Moore v. Baker
989 F.2d 1129 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
Under Georgia's informed consent law, a physician's duty to inform a patient of practical alternatives to a proposed surgery is limited to only those alternatives that are generally recognized and accepted by the mainstream medical community.
Facts:
- Judith Moore suffered from a partial blockage of her left common carotid artery, which caused her to feel dizzy and tired.
- In April 1989, Moore consulted with Dr. Roy Baker, who diagnosed her condition and recommended a surgical procedure known as a carotid endarterectomy.
- Dr. Baker advised Moore of the risks associated with the surgery but did not inform her of an alternative treatment known as EDTA chelation therapy.
- Moore consented to the surgery, which was performed on April 7, 1989.
- Following the surgery, a blood clot formed in Moore's artery, and despite its removal by Dr. Baker, Moore suffered permanent brain damage and became severely disabled.
Procedural Posture:
- Judith Moore filed a medical malpractice complaint against Dr. Roy Baker and the Neurological Institute of Savannah, P.C. in the federal district court, alleging a violation of Georgia's informed consent law.
- Dr. Baker filed a motion for summary judgment on the informed consent claim.
- Moore moved to amend her complaint to add claims of negligence in the performance of the surgery and post-operative care.
- The district court granted Dr. Baker's motion for summary judgment on the informed consent claim.
- Subsequently, the district court vacated a previous order and denied Moore's motion to amend her complaint, thereby terminating all of Moore's claims.
- Moore (Appellant) appealed the grant of summary judgment and the denial of her motion to amend to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a physician violate Georgia's informed consent law by failing to inform a patient of a potential alternative treatment that is not generally recognized and accepted by the medical community?
Opinions:
Majority - Morgan, Senior Circuit Judge
No. A physician does not violate Georgia’s informed consent law by failing to disclose an alternative treatment that is not generally recognized and accepted by reasonably prudent physicians. The relevant statute, O.C.G.A. § 31-9-6.1(a)(5), explicitly limits the disclosure requirement to such generally accepted alternatives. Dr. Baker presented overwhelming evidence that the mainstream medical community, including major professional associations, does not recognize or accept EDTA therapy as a practical alternative to a carotid endarterectomy for Moore's condition. In contrast, Moore's evidence, from two doctors who support the therapy, merely suggested that the medical profession should accept EDTA therapy, not that it is generally accepted. This was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, meaning Dr. Baker had no legal duty to inform Moore about it.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies and reinforces the 'professional standard' for informed consent regarding alternative treatments. It establishes that a physician's duty is not to inform patients of every conceivable or experimental alternative, but only those endorsed by the mainstream medical community. This holding protects physicians from liability for not discussing fringe or unproven therapies and grounds the legal duty of disclosure in the established standards of the medical profession. Consequently, future plaintiffs in similar cases must prove not just that an alternative exists, but that it is 'generally recognized and accepted' by the medical community at large.
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