Moses v. Diocese of Colorado
1993 Colo. LEXIS 913, 863 P.2d 310, 17 Brief Times Rptr. 1764 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
The First Amendment does not grant religious organizations immunity from tort liability for breach of fiduciary duty or negligent hiring and supervision when such claims can be resolved by applying neutral principles of law to secular conduct without interpreting ecclesiastical doctrine. However, religious organizations are not vicariously liable for a priest's sexual misconduct with a parishioner, as such acts are outside the scope of employment.
Facts:
- Mary E. Moses Tenantry (Tenantry) had a long history of mental illness, including multiple personality disorder stemming from childhood sexual abuse, but her condition was relatively stable.
- In 1984, the vestry of St. Philip and St. James Episcopal Church hired Father Paul Robinson (Father Robinson) as an assistant priest; his Diocese personnel file included psychological reports indicating problems with depression, low self-esteem, and "sexual identification ambiguity."
- In September 1984, Tenantry sought counseling from Father Robinson regarding her fear about her youngest child's cerebral palsy, and these sessions evolved into a mutual oral sex relationship.
- In mid-1985, Tenantry's sister, Joyce Mohr (Mohr), confronted Father Robinson about the relationship, and he admitted it but tried to keep it secret by claiming it was a confession.
- Mohr and her husband reported the sexual relationship to Father Vernon Myers (Father Myers), the parish priest, who was angered by the disclosure, scolded Mohr for not keeping it secret, minimized Father Robinson's actions, and ordered Tenantry not to talk to Father Robinson.
- In February 1986, after the sexual relationship ended, Tenantry learned Father Robinson had been appointed pastor of St. Michael’s Episcopal Church in Colorado Springs.
- Tenantry then told her husband, Moses, about the sexual relationship; Moses confronted Father Robinson, who admitted it, and Moses informed Bishop William Frey (Bishop Frey).
- On March 3, 1986, the day before a scheduled meeting with Moses, Father Robinson, and Father Myers, Bishop Frey signed a letter promoting Father Robinson, without informing the Colorado Springs parish of the allegations against him.
- At the March 4, 1986 meeting, Father Robinson admitted the sexual relationship; Bishop Frey asked Moses to let him supervise the matter, then met with Tenantry, granted her absolution, but told her not to talk to anyone about the relationship (including her sister) and not to go near the church, while recommending counseling only for Father Robinson.
- By May 1990, Tenantry's marriage ended in divorce, and her mental health significantly deteriorated, including a recurrence of her multiple personality disorder and post-traumatic stress syndrome, especially after learning of Father Robinson's promotion and Bishop Frey's actions.
Procedural Posture:
- In February 1990, Mary E. Moses Tenantry commenced a civil action against the Episcopal Diocese of Colorado and Father Paul Robinson in state trial court.
- Tenantry later amended her complaint to include Bishop William Frey.
- Father Robinson filed for bankruptcy, leading to Tenantry's claims against him being severed from the case.
- A jury returned a verdict finding the Diocese and Bishop Frey liable for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent hiring and supervision, awarding $728,100, and also found them vicariously liable for Father Robinson's breach of fiduciary duty, awarding $488,400.
- The trial judge reduced the jury's noneconomic damage award by $118,000 to comply with a statutory limit of $500,000.
- The Diocese and Bishop Frey appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Colorado, and Tenantry cross-appealed the reduction of the noneconomic damage award.
