Yes. It is completely against the rules of due process for the government to knowingly use lies to convict someone. The Court explained that a fair trial is more than just having a lawyer and a judge; it must be genuinely fair. If the government cheats by tricking the judge and jury with fake testimony, it's not a real trial, it's a 'pretense.' This violates the most basic ideas of justice. However, the Court told Mooney he had to go back to the California state courts and use their procedures (like asking for a writ of habeas corpus) to try and fix the problem first. Only after he has tried all his options in the state system can he come to the federal courts for help.

Yes, the government did break the rules by using lies and hiding the truth, because the Constitution says everyone deserves a fair chance in court. It's not a real trial if the government tricks the court and jury with lies. That's just as bad as forcing someone to confess. The government's lawyers have to follow the Constitution too. But Mooney hasn't tried all the ways he could fix this in California's courts yet. He hasn't asked for a special court order called 'habeas corpus' that could help him. So, we can't let him skip ahead to the federal level until he tries that. We're not saying 'no' forever, just 'not right now.'

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <opinion data-order="7" data-type="opinion" id="x999-1" type="majority"> <author id="b159-8"> *109 Per Curiam. </author> Thomas J. Mooney asks leave to file petition for an original writ of habeas corpus. He states that he is unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the State of California under a commitment pursuant to a conviction, in February, 1917, of murder in the first degree and sentence of death subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. He submits the record of proceedings set forth in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus presented to the District *110 Court of the United States for the Northern District of California and dismissed upon the ground that the petitioner had not exhausted his legal remedies in the state court. Applications to the Judges of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for allowance of an appeal to that Court from the judgment of dismissal have severally been denied. Petitioner charges that the State holds him in confinement without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The grounds of his charge are, in substance, that the sole basis of his conviction was perjured testimony, which was knowingly used by the prosecuting authorities in order to obtain that conviction, and also that these authorities deliberately suppressed evidence which would have impeached and refuted the testimony thus given against him. He alleges that he could not by reasonable diligence have discovered prior to the denial of his motion for a new trial, and his appeal to the Supreme Court of the State, the evidence which was subsequently developed and which proved the testimony against him to have been perjured. Petitioner urges that the “ knowing use ” by the State of perjured testimony to obtain the conviction and the deliberate suppression of evidence to impeach that testimony constituted a denial of due process of law. Petitioner further contends that the State deprives him of his liberty without due process of law by its failure, in the circumstances set forth, to provide any corrective judicial process by which a conviction so obtained may be set aside. In support of his serious charges, petitioner submits a •chronological history of the trials, appeals and other judicial proceedings connected with his conviction, and of his applications for executive clemency. He sets forth the evidence which, as he contends, proves the perjury *111 of the witnesses upon whose testimony he was convicted and the knowledge on the part of the prosecuting authorities of that perjury and the suppression by those authorities of impeaching evidence at their command. He also submits what he insists are admissions by the State that the testimony offered against him was perjured and that his conviction was unjustified. In amplification of these statements, he asks leave to incorporate in his petition, by reference, the voluminous details of the various proceedings as they were presented with his petition to the District Court. In response to our rule to show cause why leave to file the petition should not be granted, the respondent has made return by the Attorney General of the State. With this return, he submits an appendix of exhibits setting forth the consent filed by the Attorney General with the Supreme Court of the State on July 30, 1917, that the judgment of conviction be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, the subsequent opinions of that Court upon the cases presented to it, the statements of Governors of the State on applications for executive clemency made on behalf of this petitioner and of one Billings (who had been jointly indicted with petitioner and was separately tried and convicted), and the reports of Justices of the Supreme Court of the State, and communications addressed by them, to the Governors of the State in connection with such applications. The return does not put in issue any of the facts alleged in the petition. The return is in the nature of a demurrer. It submits that the petitioner “ has failed, to raise a Federal question and that, consequently, leave to file the petition should be denied.” Reviewing decisions relating to due process, the Attorney General insists that the petitioner’s argument is vitiated by the fallacy “ that the acts or omissions of- a prosecuting- attorney can ever, *112 in and by themselves, amount either to due process of law or to a denial of due process of law.” The Attorney-General states that if the acts or omissions of a prosecuting attorney “have the effect of withholding from a defendant the notice which must be accorded him under the due process clause, or if they have the effect of preventing a defendant from presenting such evidence as he possesses in defense of the accusation against him, then such acts or omissions of the prosecuting attorney may be regarded as resulting in a denial of due process of law.” And, “ conversely,” the Attorney General contends that “ it is only where an act or omission operates so as to deprive a defendant of notice or so as to deprive him of an opportunity to present such evidence as he has, that it can be said that due process of law has been denied.” Without attempting at this time to deal with the question at length, we deem it sufficient for the present purpose to say that we are unable to approve this narrow view of the requirement of due process. That requirement, in safeguarding the liberty of the citizen against deprivation through the action of the State, embodies the fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316, 317. It is a requirement that cannot be deemed tó be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation. And the action of prosecuting officers on behalf of the State, like that of adminis *113 trative officers in the execution of its laws, may constitute state action within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. That Amendment governs any action of a State, “ whether through its legislature, through its courts, or through its executive or administrative officers.” Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442, 447; Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226, 231; Chicago, Burlington &amp; Quincy R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 233, 234. Reasoning from the premise that the petitioner has failed to show a denial of due process in the circumstances set forth in his petition, the Attorney General urges that the State was not required to afford any corrective judicial process to remedy the alleged wrong. The argument falls with the premise. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 335; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86, 90, 91. We are not satisfied, however, that the State of California has failed to provide such corrective judicial process. The prerogative writ of habeas corpus is available in that State. Constitution of California, Art. I, § 5; Art. VI, § 4. No decision of the Supreme Court of California has been brought to our attention holding that the state court is without power to issue this historic remedial process when it appears that one is deprived of his liberty without due process of law in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Upon the state courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard and enforce every right secured by that Constitution. Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 637. In view of the dominant requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, we are not at liberty to assume that the State has denied to its court jurisdiction to redress the prohibited wrong upon a proper showing and in an appropriate proceeding for that purpose. The decisions of the Supreme Court of California in relation to petitioner’s conviction have dealt with the ques *114 tions presented to that Court within the limitations of particular appellate procedure. When there was submitted to that Court the consent of the Attorney General to the reversal of the judgment against petitioner and to the granting of a new trial, the Court pointed out that no motion had been made by the defendant and that his appeal was awaiting hearing. People v. Mooney, 175 Cal. 666; 166 Pac. 999. When, again in advance of the hearing of his appeal, the defendant made his motion solely upon the ground of the Attorney General’s consent, the Court held that its jurisdiction on appeal was limited to a determination whether there had been any error of law in the proceedings of the trial court and that the Court was confined to the record sent to it by the court below. People v. Mooney, 176 Cal. 105; 167 Pac. 696. On the appeal, the Court thus dealing with the record before it, found that the verdict was supported by the testimony presented and that no ground appeared for reversal. People v. Mooney, 177 Cal. 642; 171 Pac. 690. When, later, the defendant moved to set aside the judgment, and sought a certificate of probable cause on his appeal from an order denying his motion, the Court held that the general averments against the fairness of the trial were insufficient, but the Court did not place its denial of the application entirely upon that ground. The Court concluded that the proceeding by way of motion to set aside the judgment after it had become final and a motion for a new trial had been denied, and the time therefor had expired, was “in the nature of an application for a writ of cor cm nobis, at common law.” The Court thought that such a writ did not lie to correct any error in the judgment of the Court nor to contradict or put in issue any fact directly passed upon and affirmed by the judgment itself. The Court, adopting the opinion of the court below, concluded that the judgment could not be set aside because it was predicated upon *115 perjured testimony or because material evidence was concealed or suppressed; that the fraud in such a case was not such fraud as was “ extrinsic to the record ” and that it was only in cases of extrinsic fraud that the relief sought could be had. It was apparently in relation to such an application that the Court said that the injured party was “ without remedy.” People v. Mooney, 178 Cal. 525; 174 Pac. 325. And it was with respect to that proceeding, that the writ of certiorari was denied by this Court. Mooney v. California, 248 U. S. 579. The subsequent communications from the Justices of the Supreme Court in connection with applications for executive clemency were of an advisory character and were not judicial judgments under the requirements of the Constitution of the United States. We do not find that petitioner has applied to the state court for a writ of habeas corpus upon the grounds stated in his petition here. That corrective judicial process has not been invoked and it is not shown to be unavailable. Despite the many proceedings taken on behalf of the petitioner, an application for the prerogative writ now asserted to be peculiarly suited to the circumstances disclosed by his petition has not been made to the state court. Orderly procedure, governed by principles we have repeatedly announced, requires that before this Court is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus, in the case of a person held under a state commitment, recourse should be had to whatever judicial remedy afforded by the State may still remain open. Davis v. Burke, 179 U. S. 399, 402; Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179, 181, 182; U. S. ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U. S. 13, 17. See, also, Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 70. Accordingly, leave to file the petition is denied, but without prejudice. Leave denied. </opinion>

