Moody v. Daggett
429 U.S. 78 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause does not require an immediate parole revocation hearing for a federal parolee who is convicted and imprisoned for a new crime committed while on parole. The constitutional right to a hearing is triggered only by the execution of the parole violator warrant, which occurs when the parolee is taken into custody under that warrant.
Facts:
- In 1962, Moody was convicted of rape and sentenced to ten years in federal prison.
- In 1966, Moody was released on parole with nearly six years remaining on his sentence.
- While on parole, Moody shot and killed two people on an Indian reservation.
- Moody was convicted of manslaughter and second-degree murder for the killings and received two concurrent 10-year sentences.
- Following his new convictions, the United States Board of Parole issued a parole violator warrant against Moody.
- The Board did not execute the warrant, instead lodging it as a 'detainer' with the prison where Moody was serving his homicide sentences.
- Moody requested that the Board execute the warrant immediately so his original sentence could run concurrently with his new sentences.
- The Board denied his request, stating its intention to execute the warrant only upon his release from his current sentences.
Procedural Posture:
- Moody filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, seeking dismissal of the parole violator warrant.
- The District Court dismissed the petition without a responsive pleading.
- Moody, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause require the United States Board of Parole to provide a federal parolee, who is imprisoned for a crime committed while on parole, with a prompt parole revocation hearing when a parole violator warrant is issued and lodged as a detainer but not yet executed?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Burger
No. A federal parolee imprisoned for a crime committed while on parole is not constitutionally entitled to a prompt parole revocation hearing before the parole violator warrant is executed. The petitioner's loss of liberty stems from his new homicide convictions, not from the unexecuted parole violator warrant. In Morrissey v. Brewer, the Court established that the 'operative event triggering any loss of liberty' is being taken into custody under the parole warrant. The mere issuance of the warrant and lodging it as a detainer only expresses the Board's intent to consider revocation later and does not constitute a present deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Furthermore, deferring the hearing allows the parole authority to consider the parolee's institutional record during his intervening sentence, which is highly relevant to the predictive judgment of whether revocation is appropriate.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. The timing of a parole revocation hearing is an element of procedural fairness, and due process requires that the hearing be conducted with reasonable dispatch once the revocation process begins with the issuance of a warrant. A parole revocation affects the length of confinement and is a 'grievous loss' of liberty, even for an individual who is already incarcerated. Indefinite delay, which could last for years, undermines the purpose of a fair hearing, as it prevents the parolee from presenting mitigating evidence when it is fresh and changes the focus of the hearing from the circumstances of the violation to the inmate's subsequent prison conduct. The detainer, like an indictment, marks the point from which the right to a speedy determination accrues, and ignoring the prisoner's interest in a prompt disposition for years on end violates fundamental due process.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that the trigger for due process rights in parole revocation for an already-incarcerated parolee is the execution of the warrant, not its mere issuance. By distinguishing the lodging of a detainer from an actual deprivation of liberty, the Court prioritized the administrative interests of the parole board in making a fully informed decision over the parolee's interest in a speedy resolution. This precedent grants parole authorities significant discretion to delay revocation proceedings until after an intervening sentence is served, thereby limiting an inmate's ability to argue for concurrent sentences and creating a long period of uncertainty about their ultimate release date.
