Morton v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
33 Cal. App. 4th 1529, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 22, 95 Daily Journal DAR 4605 (1995)
Rule of Law:
In strict products liability claims based on design defect, the consumer expectations test can be applied to simple products like asbestos insulation, and 'state-of-the-art' evidence regarding scientific knowledge at the time of manufacture is irrelevant to demonstrate consumer expectations.
Facts:
- From December 1959 to February 1961, Robert Morton worked as a wireman installing cable on ships at the New York Shipbuilding Yard in Camden, New Jersey, primarily on the ship Kitty Hawk.
- During this time, Mr. Morton was exposed to asbestos-containing insulation products, including those manufactured by Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation (OCF).
- Mr. Morton and other percipient witnesses testified they believed the insulation products used on the Kitty Hawk were safe and had no expectation that exposure to such products would make them ill.
- Mr. Morton was in good health until October 1991, when he developed flu symptoms and chest pains.
- In May 1992, Mr. Morton was diagnosed with mesothelioma, an asbestos-caused form of cancer.
- Mr. Morton died on February 26, 1993, prior to the completion of the trial.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert and Pamela Morton (plaintiffs) brought a strict products liability action against Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation (OCF) and others in the trial court.
- The trial court ordered the trial bifurcated into damages and liability phases.
- The damages phase was tried first to the judge, who made separate findings for various types of damages.
- The liability phase was tried to a jury, which heard Mr. Morton's testimony via videotape deposition.
- After Mr. Morton's death, Mrs. Morton filed a declaration under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32 requesting to continue the action as his survivor, which the court allowed over OCF's objection.
- The jury found OCF liable to the plaintiffs and responsible for 12 percent of their damages.
- Judgment was entered against OCF for damages in favor of Mrs. Morton as administrator of her husband’s estate and in favor of Mrs. Morton individually.
- OCF appealed the judgment to the California Court of Appeal, seeking reversal.
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Issue:
1. Does the 'consumer expectations' test apply to design defect claims involving asbestos-containing products? 2. Is 'state-of-the-art' evidence, regarding what was scientifically known about product risks at the time of manufacture, admissible to disprove a design defect under the consumer expectations test?
Opinions:
Majority - Haerle, J.
Yes, the consumer expectations test applies to design defect claims involving asbestos-containing products when the product is simple and its failure is within the common understanding of ordinary consumers. No, 'state-of-the-art' evidence regarding scientific knowledge at the time of manufacture is not admissible to disprove a design defect under the consumer expectations test. The court affirmed the use of the consumer expectations test for OCF's asbestos-containing insulation product, citing Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) and Sparks v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1995). The court reiterated that this test applies when a product fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect in a reasonably foreseeable manner (Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 1978). Relying on Sparks, the court determined that asbestos insulation is a simple product whose failure (causing mesothelioma) is 'beyond the ‘legitimate, commonly accepted minimum safety assumptions of its ordinary consumers.’' The circumstances were not 'complicated design considerations,' 'obscure components,' or 'esoteric circumstances,' allowing ordinary consumers to form minimum safety expectations. The court found sufficient evidence from Mr. Morton and other witnesses that they believed the product was safe and did not expect illness from exposure. The court upheld the exclusion of OCF's 'state-of-the-art' evidence, which aimed to show that the risks were neither known nor knowable by scientific knowledge available at the time of manufacture. The court reasoned that under the consumer expectations test, the relevant knowledge and reasonable expectations are those of the consumer, not the scientific community. Therefore, what the scientific community knew about asbestos dangers is irrelevant to what a consumer reasonably expected regarding the product's safety. The court distinguished Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1991), which held state-of-the-art evidence admissible for failure to warn claims, but specifically declined to extend it to the consumer expectations test. Similarly, references to state-of-the-art evidence in Barker pertained to the risk-benefit test. The court also noted that while expert testimony might educate a jury about consumer expectations in certain complex situations, OCF's proffered evidence did not show that scientific knowledge was communicated to ordinary consumers. The court modified certain damage awards but otherwise affirmed the judgment of liability against OCF.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the application of the consumer expectations test in strict product liability cases involving products like asbestos, which, despite potentially complex scientific understandings of their harm, are simple in their use and whose dangers can be assessed by ordinary consumer experience. It reinforces that a manufacturer's or distributor's knowledge (or lack thereof) of a product's danger, or the general scientific understanding at the time, is irrelevant when assessing defectiveness under the consumer expectations test. This distinction forces manufacturers of simple products with latent dangers to meet minimum safety expectations of ordinary consumers, regardless of contemporary scientific knowledge, potentially expanding liability for long-latency diseases like those caused by asbestos.
