Moore v. Eckman
2009 WL 563566, 762 N.W.2d 459, 2009 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 23 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
To recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a bystander, the plaintiff must have had a sensory and contemporaneous observance of the injury-producing accident itself, not merely have arrived at the scene immediately after its occurrence.
Facts:
- On May 13, 2005, Anthony Moore was sitting on the trunk of a car driven by Nicole Eckman.
- Eckman drove the car forward, causing Anthony Moore to fall off the back.
- Anthony Moore sustained a severe head injury from the fall which ultimately resulted in his death.
- Anthony's mother, Carole Moore, was not present and did not witness her son fall from the car.
- Carole Moore arrived at the scene immediately after the accident occurred, finding her son lying seriously injured and unattended in the street.
- Carole Moore was the first person to arrive at her son's side and render aid after the accident.
Procedural Posture:
- Carole and Shawn Moore (plaintiffs) filed a petition in an Iowa district court against Nicole Eckman, her parents, and Pekin Insurance Company (defendant).
- The petition included a claim by Carole Moore for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a bystander.
- Pekin Insurance Company filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asking the district court to dismiss the bystander claim.
- The district court denied Pekin's motion for partial summary judgment.
- Pekin Insurance Company (appellant) applied for and was granted an appeal in advance of final judgment to the Iowa Supreme Court to review the district court's denial.
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Issue:
Does the Iowa test for bystander liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress require a plaintiff to have a sensory and contemporaneous observance of the injury-causing accident itself, as opposed to arriving at the scene immediately after the accident?
Opinions:
Majority - Baker, J.
Yes. The Iowa test for bystander liability strictly requires a plaintiff to have a sensory and contemporaneous observance of the injury-causing accident itself. The court reasoned that its precedent, particularly Barnhill v. Davis and Fineran v. Pickett, established a bright-line rule requiring the bystander to actually witness the peril to the victim. The requirement of 'sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident' was purposely adopted to limit the scope of liability and avoid extending it to all foreseeable emotional distress situations. The court explicitly rejected the plaintiff's interpretation that the test merely distinguishes between those who observe the aftermath and those who learn of it later from others. Because it is undisputed that Carole Moore did not see her son fall, she fails to meet this essential element of the bystander claim.
Concurring - Wiggins, J.
Yes. While the majority reaches the correct result based on existing precedent, it is important to note that the plaintiff only argued that her claim fit within the existing framework of Barnhill and Fineran. The plaintiff did not ask the court to extend or modify Iowa's bystander liability rule to align with other jurisdictions that allow recovery for individuals who arrive at the scene immediately after the impact. Therefore, the court was correct to deny the claim under the argument presented, but the concurrence suggests the door might be open to reconsider the rule if properly challenged in a future case.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms Iowa's adherence to a strict, bright-line rule for bystander liability claims, prioritizing legal certainty over a more flexible foreseeability standard used in other states. The court explicitly chose to 'hold the line' on the requirement of witnessing the actual accident, solidifying a significant limitation on recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. This creates a clear but potentially harsh distinction between a family member who witnesses an accident and one who arrives seconds later to find the same tragic aftermath. The special concurrence suggests that while the rule is rigid, it might be subject to change if a future litigant directly challenges the precedent and asks the court to evolve the common law.
