for innovation." The Administrator correctly classified the in-use maintenance regulations as "accompanying enforcement procedures" and, therefore, only needed to assess whether they endangered the protectiveness of California's already-waived emission standards or were inconsistent with Section 202(a)'s technological feasibility requirements. He was not required to consider if California's determination of protectiveness for the procedures themselves was arbitrary or if the procedures were independently needed for compelling conditions. The burden of proof to demonstrate that a waiver should be denied rests with the parties opposing the waiver. This is supported by legislative history where Congress rejected placing this burden on California. Opponents must present "clear and compelling evidence" that procedures undermine protectiveness and a "preponderance of the evidence" for technological infeasibility. The Administrator was also not required to consider general constitutional or antitrust claims, as these fall outside the narrowly circumscribed scope of a Section 209 waiver proceeding. Petitioners failed to provide sufficient clear and compelling evidence that the regulations undermined the protectiveness of California's standards, nor did they meet the burden to show technological infeasibility, as their claims often relied on unsupported assertions rather than concrete data.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of the EPA Administrator's authority under Section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act, solidifying California's unique role as a leader in motor vehicle emission control. By establishing that "accompanying enforcement procedures" are subject to waiver and that the burden of proof for denying a waiver lies with the challengers, the decision reinforces Congress's intent to grant California broad discretion. This precedent effectively streamlines the waiver process for California's innovations, insulating it from challenges based on general constitutional or antitrust concerns, thereby fostering a dual federal-state regulatory approach where California can continue to serve as an environmental policy laboratory.
