Moor et al. v. County of Alameda et al.
411 U.S. 693 (1973)
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Rule of Law:
42 U.S.C. § 1988 is a remedial statute that instructs federal courts on what law to apply in existing federal civil rights actions; it does not independently create a federal cause of action and cannot be used to import state vicarious liability law to sue a municipality that is not considered a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Facts:
- During a civil disturbance in Alameda County, California, in 1969, an Alameda County deputy sheriff was engaged in quelling the unrest.
- The deputy sheriff wrongfully discharged a shotgun.
- The discharge of the shotgun caused injuries to petitioners Moor and Rundle.
- Petitioner Moor was a citizen of Illinois, while petitioner Rundle was a citizen of California.
- The California Tort Claims Act of 1963 provided that public entities, such as Alameda County, were vicariously liable for tortious acts committed by their employees within the scope of their employment.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioners Moor and Rundle filed separate actions in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against several deputy sheriffs and the County of Alameda.
- The complaints alleged federal claims against the County under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, as well as state law claims, arguing the County was vicariously liable for its deputies' actions.
- The County of Alameda filed a motion to dismiss all claims against it, arguing it was not a 'person' under § 1983 and that the court lacked pendent and diversity jurisdiction.
- The District Court granted the County's motion, dismissing all federal and state claims against it.
- The District Court's dismissal was based on its findings that § 1983 did not apply to the county, that it would not exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims, and that the county was not a citizen for diversity jurisdiction purposes.
- Petitioners appealed the final judgment dismissing the County to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment on all grounds.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does 42 U.S.C. § 1988 authorize a federal court to import a state law that imposes vicarious liability on a county, thereby creating a federal cause of action against that county for civil rights violations committed by its employees, when the county is not considered a 'person' subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Marshall
No, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 does not authorize the creation of a federal cause of action against the County by borrowing state law. Section 1988 is a remedial, gap-filling statute intended to complement other civil rights acts that create causes of action; it does not enjoy the independent stature of an act creating a cause of action itself. The court's holding in Monroe v. Pape established that Congress, in enacting the 1871 act that became § 1983, specifically chose not to subject municipalities to liability. To use § 1988 to import a state law imposing such liability would be 'inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,' a practice expressly forbidden by § 1988 itself. The legislative history of § 1983 demonstrates a clear congressional intent to exclude all municipalities from the civil liability it created, and § 1988 cannot be used to accomplish what Congress plainly refused to do. Additionally, the Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims, but reversed the lower courts on diversity jurisdiction, holding that the County of Alameda is a citizen of California for such purposes.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Douglas
Yes, in effect, a federal court can apply the state's vicarious liability law in this context. The majority misreads Monroe v. Pape, which only barred suits for money damages against municipalities under § 1983, not suits for equitable relief. Because petitioners sought 'any further relief,' the County should be considered a 'person' under § 1983 for the purpose of equitable relief, which is sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction. Once jurisdiction is established under § 1983, § 1988 can be used to address deficiencies in federal remedies. Since § 1983 is 'deficient' in providing a damages remedy against the County, § 1988 authorizes the federal court to adopt the 'suitable' remedy provided by California's vicarious liability law.
Analysis:
This decision strongly reaffirmed the holding of Monroe v. Pape that municipalities were immune from suit under § 1983, clarifying that § 1988 could not be used as a backdoor to impose liability that Congress had rejected. It established § 1988's role as purely remedial and dependent on a pre-existing federal cause of action. While the Court's holding on § 1983 and municipal liability was famously overturned five years later in Monell v. Department of Social Services (1978), this case remains a key authority on the limited, non-substantive function of § 1988. The opinion also highlighted the discretionary nature of pendent jurisdiction, particularly in cases involving 'pendent parties,' leaving the question of judicial power over such parties unresolved.
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