Morison v. Rawlinson, Chief of Police
193 S.C. 25, 7 S.E.2d 635, 1940 S.C. LEXIS 39 (1940)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A municipal corporation cannot unilaterally declare a particular activity or property a public nuisance by resolution and abate it without a general ordinance defining nuisances and without providing interested parties notice and an opportunity to be heard, unless the activity is a nuisance per se or during a public emergency.
Facts:
- In 1933, a group of Black individuals, members of The House of Prayer, purchased a lot at 2549 Cherry Street in Columbia, South Carolina, and obtained a building permit from the City Council to erect a church building.
- Despite protests from citizens living nearby who worried about the customary form of worship, the City Council granted the building permit upon assurances from The House of Prayer that services would not cause public annoyance.
- In March 1938, numerous white residents in the vicinity of the church petitioned the City Council, alleging that the services conducted at The House of Prayer constituted a public nuisance.
- On March 29, 1938, without prior notice or opportunity for The House of Prayer to be heard, the City Council passed a resolution declaring the church's religious worship a public nuisance and ordering the Police Department to forthwith abate the nuisance and close the church.
- The Police Department immediately enforced the resolution, closing The House of Prayer.
- The church's services included dancing, loud shouting, clapping of hands in unison, stamping of feet, and the incessant use of drums, timbrels, trombones, horns, scrubbing boards, and wash tubs, creating a tumult audible for many city blocks.
- Meetings were conducted daily from early evening until early morning, attracting boisterous and disorderly throngs who congregated in the adjoining streets, often leading to fights.
- Police officers were summoned on multiple occasions to quell disorders, resulting in arrests for disturbing the peace, and on one occasion, an usher resisted arrest with a blackjack and knife.
Procedural Posture:
- The appellants, members of The House of Prayer, instituted a suit in Circuit Court and obtained a temporary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the City Council's resolution.
- The respondents, the Chief of Police and the police department of the City of Columbia, filed an answer and return, admitting the resolution and closure, but alleging the church's services were disorderly and a nuisance.
- Upon return to a rule to show cause, the Circuit Court referred the case to the Master for Richland County to take testimony offered by both sides.
- The Circuit Court modified the temporary injunction, allowing the plaintiffs to worship only up to 10:00 P.M. and granting peace officers the right to prohibit disorderly or boisterous conduct.
- The Master for Richland County took extensive testimony from both sides and reported it to the Circuit Court.
- Upon a full hearing, the Circuit Court issued a decree denying the injunction prayed for by the plaintiffs, dissolved the temporary restraining order (as modified), and dismissed the complaint.
- The plaintiffs appealed the Circuit Court's decision to the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a City Council have the power to declare a religious organization's worship a public nuisance by resolution and abate it without notice or a hearing, when no general ordinance defines such activity as a nuisance, and does the nature of the worship constitute an abatable public nuisance?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Fishburne
No, the City Council did not have the power to declare The House of Prayer a nuisance by resolution without notice or a hearing under the circumstances. However, Yes, the services as conducted constituted an abatable public nuisance. The Court reasoned that while The House of Prayer's services clearly constituted a public nuisance due to their unrestrained noise and public disturbance, the City Council's method of abatement was procedurally flawed. The City of Columbia had no general ordinance defining what constitutes a nuisance; rather, it acted by a mere resolution against a specific entity without affording prior notice or a hearing. The power to declare and abate nuisances must be exercised through general ordinances applicable uniformly to all persons and property of the same character, not by ad hoc resolutions. The Court emphasized that notice and a fair hearing are fundamental requirements before a specific act or thing is declared a nuisance by a council, unless it is a nuisance per se or there is a public emergency. Nonetheless, because the issue of whether the conduct constituted a nuisance was fully litigated in the Circuit Court, with both parties presenting extensive testimony, the appellants had received their "day in Court." The Court concluded that prohibiting the free exercise of religious worship was not at issue; rather, it was a question of maintaining peace and public order in a thickly populated community, and religious liberty does not extend to acts inimical to society's peace and good order, citing Davis v. Beason and In re Frasee.
Analysis:
This case significantly limits a municipality's unilateral power to declare and abate nuisances, emphasizing the necessity of formal legislative action (general ordinances) and adherence to due process (notice and hearing). It clarifies that while religious practices are protected, they are not immune from reasonable regulation when they infringe upon public peace and health. The ruling highlights the judiciary's role in reviewing municipal actions, even when the underlying factual predicate for those actions (a genuine nuisance) is present, to ensure procedural fairness and constitutional protections are observed. This case serves as a precedent for balancing public order with individual liberties, requiring proper legal channels for enforcement.
