Moore v. El Paso Chamber of Commerce
220 S.W.2d 327, 1949 Tex. App. LEXIS 1744 (1949)
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Rule of Law:
Contributory negligence by a plaintiff is not a valid defense to an intentional tort. An act is considered intentional, precluding a contributory negligence defense, when the actor intends the act itself, even if they do not intend for the specific injury to result.
Facts:
- The El Paso Chamber of Commerce sponsored a rodeo and promotional event where volunteers would rope people on the street not wearing western attire and take them to a 'corral' for 'horseplay'.
- On March 27, 1946, Jeanette Moore, a 17-year-old who was not wearing western attire, was walking downtown with her mother.
- Seeing Moore, a group of 'ropers' working for the event decided to pursue her, with one saying, 'let’s get that girl.'
- Frightened, Moore ran into a nearby drug store to escape the pursuit.
- One of the ropers, Claude Weaver, followed Moore into the drug store with his rope.
- In her continued attempt to flee into an adjacent hotel lobby, Moore ran into a glass door connecting the two businesses.
- Moore pushed her left hand through the glass panel, resulting in severe and permanent injuries to her hand and wrist.
Procedural Posture:
- Jeanette Moore sued the El Paso Chamber of Commerce for personal injuries in the 65th District Court of El Paso County, a state trial court.
- The case was tried before a jury, which found on special issues that the Chamber's agent (Weaver) was negligent and that this negligence was a proximate cause of Moore's injury.
- The jury also found that Moore was contributorily negligent in several ways and that her own negligence was also a proximate cause of her injury.
- The jury assessed Moore's damages at $6,163.
- Based on the jury's finding of contributory negligence, the trial court granted judgment in favor of the Chamber of Commerce.
- Moore's motion to set aside the judgment was overruled, and she, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff's contributory negligence bar her recovery for injuries proximately caused by a defendant's intentional act of wrongful pursuit?
Opinions:
Majority - Sutton, J.
No. A plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery for injuries resulting from a defendant's intentional wrong. The actions of the pursuer, Claude Weaver, constituted an intentional tort, not mere negligence, because he willfully and purposefully chased Jeanette Moore. Although he may not have intended for her to be injured, he intended the act of pursuit which led directly to the injury. Citing Galveston H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Zantzinger, the court affirmed the long-standing principle that contributory negligence is never a defense to an intentional wrong. The court also rejected the Chamber of Commerce's argument that it was not responsible for Weaver's actions, finding that an agency relationship was clearly implied from the circumstances. The Chamber of Commerce organized and supervised the event, Weaver was acting in furtherance of its goals using its equipment ('lassos'), and the organization cannot benefit from such activities and then disclaim responsibility when an injury occurs.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the critical distinction between negligence and intentional torts, reinforcing the principle that contributory negligence is completely inapplicable as a defense to an intentional wrong. The court clarifies that an act is deemed 'intentional' for this purpose if the actor intends the physical act itself (e.g., chasing someone), regardless of whether they intend the specific harmful result. This decision prevents defendants who commit intentional torts from shifting blame to the victim's panicked or careless reaction to the wrongful act. Furthermore, the court's finding of an implied agency relationship demonstrates that organizations can be held liable for the actions of volunteers acting under their general direction and for their benefit.
