Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio
431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
A municipal ordinance that narrowly defines 'family' and restricts the ability of related individuals to live together infringes upon the fundamental liberty of personal choice in matters of family life, which is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts:
- Inez Moore, a grandmother, lived in her home in East Cleveland, Ohio.
- Her son, Dale Moore, Sr., and his son, Dale Moore, Jr., also resided with her in the home.
- Following the death of his mother, Moore's other grandson, John Moore, Jr., came to live with her as well.
- The two grandsons, Dale Jr. and John Jr., are first cousins rather than brothers.
- An East Cleveland housing ordinance defined 'family' in such a way that it only permitted a head of household to live with one dependent child and that child's offspring.
- Under this definition, the presence of two grandchildren from different children (first cousins) in the same household was a violation, making John Moore, Jr. an 'illegal occupant'.
Procedural Posture:
- The city of East Cleveland issued a notice of violation to Inez Moore, declaring her grandson, John Moore, Jr., an 'illegal occupant' of her home.
- After Moore failed to comply, the city filed a criminal charge against her in a municipal court (court of first instance).
- Moore filed a motion to dismiss the charge on constitutional grounds, which the trial court overruled.
- Following a conviction at trial, Moore was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine.
- Moore (appellant) appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court), which affirmed the conviction, with the city of East Cleveland as appellee.
- The Ohio Supreme Court (highest state court) denied review.
- Moore appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction to hear the case.
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Issue:
Does a municipal ordinance that limits household occupancy to a narrow definition of 'family,' thereby preventing a grandmother from living with her son and two grandsons who are first cousins, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Powell
Yes, the ordinance violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court previously upheld a zoning ordinance affecting only unrelated individuals in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, this case is different because East Cleveland's ordinance slices deeply into the family itself. The freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty protected by substantive due process, deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition. This protection extends beyond the nuclear family to the extended family, as traditions of grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins sharing a household are venerable and deserving of constitutional recognition. The city's asserted interests in preventing overcrowding and traffic congestion are only marginally served by this ordinance and do not justify such a significant intrusion into the sanctity of the family. The Constitution prevents the state from standardizing its citizens by forcing them to live in narrowly defined family patterns.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Brennan
Yes, the ordinance is unconstitutional. While the ordinance serves legitimate municipal objectives, it does so through arbitrary restrictions that cut deeply into protected family life. The ordinance reflects a 'cultural myopia' by favoring the 'nuclear family' pattern often found in white suburbia, while ignoring the vital importance of the 'extended family' for many Americans, particularly poor and minority communities for whom it is often a means of economic and emotional survival. The choice to live in an extended family is a protected liberty under the Due Process Clause, and the ordinance's interference with that choice is unconstitutional. The availability of a variance procedure is irrelevant because the city is constitutionally powerless to abridge this fundamental freedom.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Stevens
Yes, the ordinance is an unconstitutional restriction on the appellant's right to use her own property. A zoning ordinance is unconstitutional if it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. The city has failed to provide any justification for a rule that allows a homeowner to live with two grandchildren who are brothers, but not if they are cousins. This distinction is irrational and does not serve any legitimate public purpose. Therefore, the ordinance constitutes a taking of property without due process and without just compensation.
Dissenting - Mr. Chief Justice Burger
No, the Court should not reach the constitutional issue. The appellant's deliberate refusal to use the city's plainly adequate administrative remedy should foreclose her from pressing her constitutional objections. The city provided a Board of Building Code Appeals to consider variances for 'practical difficulties and unnecessary hardships,' which appears to fit Moore's situation perfectly. By bypassing this available local remedy, the appellant failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. For reasons of federalism, comity, and judicial economy, the Court should require litigants to pursue such remedies before seeking relief in federal court.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Stewart
No, the ordinance does not violate the Due Process Clause. The decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas is controlling. The interest in sharing a home with extended family members is not a fundamental right 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' like the decisions to marry or bear children. As the ordinance deals with social and economic legislation and does not infringe upon a fundamental right, it should be reviewed under the rational basis standard. The ordinance's definition of 'family' is rationally related to legitimate governmental purposes of preserving family values and a quiet, residential environment. The legislative act of drawing such lines is a discretionary function that the judiciary should respect.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice White
No, the ordinance is constitutional. While Moore asserts a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, it is not an interest that requires heightened protection. The demands of substantive due process are satisfied if the ordinance is not wholly lacking in purpose or utility. The ordinance serves the normal goals of zoning regulation by limiting, in identifiable circumstances, the number and type of people who can occupy a single household to maintain the character of a single-family neighborhood. This is a rational means to a legitimate end, and the ordinance therefore does not violate the Due Process Clause.
Analysis:
This case is significant for expanding the constitutional protection of 'family' under the doctrine of substantive due process. It distinguished Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas by holding that while the state may regulate the living arrangements of unrelated individuals, it faces much stricter scrutiny when it intrudes into the composition of the family itself. The decision established that the concept of 'family' protected by the Constitution is not limited to the nuclear family but extends to the extended family, reflecting a deep respect for historical and cultural traditions. This precedent limits the power of municipalities to use zoning laws to enforce a single, narrow vision of family life and requires a stronger justification for laws that impact the ability of relatives to live together.
