Moore v. Regents of the University of California
793 P.2d 479, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
A physician has a fiduciary duty to disclose personal research and economic interests in a patient's cells before treatment, but the patient does not retain a property interest in their excised cells sufficient to support a cause of action for conversion.
Facts:
- John Moore was diagnosed with hairy-cell leukemia and sought treatment from Dr. David W. Golde at the UCLA Medical Center in 1976.
- Dr. Golde, aware of the potential scientific and commercial value of Moore's unique blood cells, recommended the removal of Moore's spleen to slow the progression of his disease.
- Before the operation, Golde and researcher Shirley Quan made arrangements to obtain portions of Moore's spleen for research purposes unrelated to his medical care, without informing Moore of their plans.
- Moore consented to the splenectomy, which was performed on October 20, 1976, believing it was solely for his therapeutic benefit.
- Between 1976 and 1983, Golde instructed Moore to travel from his home in Seattle to UCLA for follow-up appointments, representing them as necessary for his health.
- During these visits, Golde withdrew additional samples of Moore's blood, bone marrow aspirate, and other bodily substances.
- Without Moore's knowledge, Golde and his associates used these biological samples to develop a patented cell line, named the "Mo" cell line.
- Golde, the University of California Regents, and Quan entered into commercial agreements with Genetics Institute and Sandoz Pharmaceuticals to exploit the cell line, from which they derived significant financial benefit.
Procedural Posture:
- John Moore filed suit in California superior court (the trial court) against Dr. Golde, the Regents of the University of California, and others.
- The superior court sustained the defendants' demurrers, effectively dismissing Moore's lawsuit on the grounds that he had failed to state a valid cause of action, particularly for conversion.
- Moore, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the California Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal, as an intermediate appellate court, reversed the trial court's decision, finding that Moore had stated a valid cause of action for conversion.
- The defendants, as petitioners, appealed the Court of Appeal's decision to the Supreme Court of California.
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Issue:
Does an individual retain a property interest in their excised cells sufficient to support a cause of action for conversion against those who use the cells for lucrative medical research without the individual's permission?
Opinions:
Majority - Panelli, J.
No. An individual does not retain an ownership interest in their cells after they are removed from the body, and thus cannot sue for conversion. The court rejected the conversion claim for three main reasons: 1) A fair balancing of policy considerations counsels against extending the tort, as it would threaten to chill socially useful medical research by creating uncertainty over title to biological materials and imposing strict liability on innocent researchers. 2) Existing California statutes drastically limit a patient's control over excised cells, requiring their disposal as medical waste and thus removing many traditional rights associated with property ownership. 3) The patented cell line and its products are legally and factually distinct from Moore's own cells, representing the product of 'human ingenuity' rather than a naturally occurring substance. However, the court did hold that Moore stated a valid cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent, as a physician must disclose all personal research or economic interests that may affect their professional judgment and be material to a patient's decision to consent.
Concurring - Arabian, J.
No. This opinion joins the majority but emphasizes the moral and philosophical objections to recognizing a property right in human tissue. The issue of whether to commodify the human body implicates profound societal values and is a complex policy decision best left to the Legislature, which can hold hearings and gather expert advice. Courts should exercise forbearance in such matters, recognizing that they cannot resolve every moral conundrum, especially when a remedy (breach of fiduciary duty) already exists for the plaintiff.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Broussard, J.
Yes. This opinion concurs that a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty exists but dissents from the rejection of the conversion claim. Under traditional common law principles, a patient possesses the right to determine the use of a body part before it is removed. By failing to disclose his interests, Dr. Golde wrongfully interfered with Moore's right to control the use of his spleen and other tissues prior to their excision. This misappropriation of the right of control is a proper basis for a conversion claim, regardless of whether a property interest exists after removal.
Dissenting - Mosk, J.
Yes. The majority's conclusion is incorrect because the concept of property is broad enough to include an interest in one's own tissues. The policy of protecting the sanctity of the human body and preventing unjust enrichment strongly favors recognizing a patient's right to share in the profits derived from their unique biological materials. The breach of fiduciary duty claim is an inadequate remedy because it is difficult to prove causation and fails to give the patient an affirmative right to share in the profits. The majority's fear of harming research is overstated, as researchers can protect themselves through proper record-keeping and consent procedures.
Analysis:
This landmark decision established a critical boundary in biotechnology law by separating the rights of patients from the property claims of researchers. By rejecting the conversion claim, the court provided legal certainty and protection for the burgeoning biotechnology industry, ensuring that researchers and companies could invest in developing cell lines without fear of property disputes from the sources of the biological material. However, by upholding the claim for lack of informed consent, the court reinforced and expanded the fiduciary duties of physicians, requiring them to disclose any personal financial or research interests that could conflict with a patient's care. The ruling effectively prioritizes societal interest in medical research over an individual's right to profit from their own biological materials, leaving a significant ethical and legal gap that many argue must be addressed by legislatures.
