Monroe v. Standard Oil Co.
101 S. Ct. 2510, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 114, 452 U.S. 549 (1981)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) prevents employers from discriminating against military reservists based on their reserve obligations but does not require employers to provide reservists with special work-scheduling accommodations, such as make-up hours, that are not offered to other employees.
Facts:
- From 1975 to 1976, Monroe was a full-time employee at Standard Oil Co.'s continuous process refinery in Lima, Ohio, which operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
- Standard Oil Co. scheduled its employees for five 8-hour days weekly, with a different 5-day sequence each week, to ensure equitable distribution of weekend and shift work.
- During this period, Monroe was also a military reservist, required to attend training with his unit one weekend a month and for two weeks each summer.
- On a number of occasions, Monroe's military training conflicted with his scheduled workdays at the refinery.
- Although Monroe was able to exchange shifts with other employees on four occasions, he was unable to do so in most instances when conflicts arose.
- Standard Oil Co. provided Monroe with leaves of absence to attend training, as required by 38 U.S.C. § 2024(d), but did not pay him for the hours he missed or take steps to permit him to make up those hours outside his normal schedule.
Procedural Posture:
- Monroe brought an action against Standard Oil Co. in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, alleging violations of 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021(b)(3) and 2024(d).
- The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to Monroe, finding that "being scheduled for a full forty hour week" was an "incident or advantage of employment" and awarded Monroe $1,086.72 for lost wages.
- Standard Oil Co. appealed the District Court's decision to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment, holding that § 2021(b)(3) "merely requires that reservists be treated equally or neutrally with their fellow employees without military obligations" and found no discriminatory action by Standard Oil Co.
- Monroe filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States.
- The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to consider the issue.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) require an employer to provide preferential work-hour scheduling for an employee who must be absent from work to fulfill military reserve obligations, even if such accommodations are not made for other employees?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stewart
No, 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) does not require an employer to provide preferential work-hour scheduling for an employee based on military reserve obligations if such accommodations are not generally available to other employees. The Court reasoned that § 2021(b)(3) was enacted for the "significant but limited purpose of protecting the employee-reservist against discriminations like discharge and demotion, motivated solely by reserve status." The legislative history consistently indicates Congress's intent to ensure reservists receive "the same treatment afforded their coworkers not having such military obligations," rather than special benefits or preferences. The Court distinguished the broader protection of § 2021(b)(3) from the obligation under § 2024(d) to grant leaves of absence, noting that the latter specifically addresses the allowance employers should make for missed work. There is no evidence that Congress intended to impose an additional obligation on employers to guarantee the same number of hours or pay through work-scheduling accommodations. Adopting a "reasonable accommodation" theory would lack statutory or historical support and could dilute other protections in the statute concerning retention and promotion. The employer here did not deny Monroe anything he would have received had he not been a reservist; he was scheduled for 40 hours, assigned the same burden of weekend work, and allowed to exchange shifts like all other employees.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Burger, with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Powell join
Yes, 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) should be interpreted to require employers to take reasonable steps to accommodate a reservist's military obligations, such as by adjusting work schedules, to ensure they have the opportunity to work full-time and are not disadvantaged in employment solely due to their service. The dissent argued that the plain language of the statute, prohibiting the denial of "any promotion or other incident or advantage of employment," is broader than merely preventing discharge or demotion and covers the opportunity to work a full 40-hour week. The legislative history reflects a congressional purpose to ensure reservists "enjoy all of the employment opportunities and benefits accorded their coworkers who do not . . . have a Reserve obligation" and to prevent them from being "disadvantaged in employment because of their military obligations." The dissent contended that treating military absences simply as personal leaves ignores the "essence of the statutory guarantees" which necessitate special treatment for military absences to place reservists on an equal footing. It was noted that Standard Oil Co. could have accommodated Monroe's schedule without burdening other employees, demonstrating that the company's "total indifference" was not in keeping with the statute's purpose to expand employment safeguards for reservists and encourage military participation.
Analysis:
This case significantly narrows the scope of employer obligations under 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3), establishing that the statute primarily prevents discrimination based on reserve status rather than mandating affirmative preferential treatment. The decision clarifies that "incidents or advantages of employment" refers to benefits available to all employees, which cannot be denied to reservists because of their service, but does not compel employers to create special arrangements not offered to non-reservist employees. This interpretation limits the financial and logistical burden on employers but may lead to reservists experiencing reduced work hours and pay compared to non-reservist colleagues due to their military duties, potentially impacting military readiness by disincentivizing reserve service. It highlights the Court's strict construction of statutory language and legislative history in defining employer duties.
