Moore v. Illinois
434 US 220, 98 S. Ct. 458, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 163 (1977)
Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches to corporeal (physical) identifications conducted at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings, such as a preliminary hearing. Direct testimony by a witness at trial about such an uncounseled pretrial identification is per se inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief, even if an independent source for the witness's identification could be shown.
Facts:
- Shortly after noon on December 14, 1967, a man entered the victim's Chicago apartment, choked her, forced her to commit oral sodomy, raped her, and then left, taking a guitar and a flute.
- The victim described her assailant to police, stating she had seen his face for 10-15 seconds and thought he was the same man who had made offensive remarks to her in a neighborhood bar the night before.
- Police showed the victim two groups of photographs; she picked petitioner's photo from the second group as one resembling her assailant.
- Police also found a letter in a notebook the victim had found, which investigation linked to a woman with whom petitioner had been staying, suggesting petitioner had access to it.
- On the evening of December 20, 1967, police arrested petitioner at his apartment.
- The next morning, December 21, 1967, a policeman accompanied the victim to the Circuit Court of Cook County for a preliminary hearing, telling her she was going to view a suspect and should identify him if she could.
- At the hearing, the victim signed a complaint naming petitioner, heard his name called as he was led before the bench, and heard the State's Attorney summarize evidence linking him to the offenses.
- The State's Attorney then asked the victim if she saw her assailant in the courtroom, and she pointed at petitioner.
- Petitioner was not represented by counsel at this preliminary hearing, and the court did not offer to appoint counsel.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioner was convicted of rape and related offenses in the Circuit Court of Cook County (trial court).
- The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's convictions, rejecting his argument that identification testimony should have been excluded.
- The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari (409 U. S. 979 (1972)).
- Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Federal District Court, contending admission of identification testimony violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
- The Federal District Court denied the writ, finding an independent basis for the identification.
- The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of the writ (United States ex rel. Moore v. Illinois, 534 F. 2d 331 (1976)).
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari (429 U. S. 1061 (1977)).
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Issue:
Does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel apply to a corporeal identification made by a victim against a defendant at a preliminary hearing where the defendant is not represented by counsel, thereby requiring the exclusion of testimony about that identification from trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Powell
Yes, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to the identification at the preliminary hearing, and the testimony about that uncounseled identification should have been excluded from trial. The Court reaffirms that the right to counsel, established in United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California, attaches to corporeal identifications conducted "at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings," as clarified by Kirby v. Illinois. The preliminary hearing in this case clearly marked the initiation of such proceedings, as evidenced by the formal charges, the presence of the State’s counsel, and the defendant's right to oppose the prosecution. The Court explicitly rejects the lower courts' view that the identification procedure was not a 'lineup' or that its judicial setting exempted it from the counsel requirement, noting Wade applies equally to one-on-one confrontations due to their inherent suggestiveness. The circumstances of the identification were highly suggestive, as the victim was told she would view a suspect, heard his name, and heard evidence recited against him before identifying him. Had counsel been present, some or all of this suggestiveness could have been avoided. Crucially, Gilbert dictates a per se exclusionary rule for direct testimony about an uncounseled pretrial identification; the prosecution cannot introduce such evidence in its case-in-chief, even if it could prove an independent source for the witness's underlying identification. The prosecution's use of the victim's testimony about her preliminary hearing identification directly violated this rule. The Court reverses and remands for a determination of whether the error was harmless under Chapman v. California.
Concurring - Justice Rehnquist
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment, as it correctly interprets Wade and Gilbert. However, I believe the Court will eventually need to re-evaluate and reconsider the Wade-Gilbert rule, much like Escobedo v. Illinois was re-examined. The rule, which mandates a per se exclusionary approach for certain identification procedures, was designed to ensure accuracy and reliability. The Court may need to decide if this strict per se rule should continue to apply, or if such violations should be judged under a 'totality of the circumstances' standard, similar to other questions regarding pretrial identification reliability. Since the State did not challenge this specific point, I join the majority's decision.
Concurring - Justice Blackmun
I concur in the result and in the remand to determine if the error was harmless, which seems almost inevitable on this record. I believe the Court has made too much out of the case. The State of Illinois explicitly conceded that the preliminary hearing on December 21, 1967, was the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings against petitioner. With this concession, the strict ban of Gilbert v. California applies in full force and independently requires the remand. Therefore, there was no need to delve into the complexities of whether the events of December 21 marked the initiation of formal proceedings under Kirby v. Illinois or to engage with the precedent of Coleman v. Alabama. Furthermore, I disagree with the Court's implication that a rape victim's observation of her assailant for 'only 10 to 15 seconds' is somehow insignificant or unreliable. From a victim's perspective, this brief period can be more than sufficient to form an 'accurate and indelible impression,' and such observations should not be degraded or dismissed.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the strong Sixth Amendment protection against uncounseled corporeal identifications once adversary judicial proceedings have begun. It solidifies Gilbert's per se exclusionary rule, making it clear that direct testimony about such identifications is inadmissible regardless of an independent source, thus deterring police and prosecutors from conducting identifications outside the presence of counsel at critical stages. The case further clarifies that a preliminary hearing, where a defendant faces formal charges and a prosecutor, constitutes a critical stage triggering the right to counsel, regardless of whether it's a 'lineup' or a one-on-one confrontation. This has a significant impact on police procedures and prosecutorial strategy, compelling adherence to counsel requirements early in the criminal process.
