Moon v. Guardian Postacute Services, Inc.
116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218, 2002 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 993, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1005 (2002)
Rule of Law:
In California, a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) as a bystander is generally limited to members of the immediate family unit (parents, spouses, siblings, children, and grandparents) or relatives residing in the same household for a substantial period, with 'exceptional circumstances' requiring justification grounded in public policy beyond a strong emotional bond. A direct victim NIED claim requires the defendant to owe a duty of care directly to the plaintiff, not merely through the injury of a third party.
Facts:
- Ken Moon married Eileen Moon in October 1969; Eileen is the daughter of Frances McMahon, who was born in 1911.
- Since the Moons' marriage, McMahon spent at least one month per year with them in their Walnut Creek home, and had her own bedroom in their home since 1979.
- Between 1992 and 1993, McMahon lived with the Moons for approximately four to five months, during which Ken drove her weekly to UCSF Medical Center, and they developed a close, ritualistic relationship.
- McMahon moved permanently to California and lived with the Moons for a period of time before being admitted to an assisted living facility.
- On January 7, 1999, Guardian Postacute Services, Inc. (Guardian), a skilled nursing facility, admitted McMahon.
- Ken assisted in McMahon's admission to Guardian by signing admission forms, providing her medical history, and being listed as an emergency contact, with Guardian personnel assuring him of proper care.
- While McMahon was at Guardian, Ken observed her becoming malnourished, dehydrated, losing significant weight, becoming immobile and bedridden, contracting infection, and becoming incontinent.
- On January 22, 1999, Ken and Eileen visited McMahon at Guardian and observed her lying in bed with infected wounds and black and purple blisters on her feet.
Procedural Posture:
- John McMahon, as executor of Frances McMahon’s estate, and Ken and Eileen Moon filed a complaint against Guardian Postacute Services, Inc. (Guardian) for nine causes of action, including one for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) on behalf of Ken and Eileen Moon.
- Guardian filed a demurrer to the complaint.
- The state trial court sustained Guardian's demurrer to Ken's NIED claim with leave to amend, stating he failed to allege 'exceptional circumstances.'
- John, Ken, and Eileen Moon filed a first amended complaint.
- Guardian filed another demurrer to Ken's NIED claim in the first amended complaint.
- The state trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend, ruling that NIED was restricted to blood relatives and did not extend to in-laws absent undefined 'exceptional circumstances.'
- A second amended complaint was filed.
- Guardian again demurred to Ken's NIED claim in the second amended complaint.
- The state trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding Ken had yet to allege the 'exceptional circumstances' required by Thing v. La Chusa.
- The state trial court entered judgment dismissing Ken Moon's action, and Ken Moon filed a timely notice of appeal to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four.
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Issue:
Does a son-in-law qualify as a 'closely related' person for a bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claim, or as a 'direct victim' for NIED, when he observed abuse of his elderly mother-in-law after being involved in her admission to a care facility?
Opinions:
Majority - Lambden, J.
No, Ken Moon, as a son-in-law, does not qualify as 'closely related' for a bystander NIED claim, nor can he allege a claim for NIED as a direct victim. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal, holding that while 'relative' broadly includes a son-in-law, the California Supreme Court's decisions in Dillon v. Legg and Thing v. La Chusa intended to strictly limit bystander NIED claims to members of the 'immediate family unit,' such as parents, spouses, siblings, children, and grandparents, in order to draw an arbitrary but necessary line for liability. The court rejected Ken's argument that his residency with McMahon 'for a period of time' satisfied the 'relatives residing in the same household' exception, stating that a 'substantial period of time' would be required and McMahon was not residing with him at the time of injury. Furthermore, the court found that Ken's alleged strong emotional bond with his mother-in-law, while present, did not constitute 'exceptional circumstances' because such circumstances would need to be grounded in public policy, like if denying the claim would relieve the defendant from all NIED liability (which was not the case here, as Ken's wife had a claim). Regarding the direct victim claim, the court reiterated that NIED is not extended to emotional distress derived solely from a reaction to another's injury. It distinguished Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and relied on Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc. and Schwarz v. Regents of University of California, concluding that Guardian owed no direct duty to Ken, even with his involvement in McMahon's admission and care assurances. The court also declined to create an exception based on elder abuse, noting the Legislature already provided remedies through the Elder Abuse Act, and expanding NIED liability in this manner would lead to a 'staggering' number of potential plaintiffs.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Ruvolo, J.
Yes, Ken Moon can state a cause of action for NIED under a theory of bystander liability, although I concur with the majority that he has failed to allege sufficient facts for a direct victim claim. The dissent argued that the Supreme Court in Thing v. La Chusa did not intend to exclude 'closely related' family members who are related through marriage, such as in-laws and step-relations, from bystander NIED claims. The phrase 'closely related by blood or marriage' used in Thing, coupled with its footnote 10 listing specific relatives, should encompass those related by marriage, especially given the realities of modern family life. The dissent also contended that Ken detailed 'exceptional circumstances' in his complaint, describing a 30-year loving relationship with his mother-in-law that equaled or exceeded in intensity and affection those relationships many adult children have with their biological parents. The dissent criticized the majority for not clarifying what would constitute 'exceptional circumstances' if Ken's detailed pleading did not. Lastly, the dissent argued that Ken's pleading that McMahon resided with the Moons for a 'period of time' before entering the facility potentially satisfied the 'relatives residing in the same household' requirement. If the majority intended to impose a new 'substantial period of time' requirement, Ken should have been granted leave to amend his complaint, consistent with appellate review standards for demurrers. The dissent urged the Supreme Court to grant review due to the continuing controversy and ambiguity surrounding footnote 10 in Thing.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the strict limitations on bystander NIED claims in California, emphasizing that the 'closely related' requirement is narrowly construed to the immediate family unit, largely excluding in-laws, even in cases of strong emotional bonds. It highlights the judiciary's reluctance to assess subjective emotional connections for tort liability. Furthermore, it clarifies that mere involvement in a third party's care, such as signing admission forms or being an emergency contact, does not create a direct duty to the plaintiff for a direct victim NIED claim. This ruling limits the expansion of NIED liability, particularly in the context of elder abuse, placing the onus on legislative remedies rather than judicial expansion of tort law.
