Monique Haughton Worrell v. Ron D. DeSantis, Governor
N/A (2024)
Rule of Law:
The Florida Supreme Court's review of a governor's executive order suspending an elected state officer under Article IV, Section 7(a) of the Florida Constitution is narrow and deferential, limited to determining whether the order states a constitutional ground for suspension and contains factual allegations that bear some reasonable relation to that ground, without assessing the sufficiency of the evidence.
Facts:
- Monique Haughton Worrell served as the State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida, encompassing Orange and Osceola counties, after being overwhelmingly elected in 2020.
- During Worrell’s tenure, Governor Ron DeSantis alleged that the administration of criminal justice in the Ninth Circuit was “so clearly and fundamentally derelict as to constitute both neglect of duty and incompetence.”
- The Governor’s Executive Order specified that Worrell authorized or allowed charging practices that permitted violent offenders, drug traffickers, serious juvenile offenders, and pedophiles to evade incarceration otherwise warranted under Florida law.
- For instance, of 130 cases involving possession of a firearm by a convicted felon referred to the Ninth Circuit by the Osceola County Sheriff’s Office in 2021 and 2022, only five resulted in a minimum mandatory sentence.
- Similarly, of 58 non-homicide robbery-with-a-firearm cases referred by the Osceola County Sheriff’s Office during the same period, only one, as of May 2023, had resulted in a minimum mandatory sentence.
- The Executive Order also alleged that Worrell authorized or allowed practices that prevented assistant state attorneys from seeking certain statutory sentencing enhancements and limited charges for possession of child pornography.
- It further claimed Worrell’s subordinates permitted or required assistant state attorneys to disregard statutory limitations on withholding adjudication.
- The Executive Order concluded that these alleged actions led to a critical loss of experienced prosecutors in the Ninth Judicial Circuit and endangered public safety and welfare.
Procedural Posture:
- Governor Ron DeSantis issued Executive Order 23-160, suspending Monique Haughton Worrell from the office of State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit.
- Monique Haughton Worrell filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto and a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court of Florida, challenging her suspension.
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Issue:
Does an executive order suspending a state attorney from office satisfy the Florida Constitution's requirements if it alleges neglect of duty and incompetence, supported by specific prosecutorial practices and policies, which bear a reasonable relation to the stated grounds, even if those practices involve aspects of prosecutorial discretion?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes, an executive order suspending a state attorney from office satisfies the Florida Constitution's requirements when it names constitutionally enumerated grounds like "neglect of duty" and "incompetence" and provides factual allegations that bear some reasonable relation to those grounds. The Court’s role in reviewing a governor’s suspension order is narrow and deferential. The Court only determines whether the governor has specified grounds applicable under Article IV, Section 7, and whether the factual allegations in the suspension order bear some reasonable relation to the asserted basis for the suspension. This review does not extend to examining or determining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the facts, as that is the function of the Florida Senate. "Neglect of duty" means the failure of a public officer to perform a duty laid by law, irrespective of intent. "Incompetency" refers to any quality whose lack incapacitates one from office, arising from gross ignorance or carelessness in duties. The Executive Order against Worrell named "neglect of duty" and "incompetence" and provided various factual allegations, such as allowing violent offenders and others to evade warranted incarceration, failing to obtain mandatory minimum sentences or sentencing enhancements, limiting charges in child pornography cases, and disregarding statutory limitations on withholding adjudications. The Court found these allegations bore a "reasonable relation" to the charges, which is a "low threshold." The Court rejected Worrell's arguments that the allegations were impermissibly vague or constituted a lawful exercise of prosecutorial discretion, clarifying that a suspension order does not infringe on lawful discretion when it alleges generalized policies leading to categorical enforcement practices rather than case-by-case judgments.
Concurring - Justice Francis
Yes, the petition should be denied, as the Court's decision correctly denies Ms. Worrell’s petition. Justice Francis concurred in the result but separately advocated for reconsidering the manner of reviewing suspension cases. He argued for stricter adherence to the constitutional text and consideration of the political question doctrine. He believes the current practice of reviewing suspension orders for whether they "reasonably relate" to enumerated grounds improperly expands judicial authority, particularly regarding writs of quo warranto, which historically addressed the existence of authority rather than its proper exercise. This expansion, he contended, encroaches upon the Florida Constitution's commitment of suspension review power to the Senate, leading to an undue expansion of judicial power.
Dissenting - Justice Labarga
No, the executive order is insufficient because its allegations do not provide Monique Haughton Worrell with sufficient notice to mount a meaningful defense. Justice Labarga recognized the Governor's immense authority to suspend elected officials but emphasized that this power must be balanced with the need for clear justification and sufficient notice to the suspended official. He highlighted a "glaring disparity" in due process between officials subject to impeachment (who receive investigatory procedures) and those subject to suspension. Given that a suspension overrides the will of the voters, the executive order, acting as a charging document, must allege "specific, detailed facts" supporting the grounds for suspension, not merely general or conclusory allegations. He argued that the allegations against Worrell were too general, particularly considering the complex, multifaceted role of a state attorney, who must exercise broad prosecutorial discretion to respond to the diverse needs of their circuit and make difficult decisions about individual cases. He concluded that if this suspension stands, any state attorney making similar regular case disposition decisions based on their circuit's specific challenges could face suspension, undermining the public's right to elect their officials.
Analysis:
This case reaffirms the Florida Supreme Court's limited and deferential role in reviewing a governor's suspension of a state officer, emphasizing that courts will not delve into the sufficiency of the evidence. It highlights the significant constitutional power of the Governor to override the will of voters in suspending elected officials for "neglect of duty" or "incompetence," provided the executive order articulates grounds and reasonably related facts. The decision signals that broad prosecutorial discretion may be subject to gubernatorial review if it manifests as categorical policies rather than case-by-case judgments. Future cases will likely continue to test the "low threshold" of "reasonable relation" and the boundaries of permissible prosecutorial policy versus unconstitutional neglect, particularly for locally elected officials whose duties often require responsive and varied approaches across diverse judicial circuits.