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Issue:
Does the First Amendment of the United States Constitution preclude civil claims against a religious organization and its bishop for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent hiring and supervision when neutral principles of law can be applied to secular conduct, and is a religious organization vicariously liable for a priest's sexual misconduct with a parishioner?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Erickson
No, the First Amendment does not grant the Diocese and its employees immunity from liability for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent hiring and supervision. Civil courts are not prohibited from applying secular standards to tortious conduct, even when it involves religious organizations. The First Amendment's judicial abstention doctrine, which prevents courts from interpreting or weighing church doctrine or ecclesiastical law (as established in cases like Watson v. Jones and Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich), does not apply here. Under the "neutral principles of law" doctrine (Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church), courts can apply neutral state laws to religious organizations if it does not require resolving disputed issues of religious doctrine and practice. Tenantry's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent hiring and supervision do not require the court to interpret church governance documents or ecclesiastical law; they are based on secular tort principles. The court affirms Destefano v. Grabrian, which held that breach of fiduciary duty is a separate and actionable claim from clergy malpractice (which is not recognized in Colorado). A fiduciary relationship existed between Bishop Frey and Tenantry because Bishop Frey, occupying a superior position of authority in the church and recognized as vulnerable by him, assumed a duty to act for her benefit when he took control of the situation. He breached this duty by binding her to secrecy and taking no action to help her, thereby using her trust to her detriment. Furthermore, the Diocese was negligent in hiring and supervising Father Robinson. An agency relationship existed between the Diocese and Father Robinson due to the hierarchical structure of the Episcopal Church and the Bishop's and Diocese's control over priests' education, screening (including psychological evaluations with a noted "sexual identification ambiguity," depression, and low self-esteem), compensation, counseling duties, and discipline. The Diocese had an increased duty of care in hiring due to Father Robinson's anticipated close contact and special relationship with vulnerable parishioners during counseling. The psychological reports provided notice that Father Robinson might be incapable of counseling vulnerable individuals and handling transference, and the Diocese's failure to communicate this to the vestry and subsequent placement of him in a counseling role breached this duty. Similarly, the Diocese was negligent in supervision, given their knowledge of Father Robinson's psychological issues and previous instances of clergy misconduct, yet failing to adequately monitor his conduct. However, the Diocese and Bishop Frey are not vicariously liable for Father Robinson’s sexual acts. An employer is only vicariously liable for an employee’s tort when it is committed within the course and scope of employment (respondeat superior). Father Robinson's sexual relationship with Tenantry was not part of his assigned duties, customary in the church's business, or incidental to his tasks. Such conduct is contrary to church principles and was explicitly outside the scope of his employment, as confirmed by all parties, including Tenantry's own experts. The court declines to expand vicarious liability to include foreseeable acts like mishandling transference, deeming such claims better addressed through negligent hiring and supervision.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Chief Justice Rovira
No, there was insufficient evidence to establish an employment or agency relationship between the Diocese and Father Robinson to support claims of negligent hiring and supervision. The fundamental requirement for an agency relationship is the principal's right of continuous control over the agent's acts. The uncontradicted evidence showed that Father Robinson, as an assistant priest, served under the authority and direction of the parish's head priest, Father Vernon Myers, for his day-to-day duties, as mandated by Canon 14(a) of the Episcopal Church. This demonstrates that the local rector, not the Diocese or Bishop Frey, exerted continuous control over Father Robinson. Similarly, the key indicators of an employer-employee relationship are continuous control, the power to hire and terminate, and compensation. The undisputed evidence established that the Diocese did not have the power to hire or terminate Father Robinson, as he served "at the discretion of the Rector," and the parish vestry was responsible for his compensation. While the Diocese and Bishop Frey could exert 'influence' over assistant priests, as shown by the hierarchical structure and input in the hiring process or discipline, this influence does not rise to the level of continuous control, hiring/termination authority, or compensation responsibility required for a legal agency or employment relationship. The legal doctrine of subagency, which might have been relevant, was not presented to the jury as a basis for their decision. Therefore, the trial court should have dismissed the claims for negligent hiring and supervision due to lack of evidence for an employment or agency relationship.
Analysis:
This case is highly significant for clarifying the boundaries of religious organizations' civil liability under the First Amendment. It establishes that while churches are not granted absolute immunity from tort claims, courts must carefully apply the "neutral principles of law" doctrine to avoid unconstitutional entanglement with religious doctrine. The decision underscores that claims like breach of fiduciary duty and negligent hiring/supervision can proceed if based on secular conduct and legal standards. However, the ruling also draws a clear line regarding respondeat superior, refusing to hold organizations vicariously liable for clergy's intentional sexual misconduct, emphasizing that such acts are inherently outside the scope of religious employment. This creates a challenging but crucial distinction for future cases involving clergy misconduct, requiring plaintiffs to prove direct negligence rather than relying on automatic vicarious liability for sexual acts.
