Moore v. Texas (II)
586 U. S. ____ (2019) (2019)
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Rule of Law:
When determining intellectual disability for death penalty eligibility under the Eighth Amendment, state courts must adhere to current medical community standards. A court's analysis is constitutionally deficient if it relies on lay stereotypes, overemphasizes a defendant's adaptive strengths (especially those developed in prison), dismisses adaptive deficits by pointing to co-occurring mental health issues, or uses non-clinical factors that are functionally equivalent to those previously rejected by the Supreme Court.
Facts:
- As a child, Bobby James Moore lacked a basic understanding of concepts like the days of the week, months of the year, and seasons.
- Moore could scarcely tell time or comprehend basic measurements or the concept of subtraction.
- In school, Moore could not keep up with lessons due to limited reading and writing ability and was often told to draw pictures while other students worked.
- His father, teachers, and peers frequently called him 'stupid' for his slow reading and speech.
- After failing every subject in the ninth grade, Moore dropped out of high school.
- Moore was subsequently cast out of his home and became homeless, surviving by eating from trash cans.
- Throughout this period, evidence showed Moore had significant adaptive deficits in conceptual, social, and practical skills.
- Moore's intellectual testing later indicated that he was in a borderline range for intellectual disability.
Procedural Posture:
- Bobby James Moore filed a state habeas corpus petition in a Texas trial court, arguing he was intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for execution.
- The state habeas trial court conducted a hearing and found that Moore was intellectually disabled.
- The State of Texas appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the state's highest court for criminal matters.
- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court's finding, holding that Moore was not intellectually disabled and was eligible for the death penalty (Ex parte Moore I).
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Texas court's judgment, and remanded the case, holding that the state court's analysis relied on medically outdated and improper factors (Moore v. Texas I).
- On remand, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reconsidered the case but once again concluded that Moore was not intellectually disabled (Ex parte Moore II).
- Moore filed a new petition for a writ of certiorari, asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Texas court's decision on remand.
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Issue:
Does the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' determination that Bobby James Moore is not intellectually disabled, and is therefore eligible for the death penalty, violate the Eighth Amendment by failing to adhere to prevailing medical standards and by repeating analytical errors previously identified by the Supreme Court?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' determination violates the Eighth Amendment because its analysis is inconsistent with the Court's prior opinion and with prevailing clinical standards for assessing intellectual disability. The state court repeated several errors previously identified as improper: 1) It overemphasized Moore's perceived adaptive strengths, such as his ability to file pro se papers in prison, rather than focusing on his significant adaptive deficits as required by clinical practice. 2) It improperly relied on adaptive improvements Moore made within the controlled setting of prison, which clinicians caution against. 3) It wrongly concluded that Moore’s adaptive deficits could be explained away by 'emotional problems,' contrary to the medical understanding that intellectual disability can coexist with other mental health conditions. 4) Despite claiming to abandon the outdated, non-clinical 'Briseno factors,' the court's analysis was 'pervasively infected' by them, as it focused on the planning of the crime and Moore's coherence in testimony. The opinion rests on lay stereotypes and analysis that too closely resembles what the Court previously found unconstitutional.
Concurring - Chief Justice Roberts
Yes. While the Court's prior opinion in this case lacked clarity, it is easy to see that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals misapplied it. The state court repeated the same fundamental errors that this Court previously condemned. Specifically, it again relied on the substance of the prohibited Briseno factors and improperly emphasized Moore’s adaptive strengths rather than his deficits. This analysis was unconstitutional the first time, and it remains unconstitutional now.
Dissenting - Justice Alito
No. The Court should not have granted review, and its summary reversal is an improper foray into fact-finding. The Court’s prior opinion in this case failed to provide a clear, workable standard, so the Texas court's alleged errors are understandable. The majority faults the state court for 'overemphasizing' strengths without ever defining the line between permissible consideration and forbidden 'overemphasis.' Instead of usurping the state court's fact-finding role, the proper remedy for a legal error would be to vacate and remand with a clearer rule. The error in this litigation was not the state court's decision but this Court's own failure to provide a coherent rule of decision in the first place.
Analysis:
This per curiam opinion serves as a forceful reaffirmation of Moore v. Texas I and a direct rebuke to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for failing to adhere to a Supreme Court mandate. The decision solidifies the principle that the Eighth Amendment requires courts to use current, evolving medical standards to assess intellectual disability, not non-clinical, judge-made factors rooted in lay stereotypes. By summarily reversing, the Court signaled its impatience with lower courts that attempt to circumvent its precedents through superficial analytical changes while retaining the substance of a constitutionally flawed approach. The case underscores that the substance of the clinical inquiry—particularly the focus on deficits over strengths—is a constitutional requirement, not merely a suggestion.
