Montana v. Larson
255 Mont. 451, 843 P.2d 777, 49 State Rptr. 1077 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of a defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) and its comparison to the level scientifically determined to impair a person's ability to drive a motor vehicle is relevant and admissible in a non-DUI criminal case to help the jury evaluate the defendant's level of intoxication and impairment of judgment.
Facts:
- Myron Larson attended a barbecue where he consumed several alcoholic beverages, including at least four sixteen-ounce beers and two shots of whiskey.
- The hostess, Heidi St. Germaine, warned Larson that her horse, Taz, was 'inexperienced' and 'hot-blooded' and instructed him not to tug on its reins.
- St. Germaine also testified that she told Larson she did not want children riding the horse and that the horse disliked anything behind the saddle.
- Larson mounted the horse, and Brenda Perry's mother then lifted the five-year-old child onto the horse behind him.
- When the horse began to 'crow-hop,' Larson pulled back on the reins.
- The horse reared up and fell backward, crushing five-year-old Brenda, who died from her injuries a short time later.
- Over three hours after the incident, a blood test revealed Larson's BAC was .17, with a forensic scientist estimating his BAC was between .20 and .27 at the time of the accident.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Myron Larson with negligent endangerment in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, Montana.
- At trial, the court sustained Larson's objection to any mention of the statutory DUI law but permitted an expert to compare Larson's BAC to the .08 level that the scientific community has determined impairs driving.
- A jury found Larson guilty of negligent endangerment.
- Larson appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Montana.
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Issue:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion by admitting expert testimony that compares a defendant's blood alcohol content in a non-DUI negligent endangerment case to the level scientifically known to impair a person's ability to drive an automobile?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice McDonough
No. A trial court does not abuse its discretion by admitting such a comparison, as it is relevant evidence that can assist the jury in evaluating the defendant's level of intoxication and impairment. The court reasoned that under Montana Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable. Larson's level of intoxication was a key fact in determining whether his judgment was impaired. Comparing his BAC to the level known to impair drivers provided the jury with a useful context to understand the degree of his intoxication and to apply their own experience and logic in assessing his conduct. The court rejected Larson's argument that this created an improper 'DUI-type presumption,' distinguishing this case from those involving unconstitutional mandatory presumptions in jury instructions. Here, the evidence was presented through expert testimony for context, not as a legal presumption of negligence.
Analysis:
This decision broadens the applicability of blood alcohol evidence beyond traditional DUI prosecutions. It affirms that scientific standards for impairment, such as those related to driving, can serve as a relevant benchmark for juries in other criminal cases where a defendant's judgment or physical control is at issue, like negligent endangerment or recklessness. The case clarifies the distinction between presenting scientific context to a jury and creating an impermissible legal presumption of guilt. This precedent provides prosecutors with a method to explain the significance of a defendant's BAC level to a jury in various non-DUI contexts, reinforcing the broad discretion trial courts have in admitting relevant evidence.
