Morgan v. Johnson
976 P.2d 619, 137 Wash.2d 887, 1999 Wash. LEXIS 285 (1999)
Rule of Law:
The statutory intoxication defense, which requires a finding that the injured party was more than 50% at fault, does not apply to intentional tort actions because the term 'fault' in the relevant statutes purposefully excludes intentionally caused harm.
Facts:
- Mary Morgan and Louis Johnson had a relationship in the 1960s from which a daughter was born, but they did not marry and lived separate lives, with the daughter remaining with Morgan.
- In the early 1990s, the daughter became curious about her biological father, leading Morgan and Johnson to reestablish a stormy relationship marked by multiple no-contact orders and continued consensual social contacts.
- In the wee hours of April 16, 1994, Morgan and Johnson were at a Seattle karaoke bar and drank together, despite an existing no-contact order.
- After leaving the bar, a dispute occurred in the parking lot; Morgan claimed Johnson threatened her with a knife, dragged her, kicked and struck her, broke the interior rearview mirror of his Jeep, and then struck her in the face with it, breaking a tooth.
- Johnson claimed Morgan was drunk, fell multiple times, tore the rearview mirror from his Jeep and hit herself with it, and that she became violent and beat him after he said they were too drunk to drive.
- A police officer arrived on the scene, found both Morgan and Johnson intoxicated and arguing, with Morgan hysterical, missing a tooth, and having cuts and an elbow abrasion, while Johnson appeared uninjured.
- The officer found the interior rearview mirror and Morgan's broken tooth about 12 feet from Johnson's vehicle in the parking lot.
- Johnson was subsequently arrested for assault, domestic violence, and violation of a no-contact order, and Morgan later received medical attention for her injuries, including surgery and a dental bridge.
Procedural Posture:
- Mary Morgan filed an action for damages against Louis Johnson for the events of April 16, 1994, alleging intentional torts.
- At trial, Morgan waived any claims based upon negligent conduct and restricted her case to the intentional torts of assault and battery.
- Morgan timely objected to the trial court’s jury instruction based on RCW 5.40.060 (intoxication defense) and the jury verdict form which allowed the jury to consider her alleged intoxication as a defense.
- The jury answered special interrogatories, finding that Johnson intentionally caused bodily harm to Morgan, and this conduct proximately caused her injury, but also that Morgan was intoxicated, her intoxication was a proximate cause of her injuries, and she was more than 50 percent at fault.
- In accordance with the Special Verdict Form, the jury did not consider damages.
- Morgan moved for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
- The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict of the jury.
- Morgan appealed the judgment, seeking direct review to the Supreme Court of Washington, which was granted.
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Issue:
Is the intoxication defense provided in RCW 5.40.060 available to an intentional tortfeasor?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Talmadge
No, the intoxication defense provided in RCW 5.40.060 is not available to an intentional tortfeasor because the statute's reference to 'fault' specifically excludes intentional torts. The court's interpretation is guided by well-established principles of statutory construction, emphasizing that unambiguous statutes are construed plainly to effectuate legislative intent. The statute in question, RCW 5.40.060(1), states that the defense applies when the injured person was intoxicated, the intoxication was a proximate cause, and the person was more than fifty percent 'at fault.' While 'fault' is not defined within chapter 5.40 RCW, the Legislature defined it in related tort reform legislation (RCW 4.22.015). This definition of 'fault' includes negligence, recklessness, strict tort liability, and breach of warranty, but pointedly omits intentional torts. Prior cases, such as Schmidt v. Cornerstone Invs., Inc., affirmed that the definition of 'fault' was intended to encompass 'all degrees of fault in tort actions short of intentionally caused harm.' Furthermore, the court noted that the intoxication defense inherently involves a comparative fault analysis, which is central to the comprehensive tort reform scheme (chapter 4.22 RCW), a scheme that purposefully excludes intentional conduct from its purview. Applying this fault-based defense to intentional torts would be inconsistent with precedent like Welch v. Southland Corp., which held that intentional acts are not included in the statutory definition of 'fault' for apportionment of liability. Therefore, the court concluded that given the Legislature's inclusion of 'fault' as an operative element and its purposeful exclusion of intentional actions from that term, the intoxication defense does not apply to intentional torts.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of Washington's statutory intoxication defense and its interaction with the comparative fault scheme. By explicitly excluding intentional torts from the definition of 'fault,' the court reinforces the distinct legal treatment of intentional wrongs versus negligent or reckless conduct. This decision prevents defendants who commit intentional torts from using a plaintiff's intoxication as a complete defense, thereby upholding the deterrent and punitive aspects of intentional tort law. Future cases involving intentional acts will not be subject to the same comparative fault analysis as negligence cases, ensuring that a victim's intoxication cannot be used to absolve an intentional wrongdoer of liability for damages. This maintains a clear line between different forms of tort liability.
