Morrow v. Morrow
612 P.2d 730 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
Services rendered by one family member to another are presumed to be gratuitous. To enforce a contract for payment for such services, the party asserting the contract exists bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties intended to create a legally binding agreement.
Facts:
- Maude Morrow transferred title to her real property to her son, Woodye Morrow.
- Maude's other son, Warren Morrow, and his wife, Betty Morrow, provided care for Maude until her death.
- Warren and Betty alleged that they had an oral agreement with Woodye.
- The alleged agreement stipulated that upon Maude's death, Woodye would sell the property, first pay Warren and Betty for their caregiving services, and then divide the remainder of the proceeds among Maude's heirs.
- After Maude's death, Woodye refused to pay Warren and Betty for their services.
- Woodye subsequently conveyed certain mineral interests from the property to his own son, Dennis M. Morrow, for no consideration.
Procedural Posture:
- Warren and Betty Morrow (Plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit against Woodye Morrow and Dennis M. Morrow (Defendants) in the Oklahoma District Court (trial court).
- The trial court, sitting in equity without a jury, found the evidence was insufficient to support the Plaintiffs' claim for payment for their services.
- The trial court ruled that the services were presumed to be gratuitous.
- The trial court set aside the mineral conveyance from Woodye to Dennis and ordered the property's assets to be distributed among Maude Morrow's eight surviving children.
- The Plaintiffs, Warren and Betty Morrow, appealed the trial court's denial of their claim for payment for services to the Oklahoma Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does an alleged oral agreement for compensation for services rendered between family members overcome the legal presumption that such services are gratuitous?
Opinions:
Majority - Romang, J.
No. An alleged oral agreement for compensation does not automatically overcome the legal presumption that services between family members are gratuitous; the party asserting the contract must prove the parties intended to be legally bound. The court reasoned that there is a strong societal expectation, reflected in legal principles, that arrangements for care among family members are founded in love and affection, not contractual intent. While family members are free to enter into binding contracts, the burden falls on the party asserting the contract to rebut the factual presumption that the services were gratuitous. The definition of 'family' for this presumption is based on the reality of the relationship and reciprocal duties of care, not merely on legal consanguinity, thus including a daughter-in-law like Betty. Since the trial court, as the finder of fact, was unpersuaded by the evidence of a contract, and the appellants failed to demonstrate that this finding was erroneous as a matter of law, the judgment is affirmed.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the traditional judicial reluctance to interfere in intra-familial arrangements by upholding the strong presumption that services between family members are gratuitous. It clarifies that while this presumption is rebuttable, the evidentiary burden rests squarely on the party seeking compensation to prove a clear intent to form a legally enforceable contract. The decision signals to future litigants that overcoming this presumption requires more than a mere allegation of an oral promise; it requires clear evidence that the arrangement was intended to have legal consequences, distinguishing it from the vast majority of non-contractual, affection-based family support systems. The case also provides a broad, functional definition of 'family' for this rule, extending it beyond blood relations to those who share reciprocal duties of care.