Due process] is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured

—the Supreme Court held that a state actor violates a criminal defendant's due process rights by the knowing use of perjured testimony or the deliberate suppression of evidence leading to the defendant's conviction.

The Supreme Court has long held that the state's knowing use of perjured testimony to obtain a conviction violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

The "deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with `rudimentary demands of justice.'"

We are to determine only whether the action complained of... violates those "fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions,"

Manning asserts that the US Supreme Court has held that a State's knowing use of or its failure to correct false testimony or its presentation of evidence which creates a materially false impression of the evidence violates a defendant's right to due process.

After a review of the allegations in support of the exhaustion of available State remedies and after hearing and arguments thereon, this court finds that a Federal question of substance is properly before the court and that the petitioner has properly invoked the protective cloak of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Prior to Napue, it was "established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State" violates due process. Napue, 360 US at 269

We do not believe that the district attorney's failure to disclose in this case should be examined with the strict scrutiny that would apply if this were a case of the prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony.

Yes. A state conviction obtained through the knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution is a violation of the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Due process is not satisfied by mere notice and a hearing if the state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which is, in truth, a deliberate deception of the court and jury. Such a contrivance is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as obtaining a conviction through intimidation. The actions of prosecuting officers are considered state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, because due process also requires that states provide a 'corrective judicial process' to remedy such a constitutional wrong, a petitioner must first exhaust those state remedies, such as a state writ of habeas corpus, before seeking relief in federal court. Since Mooney had not yet applied for a writ of habeas corpus in California's state courts, his petition to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied without prejudice, requiring him to seek relief in the state courts first.

Yes, the State's use of perjured testimony and suppression of evidence to obtain a conviction violates the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment because due process embodies fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions. A conviction obtained by such means is as inconsistent with the demands of justice as is intimidation. The requirement of due process cannot be deemed satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice. The action of prosecuting officers on behalf of the State may constitute state action within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the petitioner has not exhausted all state judicial remedies, specifically he has not applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the state court, which is available and may provide the corrective process needed. Therefore, leave to file the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court is denied without prejudice.

Mooney v. Holohan

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